

# Recent Developments in Family and International Migration Policies in Japan: Population Policy Implication for the Republic of Korea

Hiroshi KOJIMA, Ph.D.

National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Tokyo, Japan

## INTRODUCTION

After the "1.57 Shock" (the public sensation associated with the media coverage of the record-low total fertility rate of 1.57 for 1989) in 1990, low fertility has suddenly become a policy issue. The term *shoshika* (trend toward less children or baby bust) became popular after its first use in the 1992 *White Paper on the National Life* (Economic Planning Agency 1992) and came to be often used by scholars, policy-makers, politicians and businessmen as well as mass media, particularly within the phrase of *shoshika taisaku* (measures against baby bust) or family policies, which have been implemented during the past decade and a half without too significant success.

In September 2005, Japan's Cabinet was reshuffled and the newly created Minister in charge of both *shoshika taisaku* and gender equality has been appointed and the position has been kept in the new Cabinet of the Prime Minister Abe. This is in line with the reorganization of the Ministry of Gender Equality into the Ministry of Gender Equality and the Family in the Republic of Korea in June 2005. However, this may not be always the case in Europe where feminism is often in conflict with "familism" in the political arena.

Now that the population decline has started from the end of 2005, it has become also a policy issue in Japan, particularly because the mass retirement of the skilled workers born during the short-lived baby boom between 1947 and 1949 is expected to start in 2007. The decrease in male population has been already observed for 2004. The decrease is at least partly due to the net balance of international migration. At the time when the natural growth of population is around zero, the population growth is largely affected by the balance of international migration.

Japan is not alone in Asia in terms of baby bust. All the Asian NIEs, including the Republic of Korea (hereafter, “Korea”), Chinese Taipei (hereafter, “Taiwan”), Singapore and Hong Kong SAR, now have lower total fertility rates (TFRs) than Japan. Due to the faster pace of fertility decline in Korea and Taiwan, the speed of population aging is expected to be even faster than in Japan and drastic changes in family policies have been recently observed in these societies while only gradual changes have been observed in Japan during the past decade and a half.

This paper describes the changes in fertility and international migration as well as policies in these areas. It also discusses the population-related attitudes including those towards population policy and fertility. Finally, some remarks are made regarding the demographic integration in East and Southeast Asia through international migration including marriage migration.

## **RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FERTILITY AND FAMILY POLICIES**

### **1) Trends in Fertility**

Fertility declined rapidly in Japan in the immediate postwar period (see Table 1). Then, its fertility stayed around the replacement level (total fertility rate or TFR of about 2.1) and declined further beginning in the mid-1970s. Until fertility decline started in many European countries after the first oil crisis, Japan had one of the lowest TFRs in the developed world. After falling below the replacement level to 2.05 in 1974, Japan’s TFR went into steady decline (except in 1996) and reached the record low level of 1.26 in 2005. According to the medium variant of the new series of population projections published in December 2006, Japan’s TFR is expected to stay between 1.21 and 1.25 in the coming three decades (NIPSSR 2006b).

Korea and Taiwan also started having below replacement fertility in the late 1980s and has surpassed Japan in terms of lowest low fertility in recent years. In 2000 Japan had the total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.36 which was still a little lower than in Korea (1.47) and much lower than

in Taiwan (1.68). But, in 2001, Japan's TFR was 1.33 which was already higher than that of Korea (1.30) but a little lower than that of Taiwan (1.40). Even though Korea had one of the lowest TFR in the world in 2002, the relative position was similar: 1.32 in Japan, 1.17 in Korea and 1.34 in Taiwan. However, in 2003 Japan (1.29) was surpassed in the TFR not only by Korea (1.19) but also by Taiwan (1.24). In 2004 Korea (1.16) and Taiwan (1.18) had the lowest TFRs in the world while that of Japan has stayed at 1.29. In 2005 Korea (1.08) was also closely followed by Taiwan (1.12) while the difference with Japan (1.25) increased a little. It is possible that Taiwan surpasses Korea in the near future in terms of the lowest low fertility particularly because Taiwan significantly reduced the number of newly married female spouses from the Mainland in 2004 and those from Southeast Asia in 2005 due to the ROC government's tighter control.

In Japan where out-of-wedlock births represent less than 2%, the TFR decline is explained by the respective trends of its two components: the fertility rate among married women (marital fertility) and the proportion married among women (nuptiality). While the former has remained fairly constant until the early 1990s in Japan, the latter has greatly declined particularly during the past three decades (Kojima & Rallu 1997, 1998). In other words, the trend toward higher age at marriage and higher proportion remaining never-married has greatly reduced the incidence of marriage among women in their twenties, and this may be regarded as the primary demographic determinant of the recent TFR decline.

As Table 1 shows, the proportions never-married of men aged 25-29 has been raised by 50% from 46.5% in 1975 to 71.4% in 2005. but those of men aged 30-34 and 35-39 have increased by more than 4 times and 6 times respectively. Those of women aged 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39 in 2005 (59.0%, 32.0% and 18.4% respectively) have tripled from those in 1975 (20.9%, 7.7% and 5.3%). It can also be noted that the mean age at first marriage of women rose constantly from 24.7 in 1975 through 27.0 in 2000 to 28.0 in 2005 while that of men increased from 27.0 to 29.8 during the three decades. More drastic decline in the proportion married among women has been observed in Korea and Taiwan in the same period.

But fertility decline has been moderated by international marriages particularly among native men who married more often with foreigners than native women in the three societies. In 2004 international marriages represented 5.5% of total marriages in Japan, which is much lower than in Korea (11.4%) and Taiwan (23.8%). In 2004 the births from internationally married couples represented about 2% of total births in Japan, which should be also lower than in Korea and Taiwan (13.3%).

## 2) Development of Family Policies

As mentioned above, Japanese government's explicit concern with low fertility issues started with "1.57 shock" in 1990. The development of *shoshika taisaku* (family policy measures) are summarized in Table 2. While various new measures have been taken and old measures have been renamed as *shoshika taisaku* during the past 16 years or so, the fertility kept on decreasing. It may be that costly new measures could not be adopted due to the lack of leadership and financial resources. Unlike the Presidents of Korea and Taiwan, Japan's Prime Minister has only a limited power to change policies drastically particularly because the share of budget allocated to each Ministry cannot be changed easily unless the Ministry can find a new source of budget.

Thanks to the strong leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi, new Minister in charge of *shoshika taisaku* was appointed in September 2005 and the "New *Shoshika Taisaku*" was published in June 2006. But, unfortunately, the set of new family measures may not be fully implemented due to the change of the Prime Minister and the lack of budgetary backing (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2006). The original plan in June was to transfer the budget for tax break for parental support of youth in NEET situation or unstable employment by abolishing it, but the Abe Cabinet's policy for encouraging renewed challenges for employment seem to be in conflict with the abolition. The Cabinet Office suggested the re-allocation of a part of the increase in tax revenue made by the abolition of proportional tax exemption for the doubling of child allowance for all ages. According to the FY2007 Budget published in late December 2006, the 5,000-yen monthly child

allowance will be doubled only for children aged below 3 and the compensation during the childcare leave will be raised from 40 to 50% thanks to the economic recovery which has improved the balance of the employment insurance account. While minor and less costly measures in the “New *Shoshika Taisaku*” will be implemented, costly ones will be only partially implemented at best due to the budget cuts in the negotiation of each Ministry with the Ministry of Finance and the budget deficit among prefectures and municipalities.

### 3) Possible Demographic Effects of Family Policies

Kojima (1989, 1994, 1996, 2003, 2005b) has occasionally reviewed Western literature on demographic effects of family policies. He would like to cite only three tentative conclusions from his reviews. First, family policies are designed primarily for the well-being of families and not for raising fertility. Secondly, even though family policies may not be always consistent or well-coordinated in a country, they should be considered as a system and, thus, the implantation of just a few measures to another country may not be always effective for any aims. Thirdly, even though family policies may include a motive for raising fertility, they may be effective in raising fertility only temporarily in certain geographical areas or social strata when the timing of implementation and the social environment are favorable.

Therefore, it would be appropriate to focus on the effect of local family policies on local fertility. While it is still at exploratory stage because of unavailability of local demographic data around 2005, Kojima (2005b) tried to analyze the possible effects of local family policies on nuptiality and fertility, drawing on demographic and socioeconomic indicators at local level and microdata set from the survey of local governments by the Secretariat of the House of Councilors. It conducted sample surveys of the officer in charge of *shoshika taisaku* in municipality (Ward, City, Town and Village) governments in October 2000 on fertility trends and policy responses in local areas and he had an access to the microdata set because he was Special Investigator for the House at the time of survey. The survey subjects consisted of all the municipalities with the population of 200,000 or more and sub-samples of smaller municipalities with variable sampling

proportions according to the population size category. They totaled 1,131, but only 523 municipalities returned usable questionnaires.

The TFR estimates for the periods 1993-1997 and 1998-2002 for each municipality derive from the Bayesian estimates of vital statistics published by the Statistics and Information Department, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (1999, 2004). The proportion never-married for each municipality come from Data for Local Economies: CD-ROM (Toyo Keizai Shimposha 2003). Other demographic and socioeconomic indicators also derive from the latter. These indicators for each municipality were attached to the microdata for the same municipality to conduct analyses of determinants of fertility and nuptiality. The dependent variables for fertility include the TFR estimate for the period 1998-2002 and the ratio of TFR for 1998-2002 over TFR for 1993-1997. The dependent variables for nuptiality include proportions never-married at the ages 20-24, 25-29 and 30-34 for each sex.

Independent variables include 58 policy variables deriving from the 2003 survey of municipalities, which are included in regression models as dummy variables indicating whether or not each municipality implements or plans to implement each type of family policy measure (*shoshika taisaku*) in a broader sense. Only 34 variables out of 58 have a significant effect on at least one dependent variable in at least one type of model (including the full model) and are listed in the first panel in Table 3. The model also includes 17 indicators from the Data for Local Economies as control variables which are listed in the second panel of Table 1. It also contains control variables of region, population size of municipality and proportions never-married (only for the determinants of fertility and fertility ratio) as indicated by the third panel of Table 1. Regressions with stepwise selection of independent variables were applied to the linked data sets to examine the possible effects of policy measures on fertility and nuptiality at local municipality level.

Table 3 shows the results of regressions for the full model. The first column for the determinants of 1998-2002 TFR indicates that “10-2 Establishment of Specialized Section,” “12-4

Provision of Suitable Housing for Sale,” “13-6 Events for Mixing Single Youth,” “15-1 Support for Childrearing Support Volunteers” and “16-3 Balanced Allocation of Pediatricians” have positive effects while “10-1 Formulation of Local ‘Angel Plan,’” “10-3 Resident Organization to Support Childrearing,” “11-4 Expansion of After-School Childcare” and “13-3 Subsidies for Infertility Treatment Fees.” Here, the hyphenated numbers mean the numbers for question and its sub-question. While all the positive effects seem reasonable, “13-6 Events for Mixing Single Youth” should raise fertility indirectly through a rise in nuptiality. This policy effect remains even after controlling for proportions never-married, possibly because of uncontrolled aspects of nuptiality and migration related to marriage and childbearing. While the positive effects of these policy measures seem reasonable, their negative effects are difficult to understand because they are supposed to be pro-family measures. Perhaps, there may be the reverse causation, suggesting that these measures are taken as a response to low fertility, particularly because policy variables are for 2000 and dependent variables are also for 2000 or 1998-2002.

The second column for the determinants of TFR ratio (2000/1995) indicates that “11-9 Expansion of Public Facility Childcare Service,” “15-1 Support for Childrearing Support Volunteers” and “16-1 Subsidies for Educational Costs” have positive effects, which means that they tend to lighten the decline and seems quite reasonable. On the other hand, “11-1 Child Allowances above National Standards,” “11-8 Support for Childrearing Circles,” “16-5 Adaptation Education for Foreign Residents” and “16-7 Formation of Domestic Violence Prevention Network” have negative effects. The first two negative effects are not easy to understand because of their pro-family nature and, thus, they may be considered to reflect the reverse causation. The last two negative effects may also reflect the reverse causation, indicating possibly that a steeper fertility decline due to lower nuptiality encourage international marriage, requiring adaptation education for foreign spouses and prevention of domestic violence against them or possibly that the municipalities with a higher proportion of documented foreigners and a higher incidence of domestic violence tend to experience a steeper fertility decline.

The third through fifth columns show the effects of family policy variables on female

proportions never-married at three age groups: 20-24, 25-29 and 30-34. In the third column, no policy variables have positive effect on female proportion never-married at ages 20-24, while “10-4 Legislation of Local Ordinance for *Shoshika Taisaku*,” “13-1 Marriage Support Grant” and “13-3 Subsidies for Infertility Treatment Fees” have negative effects. The first two negative effects may be reasonable because they are supposed to be pro-marriage. The third one does not seem to be unreasonable but somewhat indirect because it is a pronatalist policy measure. It is also possible that both nuptiality and demand for fertility are high in the community with a high proportion of pro-family residents. In the fourth column, “12-3 Priority Given to Families in Allocation of Public Housing” has a positive effect on female proportion never-married at ages 25-29 while “12-5 Parks for Urban Residents and Kids” has a negative effect. If the former policy means the lower priority for newly married couples without children, the positive effect may be reasonable. If the latter policy also benefit urban single residents because of parks’ role as dating spots, the negative effect may be also reasonable. In the fifth column, “12-2 Support for Making Kids’ Rooms,” “15-2 NPO Personnel Training Support” and “16-4 Adaptation Education for Kid Return Migrants” have positive effects on female proportion never-married at ages 30-34 while “Subsidies for Infants’ Medical Fees” has a negative effect. This negative effect is possible because of its pro-family nature, but all the positive effects are difficult to understand because they are also supposed to be pro-family. They may represent the reverse causation in the sense that these measures tend to be adopted in the municipality with low nuptiality and fertility.

The sixth through eighth columns show the effects of family policy variables on male proportions never-married at three age groups. In the sixth column, “13-7 Public Support for ‘Match-Makers’” and “16-2 Promotion of Mixing of Elderly and Children” have positive effects on male proportion never-married at ages 20-24 while “10-4 Legislation of Local Ordinance for *Shoshika Taisaku*” and “13-1 Marriage Support Grant” have negative effects. While the negative effects seem reasonable, the first positive effect seems unreasonable because it is supposed to be pro-marriage. It may be due to the reverse causation in the sense that public support for match-makers tends to be implemented in the municipality with low nuptiality. The second



positive effect is also difficult to understand and both cause and effect may reflect the characteristics of the municipality. In the seventh column, only “15-2 NPO Personnel Training Support” has a positive effect on male proportion never-married at ages 25-29 while only “14-3 Subsidies for Infants’ Medical Fees” has a negative effect. While the negative effect may be possible because of its pro-family nature, the positive effect may reflect the reverse causation. In the eighth column, “11-10 Expansion of Childrearing Advice” and “12-2 Support for Making Kids’ Rooms” have positive effects on male proportion never-married at ages 30-34 while “11-1 Child Allowance above National Standards” and “13-4 Subsidies for Infants’ Medical Fees” have negative effects. The positive effects may not be impossible if these measures are taken at the cost of pro-marriage measures such as public support for match-makers and housing for the newly married. The negative effects may represent the reverse causation in the sense that the municipality government tries to help older mothers with these measures in the municipality with low nuptiality.

In general, the effects of policy measures are much smaller than those of demographic and socioeconomic control variables. They are not necessarily consistent or as expected possibly because of the reverse causation. However, we could observe some interesting results with possible policy implications. The relatively large effects of Area may also suggest the interaction of local characteristics and policy measures reflecting the attitudes of local residents and policy makers. We will see if the policy effects are real or not when the estimates of fertility around 2005 will be published.

## **RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND RELATED POLICIES**

### **1) Trends in International Migration**

Net immigration has remained relatively low in Japan except in the immediate postwar

period with mass repatriation of Japanese citizens from Korea, Taiwan and Mainland China. After the mass repatriation, net emigration of Japanese to South America for settlement and that of “foreign” citizens from Korea and Taiwan for “repatriation” continued until the early 1960s when Japan’s rapid economic growth started (See Table 4). A period of small net immigration continued until 1971 with the revaluation of Japanese yen by the “Smithsonian Agreement.” Then, the net emigration of Japanese started with an increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) while the net immigration of foreigners increased. After the “Plaza Accord” of 1985 and the resultant revaluation of yen, both trends have been accelerated but the absolute value of net balance mostly remained at a low level below 100,000 or less than 0.1% of population.

An examination by nationality and sex reveals divergent trends in net migration. Among Japanese, female net emigration was mostly larger than male net emigration from the early 1970s to the early 1990s, but the latter becomes larger from the early 1990s possibly because of an increase in Japanese managers on overseas assignment without accompanied family members (Kojima 2004a). Among foreigners, however, male net immigration was larger than female net immigration in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, but the latter becomes larger since the early 1990s probably because of the increase in “foreign brides” in international migration to Japan. One of the reasons why female population increased and male population decreased in 2004 seems to be several thousand net gain of female foreign spouses through marriage migration because foreign spouses married to Japanese men amounted to 12,071 while foreign spouses married to Japanese women amounted only 3,228 in 2004.

Korea and Taiwan have also experienced a large influx of foreign workers in the 3D (dangerous, dirty and difficult) jobs in recent years and many businessman, students and their family has gone abroad. At least half a million Taiwanese businessmen are said to stay in Mainland China. A very large influx of Mainland and foreign brides has been also observed in Taiwan during the past few years and has become a policy issue. Korea also accepted many Korean Chinese brides, which has caused marriage squeeze among Korean Chinese men and has made it difficult for Korean Chinese in China to reproduce themselves without possible large

influx of undocumented North Korean women into China. A disproportionately large number of Chinese migrants in Japan are also Korean Chinese, which also reduces the size of marriage market within China.

## 2) Development of International Migration Policies

In the area of international migration, policies have more direct and immediate impacts on the trends in international migration of non-Japanese citizens as shown above: Table 5 presents the development of international migration policies, focusing on more recent period. The implementation of revised immigration control law in 1991, which allowed the descendents of Japanese to stay and work in Japan without restriction, drastically increased the influx of South Americans of Japanese origin, particularly Brazilians. As a consequence, 302,080 Brazilians and 57,728 Peruvians are now registered in Japan at the end of 2005. Even though many Japanese Brazilians will end up staying in Japan more or less permanently, the Japanese Government has no systematic immigration or social integration policy for them possibly reflecting the negative public attitudes toward immigration policy. One of the most urgent policy issues is their coverage by the social protection, particularly health insurance. The author's analysis of survey data has revealed that less than one third of Japanese Brazilian respondents are covered by any health insurance program and that the coverage and kind of insurance program affect their health-seeking behaviors and experiences of troubles at medical care facilities (Kojima 2005c).

Another urgent policy issue is the education of Brazilian children because they may also end up staying in Japan more or less permanently even though the perception and attitudes of themselves, their parents and the Japanese public may be different. It is also because Brazilians are socialized in Latin American culture, they are more likely to feel excluded in Japan than Koreans and Chinese who share East Asian culture. Some foreign spouses and their children face similar problems. As EPC/KBF (2005) indicates in the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union (CBP), "efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendent, to be successful and more active participants in

society” and “scholastic underachievement, early school-leaving and of all forms of migrant youth delinquency should be avoided and made priority areas for public intervention.” These efforts are urgently needed because of an increase in unattached and excluded Brazilian youth in some cities to prevent possible “urban violence” found in French cities and suburbs. Even though most Japanese are still reluctant to accept foreign workers to cope with labor shortage accompanied by aging and baby bust, many perceive that the policy measures for acceptance lag behind particularly in social protection and education according to a 2004 national opinion survey by the Cabinet Office (2004). While foreign spouses seemed to be more welcomed, they still need supports by social integration policies. Thus, the Japanese Government should not waste time in formulating its integration policy following principles like the CBP.

### 3) Possible Demographic Effects of “International Marriage Migration”

In recent years cross-border marriages have increased rapidly in East Asia, including Taiwan, Korea and Japan, with a large influx of “foreign brides” from Mainland China and Southeast Asia. In 2003 31.9% of all marriages registered in Taiwan were cross-border marriages, while they have decreased to 23.8% in 2004 and 20.1% in 2005 due to the tighter control by the government. In 2004 cross-border marriages represented 11.4% in Korea and 5.5% in Japan. Due to the significance of cross-border marriages in Taiwan, the ROC Ministry of Interior conducted a Census on the Living Conditions of Foreign and Mainland Spouses in 2003, with 300,000 intermarried couples.

Table 6 shows the trends in cross-border marriages in Japan for 1970 and 2004. While the number of marriages mostly declined, the percentage of cross-border marriages kept on increasing from 0.5% in 1970 to 0.9% in 1980, 3.5% in 1990, 4.5% in 2000 and 5.5% in 2004. The increase in the 1980s was particularly large because of the revaluation of Japanese yen and the booming economy in the late 1980s. However, the speed of increase is much faster in Korea and Taiwan. In the early 1970s the majority of cross-border marriages were between Japanese women and foreign men, particularly American and Korean men. However, cross-border marriages

between Japanese men and foreign women became the majority in the late 1970s and such marriages represent almost 80% in recent years. The majority of foreign wives used to be Koreans, but Filipinas became the majority in the mid-1990s. Then, Chinese (mainlander) wives have been the majority since the late 1990s, which resemble the current situation in Korea and Taiwan.

Kojima (2006e) has recently conducted a comparative analysis of family formation among internationally married couples with a foreign wife in Japan and Taiwan, drawing on the data sets from the 2000 Japanese Census of Population and the 2003 Taiwanese census of foreign and mainland spouses. The distribution of foreign wives aged below 35 by nationality in Japan shows that 42.3% of foreign wives are nationals of the Philippines, followed by those of China (21.3% including Taiwan), Korea (17.5%), Thailand (7.6%), Brazil (2.6%), the U.S. (1.0%) and Indonesia (0.8%).

Ethnic Chinese seems to be over-represented among the brides of Japanese men with the nationality of Southeast Asian countries as in the case of Taiwan, while ethnic Japanese are over-represented among South American brides and Korean permanent residents are over-represented among Korean brides. Still, there are also a lot of Korean brides having migrated from Korea to Japan around the time of marriage. Thus, marriage migrants themselves contributed to the increase and rejuvenation of Japan's population, in addition to their contribution through their reproduction.

Table 7 shows the results of cross-tabulations for Japan. Among foreign wives aged below 35, the mean age at first births, as a proxy for the age at marriage, is 25.47 and that of their husbands is 34.27, resulting in the age difference between spouses of 9.54. The positive effects of the wife's age on the age at first births of both spouses are observed, while its negative effects on the age difference between spouses are observed as in Taiwan.

The mean numbers of children ever-born (CEB) among internationally married couples is

1.03 in Japan. These figures suggest that the fertility of internationally married couples is apparently lower than among those of nationals as in Taiwan. The positive effects of the wife's age on the CEB can be found. The distribution of couples by parity shows that 35.2% have no children, 34.7% one child, 23.5% two children and 6.6% three or more children. Japan exhibits negative effects of the wife's age at lower parity, but positive effects at higher parity, which should be normal. Unlike Taiwan, the percentage of males among children by parity shows that it is normal in Japan: 51.4% for the first child, 51.6% for the second child and 50.9% for the third or higher-parity child. The proportion tends to be lower at high and low ages of the wife, but it tends to be lower at only high ages of the wife in Taiwan.

However, if we look at the results divided by migrant status, the picture looks much different. Among recent migrants (those who were not in Japan 5 years ago), the mean age gap between spouses is much larger as in the case of Taiwan. What is more striking, the fertility of recent migrants is only a half of non-migrants. It is partly due to the shorter marriage duration, but it should be partly real. According to the distribution of foreign wives by parity, almost one half of recent migrants have no children while only a quarter of non-migrants have no children. Only 13% of recent migrants have 2 or more children, which is almost one third of the percentage among non-migrants.

Since the data set contains almost no Japanese-Japanese couples of the same generation, the direct comparison is not possible. But, apparently, even the non-migrant foreign wives seem to have somewhat lower fertility than Japanese wives married to a Japanese husband. Thus, an increase in cross-border marriages should lead to fertility decline even though it may contribute to an increase in nuptiality among Japanese men while decreasing nuptiality among Japanese women. Some women may end up marrying a foreign husband of various nationalities. In these cases, particularly when the husband is a Muslim, the wives have to convert to Islam and their children will be Muslims, which may increase the likelihood of wives and children leaving Japan with limited Islamic communities to be integrated (Kojima 2006c). Whatever the nationality or religion, the emigration of foreign husbands and the whole family can be encouraged when the

attitude of Japanese are not too friendly to male foreign workers even if they may have more favorable attitudes towards foreign wives.

## **POPULATION-RELATED ATTITUDES**

Population changes at the societal level are determined by demographic behaviors and attitudes at the individual level. Individual attitudes are important in the sense that it is summed up as public opinion which may be incorporated in policy formulation and implementation.

### 1) Attitudes toward Aging and Population Policy

The Institute of Population Problems (currently, the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research), conducted its first and second Public Opinion Surveys on Population Issues in 1990 and 1995 based on the nationally representative samples of adult Japanese population. The two surveys asked the respondents whether aging in the near future was "very good", "good", "hard to say", "bad", or "very bad" and asked those who had a negative opinion about it the possible measures to slow it down. Table 8 shows the results of cross-tabulation by sex of combined answers to these two questions, collapsing the positive answers and negative answers into one category each and excluding "DK" (Don't Know) and "UK" (Unknown) from both.

In 1990, 5.0% of respondents have positive attitudes toward aging while 42.9% have neutral attitude (choosing "hard to say"). Female respondents are a little more likely to have these attitudes than males. Among those who have negative attitudes toward aging (52.1% of respondents who are asked about the possible measures to slow it down), 4.5% are in favor of immigration policy, 33.0% pronatalist policy, 9.3% both and 5.3% no intervention. Female respondents are less likely to favor immigration policy than males and a little more likely to favor pronatalist policy.

In 1995, 3.4% of respondents have positive attitudes toward aging while 38.5% have neutral attitude. There are declines in both attitudes from 1990 possibly because of the "1.57 shock." In contrast to the results of the 1990 survey, female respondents are a little less likely to have positive attitudes than males. Among those who have negative attitudes toward aging (58.1 % of respondents who are asked about the possible measures to slow it down), 2.0% are in favor of immigration policy, 44.3% pronatalist policy, 6.7% both and 5.1% no intervention. As in the results of the 1990 survey, females are less likely to favor immigration policy than males and a little more likely to favor pronatalist policy. While the proportion of non-interventionists has remained relatively stable, the percentages of those who favor immigration policy as well as those who favor both immigration and pronatalist policies have been reduced to a half, while the percentage of those who favor pronatalist policy has increased by one third. This can be also due to the "1.57 shock" as well as the economic recession decreasing the labor demand (Kojima 2000). The changes between 1990 and 1995 may be also related to the implementation of revised immigration control law in 1991.

## 2) Convergence and Divergence in Values and Attitudes in East Asia

According to the UN (2003) classification, East Asia (together with Southern Europe, Austria, Canada and Germany) is characterized by high age at first birth, high proportion of childlessness, low propensity to have 2 and more children. Rapid fertility decline in Japan as well as Korea and Taiwan seems to be related to changes in fertility-related values and attitudes. It may be also related to the fact that these societies are late comer in the Second Demographic Transition (SDT). While Japan, Korea and Taiwan have converged into lowest-low fertility societies like many European countries, Korea and Taiwan still retain strong son preference as reflected in higher sex ratio at birth (110 boys vs. 100 daughters in recent years), which is markedly different from Japan and Europe where balance preference is observed in the context of lowest low fertility.

East Asian countries including Japan, Korea and Taiwan are experiencing the SDT and the



values and attitudes should be examined to grasp the source of fertility decline in East Asia. It is also because one of main factors of the SDT in Europe is said to be changes in values and attitudes. Table 9 shows age differentials in fertility-related attitudes in each survey in the three societies. The top panel presents the percentage of respondents agreeing to the felt non-necessity to have children after marriage, the second panel from the top, the percentage of respondents with preference for a small family (0-2 children) and the bottom panel, the third panel from the top, and the percentage of respondents with son preference for children. Due to the difference in question forms in the three societies, the level of agreement to the felt non-necessity of children is much lower in Korea. But there is a regular tendency for the agreement to decrease with age in each survey in all the three societies.

However, the relationship of small family preference with age is not always regular. While the preference for a small family (2 children or less) decreases with age in Korea, the relationship is not regular in Japan. It decreases with age in 2000 and 2002 in Japan, but it increase a little in the 60s. The increase in the 60s is also found in 2001 when the level is the highest in the 30s.

In Korea, son preference increases with age regardless of the question. In Taiwan, the level of son preference is lowest in the 30s, and then it increases with age. In Japan, the relationship of son preference with age varies by survey year. It is the highest in the 20s in 2000 and 2002, but in the 60s in 2001. It is the lowest in the 60s in 2000, in the 50s in 2001 and in the 40s in 2002.

Using the same data sets, the author has recently conducted a comparative logit analysis of effects of work interruption on the number of children ever-born for married women aged below 50 in Japan and Taiwan. He has found that the work interruption due to other reasons than marriage and childbearing is likely to raise the odds of having no or one child in both Japan and Taiwan and that the work interruption due to marriage and child bearing is likely to raise the odds of having one child. I would interesting to see if the similar effects can be found in Korea with an appropriate data set.

Using the same data set for Japan (JGSS), Yasuda (2006) has found the temporary negative effect of 2002 announcement of abolishing tax break for non-working wives on women's attitudes towards marriage. Attitudes may not be directly linked to behaviors, but there is a possibility that even the announcement of non-family-friendly policy measures may have negative impact on nuptiality and fertility. The central and local governments in Japan as well as other East Asian countries should be cautious and monitor public opinion using the GSS-type surveys.

## **DEMOGRAPHIC INTEGRATION IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA**

While Western demographic literature does not mention the contribution of marriage migration to both net migration and natural increase of population perhaps because it is insignificant in the West, migration through international marriage has a significant contribution to maintaining population if not increasing population in some East Asian countries. It may be even contributing to the demographic integration of East and Southeast Asia.

As a long-term consequence of unbalanced sex ratio at birth since the early 1980s, marriage squeeze due to relative shortage of women in marriage market has already started in Asian societies including Korea and Taiwan. Taiwan has already experienced a significant increase in intermarriage as an advanced response to it. Hudson and den Boer (2004) estimate the number of surplus single males in China as 30 million in 2025 and the same amount in India. It should have a tremendous impact on international marriage market in East and Southeast Asia because international marriages represented a significant share of total marriages in East Asia. Demographic integration in East and Southeast Asia is already under way. In the near future, it would be necessary for East and Southeast Asia to have an institutional arrangement to deal with international marriages and to prevent trafficking of women as marriage partners, not to mention sex workers (Iguchi and Kojima 1997).

Population decline, aging and baby bust can be coped with by pronatalist policies,

international migration policies or both, whether in East Asia or Europe. While pronatalist policies can be implemented by national governments, international migration policies require coordination or harmonization by supra-national bodies. Perhaps, international migration policies including those dealing with international marriages could be better formulated and implemented by the world regional bodies or associations such as the ASEAN+3 (or perhaps, ASEAN+6 including North Korea, Mongolia and Taiwan). But we should keep in mind that most population, family, and social policies are implemented by nation-states while social reproduction is a global process (Folbre 1994).

## REFERENCES

- Cabinet Office, Japan. 2004. Public Opinion Survey on the Acceptance of Foreign Workers." (<http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h16/h16-foreignerworker/index.html>) (in Japanese).
- Commission of the European Communities. 2005. Green Paper "Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity between the generations." Brussels: Commission of the European Communities: COM(2005)94 final.
- European Policy Centre and King Baudouin Foundation. 2005. "Beyond the Common Basic Principles on integration: The next steps." *EPC Issue Paper*, 27 (Revised).
- Folbre, Nancy. 1994. *Who Pays for the Kids? Gender and the Structures of Constraint*. London: Routledge.
- Hudson, Valerie M., and Andrea M. den Boer. 2004. *Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Iguchi, Yasushi, and Hiroshi Kojima. 1997. "Overview of Trafficking in Women to Japan" and "Policy Recommendation." International Organization for Migration (ed.), *Trafficking in Women to Japan for Sexual Exploitation: A Survey on the Case of Filipino Women*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
- Kojima, Hiroshi. 1989a. "International Marriages." *Statistics*, Vol.40, No.2, pp.18-25 (in Japanese).
- Kojima, Hiroshi. 1989b. "The Effectiveness of Pronatalist Policies." *Jinko Mondai Kenkyu [J. of Population Problems]*, Vol.45, No.2, pp.15-34 (in Japanese).
- Kojima, Hiroshi. 1992a. "International Migrants and Marriage." *Jinko Mondai Kenkyu [J. of Population Problems]*, Vol.48, No.1, pp.28-39 (in Japanese).
- Kojima, Hiroshi. 1992b. "International Migrants and Fertility." *Jinko Mondai Kenkyu [J. of*

- Population Problems*], Vol.48, No.2, pp.38-48 (in Japanese).
- Kojima, Hiroshi. 1996. "International Migration from the Philippines to Japan." Japan Institute of Labour (ed.), *Internationalization of Labour Market and Its Effects on Japanese Economy and Society*, Tokyo, Japan Institute of Labour, pp.77-110 (in Japanese).
- Kojima, Hiroshi. 1994. "Determinants of Fertility Change and Policy Impacts in Developed Countries." Institute for Social Development (ed.), *Contemporary Families and Social Security*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, pp.107-126 (in Japanese).
- Kojima, Hiroshi. 1996. "Pronatalist and Family Policies and Their Effects in France." Makoto Atoh (ed.), *Population Issues in Developed Countries: Fertility Decline and Family Policy*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, pp.157-193 (in Japanese).
- Kojima, Hiroshi. 2000. "Japan: Hyper-aging and Its Policy Implications." V. L. Bengtson, K.-D. Kim, G. C. Meyers and K.-S. Eun (eds), *Aging in East and West: Families, States, and the Elderly*. New York: Springer, pp.95-120.
- Kojima, Hiroshi. 2003. "Fertility Trends and Family Policies in French-Speaking Societies." *Jinko Mondai Kenkyu [J. of Population Problems]*, Vol.59, No.2, pp.1-19 (in Japanese).
- Kojima, Hiroshi. 2004. "Aging Societies with Fewer Children in East Asia and Changes in Social Structure." Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (ed.), *Training Text* (<http://www.esri.go.jp/en/tie/ea7-1e.pdf>, [ea7-2e.pdf](http://www.esri.go.jp/en/tie/ea7-2e.pdf), [ea7-3e.pdf](http://www.esri.go.jp/en/tie/ea7-3e.pdf)), pp.1-46.
- Kojima, Hiroshi (ed.). 2005a. Final Report of the FY2002-2004 Project on "Low Fertility and Family Policy in Korea, Taiwan and Singapore" (supported by a Scientific Grant, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare) (in Japanese).
- Kojima, Hiroshi (ed.). 2005b. "Shoshika Taisaku at Local Level, Total Fertility Rates and Proportions Never-Married." Shigesato Takahashi (ed.), Final Report of the FY2002-2004 Project on "Studies on the New Phase of Fertility Decline and Family and Labor Policy Responses" (supported by a Scientific Grant, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare) (in Japanese), pp.273-289.
- Kojima, Hiroshi. 2005c. "Low Fertility and Policy Responses in Asian NIEs: An Introduction Focusing on the Review of Possible Policy Effects." *Jinko Mondai Kenkyu [J. of Population Problems]*, Vol.61, No.2, pp.1-22 (in Japanese).
- Kojima, Hiroshi. 2005d. "Return Migration of Japanese Managers and Their Health." *Korean Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol.15, No.2, pp.35-65.
- Kojima, Hiroshi. 2006a. "A Comparative Analysis of Fertility-Related Attitudes in Japan, Korea and Taiwan." *F-GENS Journal (Ochanomizu University)*, No.5, pp.324-336.
- Kojima, Hiroshi. 2006b. "Foreign Workers and Health Insurance in Japan: The Case of Japanese Brazilians." *The Japanese Journal of Population* (<http://www.ipss.go.jp/index-e.htm>), Vol.4, No.1, pp.78-92.
- Kojima, Hiroshi. 2006c. "Variations in Demographic Characteristics of Foreign 'Muslim' Population in Japan: A Preliminary Estimation." *The Japanese Journal of Population* (<http://www.ipss.go.jp/index-e.htm>), Vol.4, No.1, pp.115-130
- Kojima, Hiroshi. 2006d "Population decline and its demographic correlates in Japan." *European*