

Table 4. Results for Women Aged 28-30

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV
Second Stage					
Married	-0.378*** (0.009)	-0.747*** (0.235)	-0.721*** (0.188)	-0.733*** (0.188)	-0.747*** (0.238)
Relative Age	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)			
Monthly Age					0.012 (0.294)
Monthly Age Squared					-0.000 (0.005)
First Stage: IVs					
January		-0.067*** (0.018)	-0.064*** (0.015)		-0.067*** (0.018)
February		-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.057*** (0.016)		-0.059*** (0.019)
January or February				-0.061*** (0.012)	
F statistic		9.55	13.71	27.25	9.33
Hansen J statistic		0.84	0.81		0.84
[p-value]		[0.36]	[0.37]		[0.36]
LIML		-0.760*** (0.245)	-0.729*** (0.192)		-0.760*** (0.248)
Observations	103,438	103,438	103,438	103,438	103,438
Adjusted R-squared	0.144	0.043	0.057	0.051	0.043

Notes: The dependent variable is LFP. Columns represent separate regressions. Robust standard errors, adjusted by clustering for individual identifier, are presented in parentheses. LIML represents the limited information maximum likelihood estimator. ***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.

Figure 7.A. Monthly Age Profile of Marriage Probability by Birth Month




Figure 7.B. Monthly Age Profile of LFP by Birth Month




Table 5. Results for Older Women Aged 28-30, High School Graduates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV
Second Stage					
Married	-0.393*** (0.014)	-0.706** (0.318)	-0.781*** (0.204)	-0.770*** (0.204)	-0.700** (0.329)
Relative Age	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)			
Monthly Age					-0.106 (0.469)
Monthly Age Squared					0.002 (0.008)
First Stage: IVs					
January		-0.063*** (0.024)	-0.077*** (0.021)		-0.061*** (0.024)
February		-0.073*** (0.025)	-0.088*** (0.022)		-0.071*** (0.025)
January or February				-0.082*** (0.016)	
F statistic		6.02	13.83	27.55	5.64
Hansen J statistic		0.47	0.46		0.47
[p-value]		[0.49]	[0.50]		[0.49]
LIML		-0.716** (0.329)	-0.786*** (0.207)		-0.710** (0.341)
Observations	49,156	49,156	49,156	49,156	49,156
Adjusted R-squared	0.100	0.040	0.009	0.014	0.043

Notes: The dependent variable is LFP. Columns represent separate regressions. Robust standard errors, adjusted by clustering for individual identifier, are presented in parentheses. LIML represents the limited information maximum likelihood estimator. ***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.

Table 6. Results for Older Women Aged 28-30, College Graduates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV
Second Stage					
Married	-0.369*** (0.011)	-0.766** (0.298)	-0.638** (0.305)	-0.703** (0.328)	-0.770** (0.300)
Relative Age	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)			
Monthly Age					0.125 (0.399)
Monthly Age Squared					-0.002 (0.007)
First Stage: IVs					
January		-0.079*** (0.026)	-0.061*** (0.022)		-0.079*** (0.026)
February		-0.053* (0.027)	-0.032 (0.023)		-0.053* (0.027)
January or February				-0.047*** (0.017)	
F statistic		5.32	4.35	7.74	5.27
Hansen J statistic		0.60	0.41		0.61
[p-value]		[0.44]	[0.52]		[0.43]
LIML		-0.785** (0.315)	-0.647** (0.317)		-0.790** (0.317)
Observations	54282	54282	54282	54282	54282
Adjusted R-squared	0.149	0.007	0.084	0.048	0.004

Notes: The dependent variable is LFP. Columns represent separate regressions. Robust standard errors, adjusted by clustering for individual identifier, are presented in parentheses. LIML represents the limited information maximum likelihood estimator. ***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.

Figure 8.A. Monthly Age Profile of Marriage Probability by Birth Month





Figure 8.B. Monthly Age Profile of LFP by Birth Month



Transition to Parent-Child Coresidence: Parental Needs and the Strategic Bequest Motive¹

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Abstract

The strategic bequest motive implies that children may want to live with their parents and provide care for them with the expectation of inheriting a larger portion of their bequest. This paper examines this hypothesis by focusing on the *transition* to coresidence by elderly Japanese parents and their children using underutilized Japanese panel data. Unlike previous studies, evidence for the bequest motive is generally tenuous. In addition, our use of a two-component mixture logit model identifies the minority group of families that follows the bequest motive and the majority group that does not.

Key words: informal care, intergenerational transfer, bequest motive, living arrangements, coresidence, finite mixture logit, health shock.

¹ We would like to thank the Nihon University Center for Information Networking for the use of the Nihon University Japanese Longitudinal Study of Aging data.

1. Introduction

In aging societies, the need for long-term elderly care is increasing at an unprecedented rate. Despite high opportunity costs of providing informal care, informal filial care remains an important source of old-age support. According to the OECD (2005), children provide 41% of all informal care provided in the U.S., 43% in the U.K., and 60% in Japan.²

In addition to altruism and “norms”, the economic literature offers many other selfish reasons for the provision of informal care. The strategic bequest motive (Bernheim et al., 1985), among others, suggests that a child may want to live with his or her parent(s) and provide care for them with the expectation of inheriting a larger portion of their bequest. The empirical significance of this hypothesis has considerable policy implications for the public support for frail or disabled elders and their families. Previous studies regarding the bequest motive have had mixed results. While previous findings based on Japanese data are largely consistent with the bequest motive (Horioka, 2002; Kohara and Ohtake, 2006; Yamada, 2006; Kureishi and Wakabayashi, 2009), recent studies based on U.S. data have found evidence against the hypothesis (Sloan et al., 1997; Perozek, 1998; Pezzin and Schone, 1999; Sloan et al., 2002; Brown, 2007).

² The definitions could vary across countries. The figures for the U.S., U.K., and Japan are based on data from 1994, 2000, and 2001, respectively.

In this paper, we reexamine the empirical relevance of the bequest motive in the context of informal care by focusing on parent-child coresidence in Japan. We focus on intergenerational coresidence, because it appears to be the most comprehensive form of informal filial care and support for elderly parents with a long-term commitment. In Japan, informal filial care overlaps closely with parent-child coresidence. For elderly Japanese receiving any nursing care, the most common primary caregiver is a coresident child or a coresident child's spouse (32%); only 11% are cared for by non-coresident family members (The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2008). This paper capitalizes on this salient role of parent-child coresidence in Japan.

Using the Nihon University Japanese Longitudinal Study of Aging (NUJLSOA hereafter), we investigate determinants of the *transition* to coresidence by elderly Japanese parents and their children. We apply binary choice models, in which the dependent variable is whether an elderly parent without resident children begins coresidence with an adult child by the next observation point.

This study advances the existing literature in three ways. First, we study transition. Most existing economic studies that examine motives for intergenerational coresidence rely on the static approach (Yamada, 2006; Wakabayashi and Horioka, 2006). Existing studies on the dynamics of living arrangements are primarily demographical and sociological research and do not examine economic hypotheses regarding motives (Brown et al., 2002; Hays et al., 2003;

Dostie and Léger, 2005; Takagi et al., 2007). The focus on transition helps us fill this gap by offering two significant advantages. Transition analysis provides a clearer interpretation of causality than cross-section analysis. For example, an observed association between coresidence and parental ill health may be explained by the effect of coresidence on health.³ Furthermore, transition analysis provides a clearer framework to study the consequence of the heightened needs of elderly parents. Unlike the static framework, transition analysis allows us to exclude life-long coresidence where a child has never left the parental home and focus on new coresidence where a parent living independently initiates coresidence with an adult child. These two types of intergenerational coresidence could arise from different motives. Takagi et al. (2007) point out that traditional life-long coresidence is primarily a value-driven, rather than a needs-driven, arrangement.

Second, we explicitly address family heterogeneity, which has been overlooked in the existing literature. Different families may have different motives. Permitting heterogeneity offers a more precise microscopic overview of family decisions. To account for family heterogeneity, we estimate a Heckman and Singer (1984) type binary logit model with finite mixture components. This model also alleviates downward bias caused by unobserved family-specific

³ Several studies report that living arrangements influence the health of the elderly, suggesting that a reverse causal effect could exist (e.g., Sarwari et al., 1998 and Michael et al., 2001).

heterogeneity. In addition, we estimate the model separately for fathers and mothers to account for gender differences.

Third, the richness of the NUJLSOA allows us to explore various causal effects and motives. The data contains detailed information on elderly parents and their coresident and non-coresident children. To examine the bequest motive, we utilize information on the views of parents and their plans regarding bequest. The panel structure of the data provides sufficient observations for transition analysis with a large number of covariates. This study is the first to examine various motives and determinants of intergenerational coresidence comprehensively with careful treatment of causality.

Our main findings are as follows. First, the transition to parent-child coresidence is often associated with parental ill health, confirming that coresidence is motivated by parental care needs. Second, unlike previous studies on Japan, the evidence for the bequest motive is generally tenuous. Variables that can test the bequest motive directly are mostly insignificant, even after accounting for possible downward bias due to unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, all significant results that appear consistent with the bequest motive, including the effect of parental house-ownership on coresidence, have alternative explanations. Third, Japanese families exhibit noticeable heterogeneity. The mixed component logit model identifies the minority group of families exhibiting behavior that is consistent with the strategic bequest motive and the majority

group exhibiting behavior that contradicts the hypothesis. The results also reveal significant gender differences.

2. Motives for Coresidence and Related Literature

2.1. Evidence from Surveys

Table 1: Parental Reasons for Living with Their Children

Reasons (Multiple answer)	Male	Female
1. To financially support my child	13.12%	5.83%
2. To receive financial support from my child	13.01%	11.03%
3. To help with housework	5.46%	6.69%
4. To help raise grandchildren	8.61%	6.00%
5. To have my child take care of me	18.57%	23.04%
6. It's what my child wants	22.70%	20.14%
7. It's what I want	18.17%	9.67%
8. Because I want to be there for my child	5.10%	2.78%
9. Being with my child supports me mentally	11.72%	16.46%
10. I can receive advice from my child	7.22%	3.31%
11. I can give my child advice	9.70%	8.90%
12. My spouse passed away	1.26%	11.08%
13. My child are not independent yet	6.08%	4.01%
14. My child are not married	19.22%	14.13%
15. I can provide a house for my child	14.62%	13.50%
16. I have newly built house	3.55%	5.54%
17. Other reasons	20.44%	17.80%
Number of observations	125	186

Note: From the NUJLSOA data (Waves 1 to 4), weighted by sampling weights. Respondents are those who began coresidence with a child within the last two years.

The NUJLSOA asks elderly parents who began coresidence with a child within the last two years reasons for the coresidence. The result is reported in Table 1 and shows us that the reasons vary widely, including parental altruism, parental needs, and reasons that are difficult to interpret. This table is suggestive, but many questions remain regarding why parents and children “want” to live together and why some parents live without their children. This study explores these questions.

2.2. Hypotheses on Coresidence and Informal Care in the Literature

2.2.1. Strategic Bequest Model

In the strategic bequest model proposed by Bernheim et al. (1985), parents use their bequest as an incentive to exert care and attention from their children. Consistent with the hypothesis, Bernheim et al. (1985) find a positive and significant relationship between the bequeathable wealth of parents and the attention received from their children. However, recent studies using data from the U.S. have consistently found evidence against the strategic bequest motive. Perozek (1998) and Brown (2007) both find that parental assets do not affect the provision of informal care by children. Likewise, the socio-economic status of parents is negatively associated with time-transfer from children (Pezzin and Schone, 1999; Sloan et al., 2002) and with coresidence with children (Hotz et al., 2008).

In contrast, empirical findings based on Japanese data are largely consistent with the strategic bequest hypothesis. These findings can be categorized into three groups. First, parental views on bequest and the actual division of bequests show greater consistency with the bequest motive in Japan than in the U.S. (Horioka, 2002). Second, parental house-ownership and house size are positively related to intergenerational coresidence (Kim, 2004; Takagi et al., 2007).⁴

⁴ Wakabayashi and Horioka (2006) find the effect of home-ownership on coresidence to be insignificant.

However, we know of no studies that examine the effect of parental assets other than houses on informal care and coresidence in Japan. Regarding the effect of parental income and education on coresidence and informal care in Japan, previous studies have mixed results (Kim, 2004; Kohara and Ohtake, 2006; Wakabayashi and Horioka, 2006; Takagi et al., 2007). Third, inheritance expectation is positively related to coresidence and coresidence intention in Japan (Yamada, 2006; Kureishi and Wakabayashi, 2009). Murakami (2006), however, finds that coresidence raises the inheritance expectations of the children. The positive correlation between inheritance expectation and coresidence could also arise from unobserved heterogeneity in the degree of mutual child-parent altruism and the availability of other children.⁵

The strategic bequest motive does not apply to parents having only one child because they cannot credibly threaten the child with disinheritance (Bernheim et al., 1985). Previous studies find that having more children increases the probability of coresidence in Japan and the U.S. (Brown et al., 2002; Hays et al., 2003; Dostie and Léger, 2005; Takagi et al., 2007; Hotz et al., 2008). This is consistent with the bequest motive, although it allows for other explanations.

2.2.2. Other Hypothesized Motives

Other Exchange Motives: Inter Vivos Transfers and Grandparenting The exchange motive

⁵ Yamada (2006) has no information on the presence of siblings. Kureishi and Wakabayashi (2009) control for the number of children, but not their circumstances such as marital status.

first proposed by Cox (1987) is a broader notion, meaning that parents and children exchange time-related services and money or goods. Whereas the bequest motive predicts financial transfers at the death of parents, the exchange motive may lead to inter vivos transfers. Henretta et al. (1997) find that, in the U.S., past inter vivos transfers from parents are a strong predictor of future informal filial care. Similarly, Tabuchi (2008) finds that parental financial assistance for the house purchase of a child is positively associated with geographical proximity between the parents and children in Japan. In addition, parents might reward children by providing childcare for grandchildren (Wolff, 2001; Kim, 2004; Yamada, 2006).

Demonstration Effect Cox and Stark (1995) present a model in which the amount of care and attention children provide to parents affects the amount of future intergenerational transfers received from their own children. Thus, their model predicts that the presence of grandchildren has positive effects on transfers from children to parents. Wolff (2001) finds that whereas individuals with small children are more likely to visit their parents in France, those with older children are not. Wolff (2001) concludes that the motivations of the children are to receive childcare assistance from their parents, rather than providing a future role model.

Dynasty Model The dynasty model by Chu (1991) assumes that the objective of the parents is to perpetuate the family line. This model predicts that one child inherits the family line together with the family house and/or business, receives a bequest from the parents, and lives with the

parents. Consistent with this hypothesis, the eldest son in Japan is more likely to live with his parents than are the other children (Wakabayashi and Horioka, 2006).

Pure Altruism Testing for filial pure altruism is generally not straightforward because evidence against one selfish hypothesis (such as the strategic bequest motive) can be obscured by other selfish motives and alternative hypotheses (such as social norms and family traditions). Nevertheless, the literature regards the negative effects of parental economic strength on time transfers from children as a supporting evidence for pure altruism (Pezzin and Schone, 1999; Sloan et al., 2002; Hotz et al., 2008). Another supporting finding is the positive relationship between parental cognitive problems and the provision of nursing care by the children (Sloan et al., 1997).

2.2.3. Other Determinants of Living Arrangements

There are determinants other than motives that affect the utility gain and cost of coresidence and informal care, such as relocation costs, severity of disability, and access to formal care. Jellal and Wolff (2002) discuss intergenerational cultural transmission, suggesting that parental behavior might affect the children's utility function.

2.3. Existing Studies on Transitions in Living Arrangements

The vast majority of aforementioned studies that explore the motives for informal care and

coresidence are based on cross-sectional analyses.⁶ On the other hand, previous studies that examine transitions in living arrangements based on panel data focus on identifying predictors of transitions rather than on testing economic hypotheses regarding motives. These studies indicate that factors such as ill-health, disabilities, widowhood, and having unmarried children are all positively associated with the transition to coresidence with children (Mickus et al., 1997; Brown et al., 2002; Hays et al., 2003; Dostie and Léger, 2005; Wakabayashi and Horioka, 2006; Hotz et al., 2008). Takagi et al. (2007) find that Japanese elderly parents with functional disabilities are more likely to be in newly-resumed (or “boomerang”) coresidence than in independent-living or in life-long coresidence.

3. Data

The data is derived from the NUJLSOA, a nationally representative survey of the population aged 65 and over.⁷ The four waves of the survey were conducted in 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2006. The first wave sampled 4,997 individuals and the sample response rate was 74.6%. The second and third waves sampled additional cohorts of 65 and 66 years old.

⁶ A notable exception is Brown (2007), who uses a dynamic structural model.

⁷ To collect data from a sufficient number of respondents aged 75 years and older, this population was oversampled by a factor of 2 in the first wave. For the details of the NUJLSOA, see <http://www.usc.edu/dept/gero/CBPH/nujlsOA/>.

Table 2 provides background information on the prevalence of different types of living arrangements of the Japanese elderly. Living with a child is most common, with about 50% of elderly Japanese living with a child. The second most common living arrangement is living with a spouse only. Over time, a steadily-declining share of elderly parents live with a child, and an increasing share of elderly parents live either alone or with a spouse only. Mothers are more likely to live without a spouse, probably due to their longer life expectancy and their tendency to marry older men.

Table 2: Living Arrangements across Socio-Demographic Groups

Wave 1 (1999)	All	Parents	Fathers	Mothers	Married	Widowed	Work
Living alone	12.0%	9.8%	4.5%	14.1%	0.2%	26.8%	8.0%
Spouse only	31.5%	31.0%	42.4%	22.0%	47.5%	0%	32.9%
Spouse & child	29.0%	31.2%	41.4%	23.0%	47.7%	0%	41.1%
Spouse & others	2.8%	2.7%	4.0%	1.7%	4.2%	0%	3.4%
Single & child	21.6%	23.2%	7.2%	36.0%	0.4%	67.7%	13.7%
Single & others	3.2%	2.1%	0.6%	3.2%	0.1%	5.6%	1.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Wave 4 (2006)	All	Parents	Fathers	Mothers	Married	Widowed	Work
Living alone	14.8%	12.6%	6.4%	17.9%	0.6%	33.9%	7.6%
Spouse only	35.2%	34.9%	44.9%	26.4%	53.3%	0%	35.7%
Spouse & child	26.3%	27.9%	37.7%	19.6%	42.6%	0%	40.9%
Spouse & others	1.9%	2.0%	2.8%	1.4%	3.1%	0%	1.5%
Single & child	19.3%	20.5%	7.3%	31.6%	0.3%	60.2%	13.9%
Single & others	2.6%	2.1%	1.00%	3.1%	0.1%	6.0%	0.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Note: Data from the NUJLSOA, weighted using sampling weights. Except for the first column titled “all”, the figures are based on individuals with at least one surviving child. Parents classified as “living with a child” may also live with other family members. “Others” include anyone other than the parent’s own child and spouse.

Table 3 shows the transition in living arrangements between waves. The large diagonal

entries clarify that living arrangements of the elderly appear to be largely stable.⁸ For both singles and couples, living with a child is associated with higher probabilities of transition to death than transition to living without a child. This observation highlights the important role of children in the provision of informal care to sick or disabled elderly parents. From the states “living alone” and “spouse only”, the most common transitional change other than death is to initiate living with a child by the next wave. The elderly parents living with “others” (i.e., individuals other than the spouse and children) are less likely to begin living with a child by the next wave, suggesting that there is no available or willing child to live with. Among the different types of living arrangements, living with others is relatively unstable. This pattern indicates the differing nature of parent-child and parent-others interactions, with the latter being relatively provisional and unstructured.

The population of interest in this study is elderly individuals aged 65 years and older with at least one surviving child. We use three comparison periods: 1999/2001, 2001/2003, and 2003/2006. The unit of observation consists of an elderly parent who completed two consecutive surveys. The elderly parent must have at least one surviving child in both surveys. The definition of a child includes biological, step, and adopted children, but not children-in-law. Furthermore,

⁸ The living arrangements during the period between 2003 and 2006 are less stable because this period is a 3-year interval.

because our focus is on the transition to coresidence, we require that an elderly parent does not live with any child in the base year. We also restrict the sample to elderly parents who have no surviving parent throughout the period to avoid the complications added when elderly parents are also in the position of a “child.” However, this is rare. We exclude observations of those in a jail or hospital at any time during the period, or in a nursing home during the base year. Those with data issues such as critical missing values and inconsistent answers and those labeled by interviewers as “unreliable” respondents are also excluded. Our final sample consists of 1,944 elderly father-periods and 1,902 elderly mother-periods.

Table 3: Changes in the Living Arrangements of Elderly Parents

1999	Living alone	Spouse only	Spouse & child	Spouse & others	Single & child	Single & others	
2001	Living alone	83.85%	3.04%	0.27%	4.58%	3.61%	21.90%
	Spouse only	1.01%	84.30%	6.36%	27.62%	0.38%	0.00%
	Spouse & child	0.00%	5.27%	80.46%	15.67%	0.31%	0.00%
	Spouse & others	0.00%	0.95%	1.75%	38.06%	0.07%	0.00%
	Single & child	9.38%	0.75%	5.75%	2.59%	84.09%	11.69%
	Single & others	1.25%	0.00%	0.05%	0.60%	4.16%	40.07%
	Death	4.51%	5.68%	5.37%	10.89%	7.39%	26.33%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
2001	Living alone	Spouse only	Spouse & child	Spouse & others	Single & child	Single & others	
2003	Living alone	86.46%	4.30%	0.37%	0.68%	3.25%	14.74%
	Spouse only	1.20%	87.41%	7.88%	25.34%	0.00%	0.00%
	Spouse & child	0.00%	3.53%	80.68%	16.47%	0.49%	0.00%
	Spouse & others	0.00%	0.69%	1.71%	41.87%	0.00%	0.00%
	Single & child	5.19%	0.16%	4.87%	0.85%	84.03%	12.67%
	Single & others	2.18%	0.06%	0.00%	3.37%	4.51%	40.34%
	Death	4.97%	3.86%	4.49%	11.42%	7.72%	32.25%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
2003	Living alone	Spouse only	Spouse & child	Spouse & others	Single & child	Single & others	
2006	Living alone	81.14%	5.43%	0.30%	1.42%	4.75%	18.13%
	Spouse only	0.43%	81.20%	8.90%	30.66%	0.18%	0.00%
	Spouse & child	0.36%	4.90%	77.91%	9.38%	0.52%	0.00%
	Spouse & others	0.00%	1.08%	1.78%	40.77%	0.00%	0.00%
	Single & child	8.38%	1.01%	3.82%	0.00%	77.52%	16.16%

Single & others	1.22%	0.18%	0.22%	1.51%	4.68%	28.33%
Death	8.46%	6.18%	7.07%	16.27%	12.34%	37.37%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Note: Data from the NUJLSOA, weighted using sampling weights. The population studied is elderly parents with at least one surviving child in the base year. “Others” include anyone other than the parent’s own child and spouse.

Dependent Variable The dependent variable is a binary variable for the transition of an elderly parent to coresidence with a child during a particular comparison period. Table 4 reports the sample size and frequency of the transition in the three periods. Between 1999 and 2006, 115 (5.9%) of father observations (5.9%) and 150 mother observations (7.9%) began coresidence. Of the parents who began coresidence, about 90% accommodated the child who moved into their house; the remaining parents moved geographically.⁹

Table 4: The Number of Observations Used in the Analysis

Year	Male			Female		
	Total	Not coresided	Male Began coresidence	Total	Not coresided	Female Began coresidence
1999 – 2001	685	637 (93.0%)	48 (7.0%)	651	599 (92.0%)	52 (8.0%)
2001 – 2003	644	617 (95.8%)	27 (4.2%)	643	605 (94.1%)	38 (5.9%)
2003 – 2006	615	575 (93.5%)	40 (6.5%)	608	548 (90.1%)	60 (9.9%)
Total	1,944	1,829 (94.1%)	115 (5.9%)	1,902	1,752 (92.1%)	150 (7.9%)

Explanatory Variables This study exploits a large set of explanatory variables consisting of parent and child characteristics, inheritance history, informal care experience, and personal attitudes about social norms and values. The variables are defined in Table 5. Appendix A

⁹ This figure may be biased if the recontact rate is significantly lower for those who moved. However, even using our most conservative estimates, the vast majority of parents (75-80%) did not move and accommodated children.