inherent taste for marriage. It could also be the case that men become more selective when the female unemployment rate is high for some reason and choose not to marry women who remain unmarried because men believe these women are negatively selected. I cannot rule out such possibilities, however, the crowding out effect is at least one of the possible explanations for the negative effect of the female unemployment rate on marriage incidence for older women.

7 Concluding Remarks

The increase in marriage incidence due to relatively worse female labor market conditions is driven by the acceleration of marriage timing by women in their teens and early twenties. Marrying younger in response to labor market conditions does not increase the probability of future divorce. Moreover, this increased marriage incidence at the teens and early twenties does not increase the fraction of women who will ever marry in the long run. That is, the response of the marriage rate of young women to gender-specific unemployment rates is a timing effect for those who would marry anyway, rather than a permanent increase in the number of women who ever marry. Furthermore, despite the significant effects on marriage incidence, gender-specific labor market conditions in youth do not significantly affect the fertility and labor market outcomes observed in the mid-thirties, except for a subtle change in weeks worked.

These results cast doubt on the view that further improvement of women's status in the labor market will lead to a further decline in the marriage rate. It is true that women delay marriage to exploit better labor market opportunities and that this lowers the marriage rate in the population. However, women who would marry eventually do marry anyway, and there seems to be no effects on marriage stability. Moreover, a decrease in marriage incidence due to labor market fluctuations does not lead to an increase in single parenthood or a decline in fertility, in contrast to the prevailing view that changes in marriage incidence imply changes in the number of women who ever enter stable marriage.

Yet, it must be kept in mind that this paper has estimated the effects of temporary fluctuations in gender specific labor market conditions, which, by definition, do not affect permanent income or long-run labor market prospects. Permanent shifts in labor market prospects of women may

change the perceived value of marriage in the long run, although it is difficult to distinguish such permanent shifts from other changes in trends. Nonetheless, this study provides at least some evidence that the response of contemporaneous marriage incidence is basically an inter-temporal substitution behavior by showing the absence of the long-run effects.

A Data Appendix

A.1 SIPP

Wave 2 of the SIPP contains retrospective information of marriage history of up to three marriages, the dates of birth of the first and last children and limited migration history, as well as basic demographic information as of the date of survey. I format the dataset as if it were a set of panel surveys interviewed on January 1st every year since 1978. When I estimate the effects of contemporaneous unemployment rates (e.g. Table 3), the dependent variable is defined as the probability of getting married during the year when the woman becomes age x.

Variables in the SIPP Core Panels are collected either on a monthly basis or once in each wave. The dataset is collapsed to an annual basis by taking either the value at January or the average over the year of each variable and merged with the variables from the Wave 2 Topical Modules. Consequently, the sample is restricted to those who were present in the household at both the Wave 2 interview and the first interview in the corresponding calendar year. Since some variables (e.g. spouse's age, the number of children, employment status) are available only from the Core Panel data, I have to restrict the sample for analysis using such variables accordingly. Table A1 shows summary statistics for each subsample.

The Migration History Topical Module includes information on: the state of residence on the date of survey; the year and month when the respondents moved to this state; the state of previous residence (if there is any), which can be the same state as the current residence; the year and month when the respondents moved into current and previous residences; and the state or country of birth. Thus, the state of residence can be retrieved back to the earlier of the dates moving to the current state or moving to the previous residence. I also assume that those whose state of the previous residence is the same as the state of birth had lived in that state since their birth until

they moved to the state of current residence. Table A2 shows the fraction of the observations in the base sample whose state of residence in the year is identified. The state of residence at marriage is determined for 75.7 percent (77.9 percent for still in the first marriage, 69.2 percent for divorced) of all first marriages in the sample.

A.2 PSID

Extracting marriage history from the PSID is tricky because for most couples, one of the spouses had not been included in the survey until they married. Also, although the PSID tries to follow every member of the households interviewed in the previous year, many people (especially those who joined in the sample at their marriage) disappear when they divorce. Therefore, for the marriage hazard regression (Table 3), I restricted the sample to women who were in the original sample in 1968 and their daughters so that newly joined cohabiting partners are not included in the sample.

For the analysis of the effects of gender-specific unemployment rates at marriage on spouse's characteristics (Table 5) and the number of children (Table7), the dataset is constructed in the following way:

1. Extract all first marriages of women in Marriage History File 1985-2005.

2. Merge it with men in the same file, and fill the dates of marriage and divorce missing from wives' records with their husbands'. This mitigates the attrition due to divorce to some extent. Now the sample size is equal to the number of marriages.

3. Merge the extracted marriage history data with a longitudinal file of all women from the main PSID, which includes all non interviews, and then merge it with a longitudinal file of all men, which also includes all non interviews.

This yields a panel dataset of married couples containing all available information of both wives and husbands.

The year of birth, the years of schooling and the number of children are taken from Individual Data File 1968-2005. Religion is taken from Main Family Data files 1985-2005 and available only

for household heads and their wives. Since both no religion and no answer seemed to be coded as "0", I assume the respondent has no religion if he/she has answered 0 for all interviews, and replace the others with the non-zero answers by the same person in other years. To make the coding consistent over time, religions are recoded for all years as follows: no religion, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist/African Methodist, Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Protestant unspecified, Greek/Russian/Eastern orthodox, and other religions. While most people do not change their religion, for those who have changed religion since marriage, the religion in the next year of marriage is used to define the variable "same religion".

Race is available only for respondents who have been a head or a wife of an interviewed household at some point in 1968-2005 or children of mothers included in Fertility History File 1985-2005. For those whose race is not determined directly, if they are born to a family whose head and wife are of the same race, I assume they are also of the same race.

B Robustness Checks

B.1 Instrumenting for Unemployment Rates

Following Bartik (1991) and Blanchard and Katz (1992), I constructed instruments for state unemployment rates by gender by taking weighted average of nation-wide unemployment rates by industry-occupation cells using the industry-occupation composition of each state and gender as the weights. I use industry-occupation specific unemployment rates instead of log employment changes used by Bartik (1991) and Blanchard and Katz (1992), because log employment changes might pick up differences in changes in marriage and labor supply decisions of women with different skill levels, which might produce a persistent but not permanent effect on the marriage rate in each state. Another important difference from Bartik (1991) and Blanchard and Katz (1992) is that weights are fixed over the entire period, rather than based on the industry-occupation composition in the previous year.

28 industry-occupation cells are defined as follows. First, based on the one-digit occupation code in the CPS, I split all jobs into two groups: white collar (WC), and blue collar, service and farmers (BC). Next, I recode the major industry code so that the coding is consistent over time

and each industry has a large enough sample size: agriculture/forestry/fishery, mining, construction, manufacturing-durable, manufacturing-nondurable, transportation/communication/utility, wholesale trade, retail trade, finance, personal service (including private household), business and repair service, entertainment service, hospitals and other medical service, educational service, other service, and public sector. Then, I split each industry into BC and WC, except for the following four industries whose sample size of BC or WC is too small: agriculture/forestry/fishery, mining, finance, and entertainment service.

The ideal instruments for gender-specific state unemployment rates should affect labor demand for men and for women differently and be independent from marriage behaviors of the population. Also, they must vary across states over years so that state- and year- fixed effects can be controlled for. As pointed by Blanchard and Katz (1992), the weighted average of industry-occupation specific unemployment rates is a valid instrument for the state unemployment rate if national-level changes in unemployment rates by industry-occupation are not correlated with labor supply shocks in the state. Panel A of Table B1 shows that the first stage correlation is strong enough even after controlling for state- and year- fixed effects. However, Panel B shows that much of the variation in the instruments is absorbed by these fixed effects. Therefore, we should keep in mind that small noises might affect the IV estimates substantially.

To make the estimation feasible, the Cox's proportional hazard model in equation (1) is modified into the following linear probability model:

$$M_{its} = \alpha_{age} u^w_{ts} + \beta_{age}(u^h_{ts} - u^w_{ts}) + age_i + \eta_s + \xi_t + \varepsilon_{its} \tag{7}$$

where age_i and ξ_t are dummy variables for each single year age and calendar year. Panel C of Appendix Table B1 presents the estimated α and β in (7). The first column shows the OLS estimates. The point estimates imply that 1 percentage-point rise in the female unemployment rates increases the marriage hazard for 17-20 years old women by 0.2 percentage point, which is much smaller than the effect estimated by the Cox's proportional hazard model shown in Figure 3. Nevertheless, the signs and the relative size of coefficients of different age categories remain the same. The second column reports the 2SLS estimators. The point estimates are in the range

between the effects estimated by the OLS and by the Cox hazard model.

B.2 The Effects by Age at Marriage

Since the effects of contemporaneous unemployment rates by gender on the marriage hazard vary with women's age, the effects of unemployment rates at marriage could also vary with women's age at marriage. Thus, I allow the coefficients of unemployment rates at marriage to vary with the age at marriage in the same way as in Table 4B. Appendix Table B2 presents the effects on spouses' characteristics. The results are noisy but similar to Table 5. Appendix Table B3 shows the effects on the number of children. It confirms that the effects are insignificant, as shown in Table 7.

B.3 Legal Institutions

Benefits from being legally married such as spousal benefits from employers or health insurance coverage may have different importance for women of different ages. If so, the availability of such benefits could change the effects of gender-specific unemployment rates on marriage incidence. Since it is hard to obtain individual-level information on this, I use indicators of state laws that give benefits to legally married wives as proxies for differences between legal marriage and cohabitation. Specifically, I use the following two indicators. One is whether the state's marital-property law follows the common law rule, under which the distribution of property upon divorce is directed toward husbands.[32] Since the financial gain from having a high earning spouse is lower in such states, worse female labor market conditions should have less positive effects on marriage incidence in states with the common law property right rule. The other indicator is whether the state of residence recognizes common law marriages; in the states where the common law marriages are recognized, financial benefits from legal marriage are supposed to be smaller than in other states, therefore the coefficients of gender-specific unemployment rates will be closer to zero.[33]

[32] The classification is based on Gray (1998). States with the common law property rule are Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.

[33] States that recognize the common law marriages are the following: Alabama, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia (until 1/1/97), Idaho (until 1/1/96), Iowa, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire (for inheritance purposes

Appendix Table B4 presents the estimated coefficients of gender-specific unemployment rates in equation (1). The difference in the rule on the property division at divorce makes no difference in the effects of labor market conditions on marriage incidence. Moreover, contrary to expectations, the coefficient of the female unemployment rate is more negative for older women in the states where common law marriages are recognized. Therefore, the differential benefits from being legally married do not seem to be able to explain why the effects of unemployment rates on marriage incidence vary with women's age.

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Table 1 Summary Statistics

Non-Hispanic white women who had not married until age 16 or 1978

		(A) SIPP	(B) PSID
Year of birth:	mean	1965.4	1967.3
	min	1956	1956
	max	1980	1980
Year of 1st marriage:	mean	1986.0	1989.1
	min	1978	1978
	max	2001	2005
Average age at first marriage		22.4	23.0
Average age at birth of 1st child		23.4	23.5
Sample size (persons)		52,217	3,698
% by schooling	Dropouts	9.2%	9.2%
	High school	30.5%	34.6%
	Some college	35.1%	28.0%
	College	25.3%	28.2%

Note: The statistics of the first marriage are based on those who married by the age of 35, and those of birth of the first child are based on those who had a child by their last interview. The SIPP sample is weighted by the sample weights.

Table 2: Summary statistics of gender-specific unemployment rates, non-Hispanic white 15-40 years old, 45 states, 1978-2003.

	Mean	Standard Deviation	p75-p25
Female unemployment rate	6.61	2.12	2.75
residuals	-	1.04	1.27
Male unemployment rate	6.64	2.51	2.93
Male- Female gap	0.03	1.44	1.72
residuals	-	0.97	1.24
Number of observations	1,170		

Note: The residuals are net of the other gender's unemployment rate and year- and state- fixed effects. R2s for the regressions of the female unemployment rate and the male-female gap are 0.76 and 0.55, respectively.

Table 3: Effects of the female unemployment rate and the male-female gap in the unemployment rate on the marriage hazard
(Cox's proportional hazard model)

A. Pooled

	SIPP				
	All women	High school Or less	Some college	BA or more (>=21 yrs old)	PSID
Female unemployment rate	0.048***	0.022	0.029**	0.069***	0.029
	[0.012]	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.027]
Male-female gap in u rates	-0.036***	-0.033**	-0.028**	-0.014	-0.009
	[0.011]	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.015]	[0.028]
Observations	269,621	89,812	94,513	58,249	11,109
Persons	39,949	17,240	14,333	10,135	1,832

B. By age

	SIPP				
	All women	High school or less	Some college	BA or more (>=21 yrs old)	PSID
Female unemployment rate* woman's age					
17-20 years old	0.129***	0.064***	0.115***	--	0.117***
	[0.014]	[0.015]	[0.016]		[0.034]
21-23 years old	0.046***	-0.004	0.020	0.170***	-0.006
	[0.011]	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.028]
24-27 years old	-0.070***	-0.088***	-0.080***	0.017	-0.106***
	[0.014]	[0.020]	[0.016]	[0.012]	[0.031]
28 or older	-0.217***	-0.228***	-0.218***	-0.147***	-0.271***
	[0.030]	[0.037]	[0.029]	[0.026]	[0.044]
Male-female gap* woman's age					
17-20 years old	-0.097***	-0.070***	-0.103***	--	-0.170***
	[0.024]	[0.021]	[0.027]		[0.044]
21-23 years old	-0.011	-0.015	0.029	-0.065***	0.047
	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.019]	[0.025]	[0.038]
24-27 years old	0.038**	0.079***	0.006	0.020	0.127**
	[0.016]	[0.021]	[0.025]	[0.019]	[0.057]
28 or older	-0.007	-0.021	-0.033	0.006	0.198**
	[0.038]	[0.053]	[0.054]	[0.026]	[0.089]
Observations	269,621	89,812	94,513	58,249	11,109
Persons	39,949	17,240	14,333	10,135	1,832

Note: Standard errors in brackets are clustered by the state of residence. The baseline hazard depends on age and is stratified by the year of birth. All columns include controls for state fixed effects.

Table 4: Effects of the past gender-specific unemployment rates on divorce (SIPP)

A. Pooled effects on the probability of divorce within 5 or 10 years (Probit, marginal effects)

Dependent variable:	5-year divorce rate		10-year divorce rate	
Unemployment rates at:	Marriage	Age 18-20	Marriage	Age 18-20
Female unemployment rate	-0.001	0.001	0.005	0.004
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.006]
Male-female gap in unemp. rates	-0.001	0.002	0.001	0.023***
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.005]
Observations	19,997	19,544	13,184	12,155

B. Effects by wife's age at marriage on the probability of divorce within 5 years (Probit, marginal effects)

Dependent variable:	5-year divorce rate		10-year divorce rate	
Unemployment rates at:	Marriage	Age 18-20	Marriage	Age 18-20
Female unemployment rate * wife's age at marriage				
20 years old or younger (α_1)	-0.003	-0.004	0.001	-0.001
	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.007]
21-23 years old (α_2)	0.003	0.003	0.009*	0.01
	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.007]
24-27 years old (α_3)	-0.002	0.001	0.007	-0.001
	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.010]
28 years old or older (α_4)	-0.002	0.009*	0.007	0.018
	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.009]	[0.012]
Male-female gap in unemployment rates * wife's age at marriage				
20 years old or younger (β_1)	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.028***
	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.006]
21-23 years old (β_2)	-0.004	0.001	0.000	0.019***
	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.006]
24-27 years old (β_3)	-0.001	0.007	0.006	0.031***
	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.007]	[0.009]
28 years old or older (β_4)	0.008	-0.001	0.016	0.002
	[0.008]	[0.007]	[0.015]	[0.016]
Observations	19,997	19,544	13,184	12,155
Test stats for $\alpha_1=\alpha_2=\alpha_3=\alpha_4=0$	5.98	10.79	5.64	8.26
(P-value)	(0.201)	(0.029)	(0.228)	(0.082)
Test stats for $\beta_1=\beta_2=\beta_3=\beta_4=0$	4.80	3.69	1.73	24.43
(P-value)	(0.309)	(0.449)	(0.785)	(0.000)

Note: Standard errors in brackets are clustered by the state of residence at marriage/birth. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of X. Controls included in the regressions but omitted from the table are dummy variables for the year of marriage/birth and for the state of marriage/birth. Panel B also includes a dummy variable for the age at marriage (21-23, 24-27, 28-35).

Table 4: Effects of the past gender-specific unemployment rates on divorce (SIPP)

C. Cox's proportional hazard model with contemporaneous unemployment rates

	pooled	by age
Contemporaneous female unemployment rate	-0.013	-0.009
	[0.012]	[0.013]
Contemporaneous male-female gap in unemp. rates	0.004	0.006
	[0.019]	[0.019]
Female unemployment rate at marriage (α_1)	0.019	0.011
	[0.016]	[0.018]
*21-23 years old (α_2)	--	0.033**
		[0.016]
*24-27 years old (α_3)	--	0.012
		[0.023]
*28 years old or older (α_4)	--	-0.003
		[0.034]
Male-female gap in unemp. rates at marriage (β_1)	0.004	0.019
	[0.021]	[0.019]
*21-23 years old (β_2)	--	-0.026
		[0.018]
*24-27 years old (β_3)	--	-0.021
		[0.026]
*28 years old or older (β_4)	--	0.040
		[0.056]
Dummy variable for wife's age at marriage		
21-23 years old	--	-0.835***
		[0.128]
24-27 years old	--	-1.024***
		[0.188]
28 or older	--	-1.094***
		[0.236]
Observations	219,075	219,075
Persons	24,117	24,117
Test stats for $\alpha_1=\alpha_2=\alpha_3=\alpha_4=0$	--	6.65
(P-value)		(0.156)
Test stats for $\beta_1=\beta_2=\beta_3=\beta_4=0$	--	5.04
(P-value)		(0.283)

Note: Standard errors in brackets are clustered by state of residence at marriage. Baseline hazard is depends on years since marriage and is stratified by the year of marriage. Both columns include controls for state-of-marriage fixed effects.

Table 5: Gender specific unemployment rates at marriage and spouses' characteristics
Liner OLS for (1) (2) / Probit (marginal effects) for (3) (4)

A. unemployment rates at marriage

Variables	(1) Husband's age-wife's age		(2) Husband's years of schooling		(3) Same religion	(4) Same race
Dataset	SIPP	PSID	SIPP	PSID	PSID	PSID
Female unemployment rate	-0.107	0.199**	-0.061*	0.049	-0.025*	-0.010*
at marriage	[0.097]	[0.095]	[0.034]	[0.038]	[0.014]	[0.005]
Male-female gap in unemp. rates	-0.071	-0.222***	-0.021	0.008	-0.025	0.007
at marriage	[0.093]	[0.082]	[0.048]	[0.050]	[0.016]	[0.005]
Wife's years of schooling			0.612***	0.562***		
			[0.018]	[0.038]		
Observations	4,192	1,622	4,112	1,498	1,430	1,081

B. Unemployment rates at age 18-20 (SIPP only)

Variables	(1) Husband's age-wife's age	(2) Husband's years of schooling
Female unemployment rate	-0.020	0.010
at marriage	[0.087]	[0.035]
Male-female gap in unemp. rates	-0.075	-0.010
at marriage	[0.124]	[0.059]
Wife's years of schooling		0.600***
		[0.014]
Observations	4,488	4,408

Note: Standard errors in brackets are clustered by the state of residence at marriage for Panel A and the state of birth for Panel B. Controls included in the regressions but omitted from the table are dummy variables for the year of marriage/birth and for the state of marriage/birth.

Table 6: Effects of gender-specific unemployment rates that the cohort faced at fixed ages on the fraction of women who have ever married in the cohort at different ages.
(Birth cohorts 1960-70 in SIPP 2001 and SIPP 2004)

Age	Median age of marriage	22	24	26	28	30	35
Female unemp. rate	-0.263***	0.019***	0.019***	0.015**	0.007	0.007	0.000
at age 18-20	[0.027]	[0.007]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.005]
Male – female u. rate	0.131***	-0.008	-0.012	-0.009	-0.008	0.001	0.000
At age 18-20	[0.035]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.007]
Observations	9,536	486	486	486	486	486	397

Note: The first column is the median regression at the individual level, and the other columns are linear regressions at the cohort level (separate regressions by age) weighted by the sum of SIPP sample weights of all observations in each cell. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by the state of birth. Controls included in the regressions but omitted from the table are dummy variables for the year of birth and for the state of birth.

Table 7: Effects of gender-specific unemployment rates at the time of marriage on the number of children

Sample and dependent variable:	SIPP: the number of children at survey for women who were 35-37 years old at survey		PSID: the number of children at age 35
Unemployment rates at:	Marriage	Age 18-20	Marriage
Female unemployment rate	-0.015	-0.025	0.007
	[0.020]	[0.027]	[0.031]
Male-female gap in unemp. rates	-0.036	0.002	0.023
	[0.024]	[0.039]	[0.039]
Observations	2,806	2,621	946

Note: Standard errors in brackets are clustered by the state of residence at marriage/birth. Controls included in the regressions but omitted from the table are dummy variables for the year of marriage/birth and for the state of marriage/birth.

Table 8: Effects of gender-specific unemployment rates that the cohort faced at fixed ages on the fraction of women who have ever had a child in the cohort at different ages.
(Birth cohorts 1960-70 in SIPP 2001 and SIPP 2004)

	Median age at first births	Have a child by age 25	Have a child by age 30	Have a child by age 35	Have a child before marriage	Ever been a single mother
Female unemp. rate	-0.027	0.002	0.002	0.005	-0.005	0.003
at age 18-20	[0.061]	[0.008]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.007]
Male – female u. rates	0.489***	-0.014	-0.020**	-0.005	0.000	0.001
At age 18-20	[0.080]	[0.010]	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.006]	[0.007]
Observations	9536	486	486	397	486	486

Note: The first column is the median regression at the individual level, and the other columns are linear regressions at the cohort level (separate regressions by age) weighted by the sum of SIPP sample weights of all observations in each cell. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by the state of birth. Controls included in the regressions but omitted from the table are dummy variables for the year of birth and for the state of birth.

Table 9: Effects of gender-specific unemployment rates that a woman faced at age 18-20 on various outcomes observed at age 33-37

A. All women

	Log real personal earnings	Log real household income	Weeks worked last year (% in all weeks)	Full time employment	Pr (ever married)
Female unemp. rate	0.011	-0.005	0.012**	0.008	-0.001
At age 18-20	[0.019]	[0.008]	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.006]
Male – female u. rates	0.021	-0.003	0.002	0.006	0.006
At age 18-20	[0.020]	[0.011]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.007]
Observations	10,160	12,726	12,746	12,746	15,098

B. Women who have married

	Log real personal earnings of the woman	Log real household income	Weeks worked last year (% in all weeks)	Full time employment	Log real personal earnings of the husband
Female unemp. rate	0.012	0.000	0.017**	0.01	-0.012
at age 18-20	[0.022]	[0.008]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.014]
Male – female u. rates	0.025	-0.012	0.003	0.006	-0.018
At age 18-20	[0.020]	[0.013]	[0.009]	[0.008]	[0.016]
Observations	8,877	11,263	11,276	11,276	9,077

Note: Standard errors in brackets are clustered by the state of birth. Controls included in the regressions but omitted from the table are dummy variables for educational backgrounds (high school graduate, some college, BA or more), for current age, for the year of birth and for the state of birth.

Table 10: marriage hazard regressions splitting sample by potentially related factors

Cox's proportional hazard model
(specification identical to Table 3b estimated with different subsamples)

	(1) Baseline (same as Column 1 of Table 3)	(2) Schl>12, age >=21, within 3 yrs since graduation	(3) Not employed fulltime and not enrolled fulltime in the previous year (core panel)	(4) Not having a child	(5) Living in the state of birth
Female unemployment rate* woman's age					
17-20 years old	0.129***	-	0.391***	0.125***	0.065***
	[0.014]	-	[0.098]	[0.016]	[0.014]
21-23 years old	0.046***	0.090***	0.154*	0.046***	0.022**
	[0.011]	[0.018]	[0.088]	[0.012]	[0.010]
24-27 years old	-0.070***	-0.068***	-0.056	-0.073***	-0.042***
	[0.014]	[0.022]	[0.112]	[0.014]	[0.015]
28 or older	-0.217***	-0.252***	-0.134	-0.223***	-0.105***
	[0.030]	[0.056]	[0.129]	[0.027]	[0.029]
Male –female gap in unemp. rate* woman's age					
17-20 years old	-0.097***	-	-0.139	-0.098***	-0.078***
	[0.024]	-	[0.110]	[0.028]	[0.020]
21-23 years old	-0.011	-0.013	0.105	-0.009	0.008
	[0.012]	[0.029]	[0.091]	[0.014]	[0.015]
24-27 years old	0.038**	0.021	0.101	0.043***	0.054***
	[0.016]	[0.029]	[0.138]	[0.016]	[0.018]
28 or older	-0.007	0.017	-0.015	0.016	0.022
	[0.038]	[0.054]	[0.195]	[0.039]	[0.036]
Observations	269,621	24,424	8,209	234,716	185,750
Persons	39,949	9,540	5,097	37,673	26,503

Note: Standard errors in brackets are clustered by the state of residence. The baseline hazard depends on age and is stratified by the year of birth. All columns include controls for state fixed effects.

Figure 1a: % of women who have ever married, by age

Non-Hispanic white women born in 1956-80; SIPP 90-04 (weighted)



Figure 1b: Composition of age at marriage
(sum = 81%, i.e. 19% are not married by 30)



Figure 2: Female unemployment rate and male-female gap for selected states
(Non-Hispanic whites, age 15-40, 1978-2003, CPS)