in Yamagami and Morita, and at 1% level in Oyama. Yamagami's fertility function shows that a rise in husband income by 10 thousand yen per year would raise the number of children by 0.00244. Oyama's analysis shows that an increase of 10 thousand yen per month would elevate the number of children by 0.01. Morita's OLS result implies that the elasticity of fertility to husband income is 0.043.

However, these income effects are so small that very high allowance is required to produce a visible effect. The table also shows the amount of child allowance that is necessary to raise the number of children by 0.1. If Morita's elasticity were correct, no economic support policy could make a significant effect on fertility. Even if we rely on Yamagami's coefficient, the child allowance of 34,000 yen per month must be paid to raise the TFR by 0.1. In Sweden, 950 krona (15,000 yen) is paid per month per child under 16 years old (METI, 2005). Thus, the required amount is more than twice as much as Sweden that is famous for very generous family allowance.

In Korea, Lee SS and coauthors showed that family income has no effect on fertility (2004, p. 95). If this result were correct, economic support measures including child allowance, tax relief, or one time cash benefit would not make sense. On the other hand, the multiple regression model by Lee IS (2005, p. 79) showed that a rise in family income by 10 thousand won per month would elevate the number of children by 0.001. To raise the TFR by 0.1, the monthly allowance of 100 thousand won is required. According to a newspaper, the Uri Party is planning a means tested allowance system that provides with 10,000 won monthly to the second and subsequent children (Money Today, July 14, 2006). In 2004, approximately 49% of all births were the second and higher birth orders. If 100,000 won per month were given universally, the TFR would rise by 0.01 x 0.49 = 0.0049. The effect would be invisible if the allowance were strictly means tested, as in the proposal of Uri Party.

4-3. Childcare Leave

The childcare leave was approved in the Diet of Japan in May 1991 and enforced in April 1992. Although the law allowed a female worker or her husband to leave until the first birth day of their child, there was no cash benefit at that time. The amendments in June 1994 legalized a cash benefit of 25% of wage and exemption from social security premiums during the leave. These revisions were enforced in April 1995. The amendment in November 2001 raised the cash benefit to 40% and was enforced in April 2002. Under the current system, 30% is paid monthly during the leave and 10% is paid after returning to work. Although the leave is basically allowed until the first birthday of a child, public servants can leave until the third birthday. Other workers can prolong the leave for six months if a daycare center is not available. However, no cash benefit is paid in either case for the prolonged period.

According to the Basic Survey of Employment Management of Women in 2003,

73.1% of female workers who gave birth in fiscal year 2002 took childcare leave. However, many women retire from work before childbearing and are not included in the denominator (Atoh, 2005, p. 46). A female worker who was not continuously employed for a year or who does not plan to come back to her job is also excluded. There were 103,478 cases that received cash benefit during childcare leave in 2003 (NIPSSR, 2005, p. 381). This was only 9.2% of the number of annual births.

In Korea, childcare leave was defined in 1987. After several amendments, 400 thousand won per month is paid since 2004. According to the Committee for Low Fertility and Aging Society (2006, p. 67), only 26% of mothers who took maternity leave in 2005 took childcare leave. The number of mothers who took childcare leave in 2004 was 9,304. This was only 1.9% of the number of annual births and was much lower than 9.2% in Japan. The degree of family friendliness in Korea seems to be very low. Even when taking maternity leave (90 days), Korean women have to worry about many things (Chang JY, 2005, p. 49; Choi EY, 2005, p. 278).

Table 3. Effect of Childcare Leave in Japan

Literature	Suruga and Nishimoto (2002)	Shigeno and Matsuura (2003)	Yamaguchi (2005)	Suruga and Chang (2003)
b	0.0231	0.1244	0.1886	0.22298
$\exp(b)$	1.0234	1.1325*	1.2076*	1.2498
Fertility without leave (f_0)	0.0368	0.0364	0.0362	0.0361
Fertility with leave (f_1)	0.0376	0.0411	0.0434	0.0447
Proportin of leave takers (p)	0.092	0.092	0.092	0.092
Required p to raise TFR by 0.1	--	0.424	0.709	0.490

* $\exp(b/5)$

There are several studies that evaluate the effect of childcare leave on fertility in Japan. Table 3 shows partial regression coefficients in four studies. Since each coefficient b is supposed to show a log-odds ratio of fertility between a female who can take childcare leave and one who cannot, $\exp(b)$ gives a odds ratio. Because Shigeno and Matsuura (2003) and Yamaguchi (2005) analyzed fertility of a five-year period, $\exp(b/5)$ is shown in the table. While Suruga and Nishimoto (2002) used Basic Survey of Employment Management of Women by the former Ministry of Labour, other three studies used Japanese Panel Survey on Consumers by the Institute for Research on Household Economic. Thus, the difference in magnitude seems to come from the difference in data source.

If we express the average fertility rate of a female who cannot take childcare leave with f_0 and that of one who can take with f_1, the odds ratio is;

$$\exp(b) = \frac{f_1}{1-f_1} \Big/ \frac{f_0}{1-f_0}.$$

If the proportion of women who can take childcare leave is expressed as p, then the TFR can be written as follows.

$$TFR = 35\{(1-p)f_0 + p f_1\}.$$

The multiplier 35 comes from the length of reproductive period. The expressions above give the following quadratic equation of f_0.

$$(1-p)(1-e^{-b})f_0^2 + \{p + (1-p)e^{-b} - \frac{TFR}{35}(1-e^{-b})\}f_0 - \frac{TFR}{35}e^{-b} = 0.$$

Though the expression is a little messy, it is possible to determine the value of f_0 if one gives an adequate value for each parameter. In Table 3, TFR=1.29 and p =0.092 were applied. Once the values of f_0 and f_1 are determined, we can simulate the effect of rise in p, the proportion of women who take childcare leave. The hypothetical proportion that is required to raise the TFR by 0.1 is shown in Table 3. If the reality is close to the analysis by Suruga and Nishimoto, it is impossible to elevate the TFR by 0.1 with the use of childcare leave. Even if we rely on other three studies, an extremely impressive improvement from 9% to more than 40% is required. It would be difficult to make such an advance within a decade.

4-4. Childcare Service

The compatibility between female work and childrearing has been the primary political goal of the Japanese government. The Angel Plan announced in 1994 had "support for simultaneous child rearing and work" at the top of its list. In accordance to this guideline, a major revision was made to the Child Welfare Law in 1997 and public daycare service shifted from the municipality assignment system (administrative measures) to a system to allow parents to select their preferred daycare center. The New Angel Plan in 1999 sustained the emphasis on compatibility. The New-New Angel Plan in 2004 also contained a chapter on "Compatibility between Work and Family and Reconsideration of Work Customs." However, childcare service was discussed in other chapter entitled "Renewed Support and Solidarity for Childcare." The chapter contained various issues such as reinforcing local childcare centers, supporting a variety of childcare services, assisting volunteer activities on childcare, expanding public daycare services, running after-school clubs at primary schools, etc.

The cabinet of Japan adopted "Zero Waiting List for Daycare Program" as a political goal in July 2001. The governmental effort was partially successful at least in very recent years. According to the Children and Families Bureau, the number of children on the waiting list decreased from 26,383 in 2003 to 23,338 in 2005. However, daycare service is still less available in Japan for very early childhood. Of the 23,338 children on the waiting list, 15,831 (67.8%) were under two years old. This accounts for 0.47% of the population under age two.

There were 632,011 children under age two (18.6% of the population) in daycare center in April 2005. Since the proportion was 13.4% in 1998, there was an increase by 5.2 percentage points by 2005. However, such an improvement in childcare service does not seem to have contributed to fertility in Japan. According to Choi EY (2004, p. 30), the enrollment rate was 14.1% in 2003, which was lower than 17.0% in Japan in this year.

The simplest measure of compatibility between wife's work and childbearing would be the proportion of working mothers among all wives. This measure is the key to understanding the micro-macro paradox of the relationship between fertility and female labor force participation. Let g be the proportion of working mothers, m be that of all mothers, and w be that of all workers. Then, a two by two contingency table can be written as follows;

	Not Mother	Mother	
Not Worker	$1-w-m+g$	$m-g$	$1-w$
Worker	$w-g$	g	w
	$1-m$	m	1

For all four cells to be positive, the following condition is necessary in addition to $0 < g < m$ and $0 < g < w$.

$$1-w-m+g > 0.$$

For the work status of a wife and presence of a child to be negatively correlated, g must be smaller than the expected value of the independence model.

$$g < w\,m.$$

If we coordinate the proportion of workers (w) on the horizontal axis and that of mothers (m) on the vertical axis, the area enclosed by a straight line and a hyperbola simultaneously satisfies two conditions above. Figure 13 shows such areas for $g = 0.2$, 0.4 and 0.6. When the compatibility is raised, the area moves in the upper-right direction. Then, the paradoxical situation can be understood as a result of an

increasing compatibility. When wife's work and childrearing was less compatible, all the countries were located at lower-left region of the graph. However, some countries succeeded in improving the compatibility and moved to upper-right direction. In this way, the positive correlation appeared at macro level while the negative correlation is sustained at the micro level.

One implication of Figure 13 is that the higher the compatibility, the narrower the area in which the micro-macro paradox holds. Then, it is expected that a country with high compatibility may easily escape from the area and the micro level correlation may turn to be positive. This expectation is materialized in Sweden where recent micro level analyses showed the positive impact of women's works on fertility (Hoorens, et al., 2005, pp. 226-227). However, Figure 14 suggests that in a country with low compatibility such as Japan and Korea, there is a wide room of fertility decline.

Figure 13. Area with Negative Correlation for Different g



Table 4 shows contingency tables of work status and the presence of a child of married women aged 30-34 in Japan and Korea. This age group is the bottom of the M-shaped labor force participation pattern in both countries (see Figure 12), implying the compatibility is most crucial. In Japan, the governmental policy failed to increase the proportion of working mothers and the increase in labor participation resulted in fertility decline. In Korea, the proportion of working mothers is slightly higher than in Japan. However, it is difficult to say that Korean wives enjoy higher compatibility considering their earlier marriage and older age of their children than Japanese wives.

Some analyses of micro data in Japan identified the effect of childcare services on the work status of wives. For example, Oishi (2003) found that the cost of daycare service has negative impact on a wife's labor force participation. However, recent multivariate analyses did not identify a significant effect of childcare service on fertility. Shigeno and Ohkusa (1999) included such indices as waiting list for daycare service, availability of infant care and night-time care into their model but none of them had significant effect on recent birth. Shigeno and Matsuura (2003) included respondent's substantive evaluation for local childcare service into their fertility function but its *t* value was 1.19. One statistically significant result was obtained but it was bivariate analysis and was not a net effect (Shigeno, 2006, p. 109). Thus, even if there is a net effect of governmental effort for childcare service, its magnitude is too small to be verified clearly. Considering that the net effect of childcare service has been asserted in Western countries (Kojima, 2005; Choi EY, 2006), there seems to be a cultural pattern that intercepts the effect.

Table 4. Labor Force Participation and Motherhood of Married Women Aged 30-34 (%)

		Not Mother	Mother
Japan (1997)	Not Worker	9.6	47.1
	Worker	11.9	31.4
Japan (2004)	Not Worker	8.2	48.7
	Worker	12.9	30.2
Korea (2000)	Not Worker	3.7	60.9
	Worker	3.2	32.2

Source: Employment Status Survey (Japan), Census (Korea)

5. Low Fertility and Policy Intervention in Comparative Perspective

5-1. Spread of Lowest-Low Fertility in Europe and Asia

Lowest-low fertility appeared in Europe during the 1990s causing a drastic change in the demographic map of the region. The second demographic transition theory (van de Kaa, 1987) described the novelty of Western and Northern European countries in terms of below replacement fertility and emergence of postmodern behaviors such as cohabitation and extramarital births. However, while these forerunners stayed at moderately low fertility, latecomers showed unexpected declines to lowest-low fertility. This change caused not only a reverse in the geographic pattern of European fertility but also that in the correlation with fertility of the total

first marriage rate, the proportion of extramarital births, and the female labor force participation rate (Kohler et al., 2002, pp. 643-644).

Table 5 lists up the countries having lowest-low fertility since 2000. While Kohler and his coauthors (2002) listed 14 countries in 1999, there are 20 countries on this new list. Small countries and areas such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Luxemburg, Andorra, and San Marino were excluded. Korea arrived at the threshold of 1.3 in 2001, followed by Japan and Taiwan in 2003. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Lithuania joined the group after 2000. On the other hand, Estonia, Armenia and Russia escaped from lowest-low fertility. Belarus was excluded from the table because of the lack of recent data.

Table 5. Lowest-Low Fertility after 2000

Region	Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Eastern Asia	Japan	1.36	1.33	1.32	1.29	1.29	1.25
	Republic of Korea	1.47	1.30	1.17	1.19	1.16	1.05
	Taiwan	1.68	1.40	1.34	1.24	1.18	1.12
Southern Europe	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.28	1.44	1.23			
	Greece	1.27	1.25	1.27			
	Italy	1.24	1.23	1.26	1.29		
	Slovenia	1.26	1.21	1.21	1.20		
	Spain	1.24	1.26	1.27	1.30		
Eastern Europe	Bulgaria	1.30	1.24	1.21	1.23		
	Czech Republic	1.14	1.14	1.17	1.18		
	Hungary	1.32	1.31	1.30	1.28		
	Poland	1.34	1.29	1.24	1.22		
	Romania	1.31	1.27	1.26	1.27		
	Slovak Republic	1.30	1.20	1.19	1.20		
Former USSR	Armenia	1.11	1.02	1.21	1.35		
	Latvia	1.24	1.21	1.24	1.29		
	Lithuania	1.39	1.30	1.24	1.26		
	Moldova	1.30	1.25	1.21	1.22		
	Russian Federation	1.21	1.25	1.32	1.32		
	Ukraine	1.09		1.13	1.17		

(Source) Japan: Statistics and Information Dpt, MHLW
Korea: Korea National Statisitics Office
Taiwan: Taiwan Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics
Europe: Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Development in Europe 2003&2004

5-2. Ineffectiveness of Pronatal Policy

As shown in the sections above, the performance of governmental intervention to fertility has not been very impressive. It turned out that the elasticity of fertility to income is so small that unrealistically large amount of economic support is required to induce a significant fertility recovery. The effect of childcare leave is also so small that a significant rise in fertility via this channel is either impossible or requires a

revolutionary change in labor custom. Governmental efforts for daycare services have not succeeded in raising the compatibility between work and the family. The net effect of daycare service has not been verified statistically.

There is considerable evidence that the pronatal policy has some effects. Cases frequently referred to include France after the Second World War, German state of Saar under French rule, Eastern European socialist countries until the 1970s, and Sweden around 1990 (Chesnais, 1998, pp. 98-99; Atoh, 2000, pp. 198-199; Caldwell et al., 2002, p. 18). Besides these historical cases, abundant quantitative analyses of micro data have proved the effectiveness of various policy measures (Kojima, 1989; 2003). Thus, it is widely accepted that the effect of pronatal policy is not zero. However, the critical question here should be "Can Japan achieve moderately low fertility with policy interventions?". It seems to be very difficult to narrow the difference between Japan and moderately low fertility countries in Western and Northern Europe and English speaking developed countries, considering the small elasticity of fertility to policy measures.

Figure 14. TFR Singapore



Even if policy intervention is successful, its effect is not necessarily lasting. Figure 14 displays the trajectory of the TFR in Singapore. In March 1987, Singapore started a new population policy. Under the slogan of "Have three or more, if you can afford it", such pronatal measures were enforced as tax relief for the third and subsequent children, subsidization of daycare cost, and housing privilege for a large family (Sasai, 2005, pp. 466-467). As a result, the TFR jumped from 1.43 in 1986 to 1.96 in 1988. However, the TFR started declining again from 1989, though it took 15 years to drop to the level of 1986.

There is diversity in attitudes among Korean demographers toward the effectiveness of pronatal policies. Park ST (2002, p. 653) suggested that educational policy that gives an advantage to a large family would be effective in addition to measures already applied in Japan. Kim SK (2004, p. 31) expressed an optimistic view that an efficient development of governmental policy can raise Korean TFR to 1.6 within a decade. Jun KH (2005) also emphasized the effectiveness of pronatal policy, referring to experiences of France in the 1950s and of Eastern Germany in the 1970s.

On the other hand, Kim DS (2005) gave a pessimistic prediction that pronatal policy will not work considering rapid population aging and negative attitude toward marriage and childbearing among young Korean women. Lee SS (2006, pp. 13-14) showed that there is no correlation between budget for pronatal measures and fertility and stated that such measures can be expensive but fruitless.

5-3. Cultural Deterministic View on Fertility

France is famous for its long history of pronatal policy intervention. The Family Code that imposed family allowances was enacted as early as in 1939 and was integrated to social security system in 1945 (Kojima, 1996, p. 157; Caldwell et al., 2002, p. 8). In the background, there was an anxiety on French fertility that was lower than England throughout the 19th century (Chesnais, 1998, p. 92). On the contrary to France, the United Kingdom is famous as a country without pronatal policy (Hiraoka, 1996, p. 131; Atoh, 2000, p. 200; Kamano, 2003, p. 54). Parental leave is 26 weeks and no cash benefit is given (Fukuda, 2003, p. 12), which is less generous than Japan. Governmental effort for childcare service is low and non-profit organizations play a major role. Child allowance is lower for the second and higher order children (Neyer, 2002, pp. 62-67). In spite of this opposing policy orientation, TFRs in France and the United Kingdom showed a very similar trajectory. As depicted in Figure 15, it is only since 1998 that France has consistently overcome the United Kingdom in fertility.

Figure 15. TFR in France, Britain and the US



Weak explanatory power of policy intervention becomes clearer if we include another English speaking country. The United States is even more indifferent to family policy than the United Kingdom. There is no child allowance system. Parental leave is untouched to be 12 weeks without cash benefit (Kamano, 2003, p. 55). Despite the lack of governmental effort, TFR of the United States has been considerably higher than France since the mid 1980s. Thus, there must be some socio-cultural characteristics in Anglo-Saxon countries that keep fertility higher than France. The distinctive feature of age pattern of fertility in English-speaking countries (Chandola et al., 2002) seems to support such an inference.

There is a cultural divide between moderately low fertility and lowest-low or very low fertility. As suggested in Table 5, all Western and Northern European countries and English-speaking countries have successfully avoided lowest-low fertility. McDonald (2005) chose the line of 1.5 to divide moderately low fertility and very low fertility. In his cultural divide, all Nordic countries, all English-speaking countries, and all French and Dutch speaking Western European countries have TFR of 1.5 or higher. The countries with very low fertility are all advanced Eastern Asian countries, all Southern European countries and all German-speaking Western European countries. While emphasizing the role of policy intervention, McDonald suggested that this divide has deep historical roots and is difficult to change. Atoh (2005, pp. 51-52) pointed out the influence of traditional values as one of factors beyond family policy.

Figure 16. Median Age at Home-Leaving of Cohorts Born around 1960



Source: Billari, et al. (2001), Goldscheider&Goldscheider (1994), Ravanera et al. (1995), Suzuki (2003b)

When lowest-low fertility was a phenomenon within Europe, it was natural to look for features common in lowest-low fertility countries. However, once lowest-low fertility has spread out from Europe, the appropriateness of this attempt is questionable. Because lowest-low fertility has appeared in very different cultural settings in Southern Europe, Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia, the phenomenon seems to be a natural response to socioeconomic changes in the postmaterial era. In this respect, those countries that have avoided lowest-low fertility should be seen as exceptional and requiring explanation. This section expands the discussion in Suzuki (2003a) and examines cultural determinants of moderately low fertility in Western and

Northern Europe and advanced English-speaking countries.

Reher (1998) asserted that the contrast between weak family ties in Western and Northern Europe and strong family ties in Southern Europe has deep historical roots. In contrast to the Oriental family system that affected Southern Europe, the "Occidental" structure was based on the conjugal pair and women's position was high in the northern part of the continent. The Reformation changed the meaning of marriage from a sacrament to a civil contract, enhanced women's position further, lowered parental authority, and promoted individualism (Reher, 1998, pp. 213-214). Thus, gender equity and compatibility between wife's work and childcare in today's moderately low fertility countries have long historical background. This is why these countries developed non-parental childcare activities by baby sitters, tutors, childcare workers and other professionals. In contrast, countries with strong family ties are still clinging to maternal cares. According to the Third National Family Survey in 2003 (NIPSSR), 82.9% of Japanese wives agreed that "A mother should not work but take care of her child for three years after the birth". Such an emphasis on mother's supreme role could be the factor that intercepts the effect of childcare service on fertility.

Another prominent feature of Western-Northern Europe and its descendents is early home-leaving. In these countries in the pre-industrial era, young men and women left the parental home before marriage to work as servants (Reher, 1998; Wall, 1999). The tradition of the majority of men and women leaving home before marriage still remains today (Billari et al., 2001, pp. 18-19). Premarital home-leaving is supposed to promote union formation through both consensual union and formal marriage, while Southern European adolescents are suffering from postponement syndrome, which discourages autonomy and decision making ability in their own lives (Dalla Zuanna, 2001; Livi-Bacci, 2001). As shown in Figure 16, Japan occupies a singular position in that men leave as early as Northern Europeans while women leave as late as Southern Europeans. However, since late leaving of either sex discourages union formation, Japan may suffer from the same problem as Southern Europeans.

Figure 17. Proportion of Extramarital Birth



Source: Council of Europe, NIPSSR

Last but not least, a clear cultural divide in cohabitation and extramarital birth has been observed. These postmodern behaviors were once related to the fertility decline to below replacement level. Today, however, the low frequency of such behaviors is a good predictor of lowest-low fertility. Japan is characterized by very robust marriage institution. As shown in Figure 17, the proportion of extramarital births in Japan has been extremely low even compared with lowest-low fertility countries in Southern Europe. The proportion in 2004 was 1.99%, which hardly changed from 0.80% in 1980. As long as the Japanese people cling to reproduction via marriage, it would be difficult to avoid postponement syndrome, cease overprotecting children, flatten continuously rising cost of children, and socialize childrearing.

Patterns of home-leaving, cohabitation and extramarital births are unclear in Korea. It seems that no Korean demographer is interested in home-leaving behavior of young people. Some Korean demographers asserted that premarital cohabitation is recently on an increase without showing any evidence (Jun KH, 2002, p. 110; Byun HS, 2002, pp. 244-245). However, the Frontiers of Gender Studies Survey in 2004 by Ochanomizu University showed that, in Seoul capital region, the proportion of unmarried persons who experienced cohabitation was as low as in Japan (Takezawa, 2005, p. 50). Thus, the proportion of currently cohabiting young women is supposed to be practically zero[2]. No data are available for extramarital births, even though it is widely believed that such cases are rare in Korea (Cho BY et al., 1999, p. 31; Eun KS, 2003, p. 577; Lee SS et al., 2004, p. 74).

Conclusion

Japan has been adopting and extending policy measures to cope with low fertility. However, those efforts have not been successful in preventing fertility decline. Quantitative analyses have shown that the effects of policy interventions are weak. Thus, a large part of the difference from moderately low fertility should be attributed to direct effects of cultural features, not to governmental efforts. This might apply to Korea and Taiwan. It is just a fantasy that TFR would come back to moderately low level if Eastern Asian countries adopted policy interventions used in Western and Northern Europe. Although gender equity is a widely accepted political goal, it would be difficult to catch up Western-Northern Europe that has long historical background. It is questionable if a consensus can be made that a government should promote early home-leaving of young people. A government definitely should not induce extramarital births by increasing the number of welfare mothers. Then, continuous fertility recovery would be impossible without a radical change in family

2 The proportion for Japan is estimated to have been 0.48% in the late 1990s (Suzuki, 2003a, p. 6).

pattern. Although there is a sign of assimilation to Western-Northern weak family pattern in Southern Europe, such a change would be more difficult to take place in Eastern Asia. Then, it would be possible that lowest-low fertility in Eastern Asia lasts longer and falls further than that of European forerunners.

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日韓の極低出生力の要因と政策の非有効性

合計出生率が1.3以下と定義される極低出生力は、2000年代に入り東アジアに波及した。日韓とも最近の出生力低下には結婚力低下とともに結婚出生力低下も寄与しているが、日本では結婚出生力低下は性交頻度の低下と不妊の増加によると考えられる。配偶者や子への需要は必ずしも低くなく、子の費用の高騰、若年労働市場の悪化と不確実性の増加、女子の労働力参加等が需要の達成を妨げていると見られる。児童手当、育児休暇、保育サービス等の出生促進策の効果は、期待されるほど高くないことが示される。北西欧や英語圏先進国との出生力の差は、政府の努力よりは文化的パターンの差異に求められるべきである。

日韓의 極低出産力의 要因과 政策의 非有效性

合計出産率이 1.3 以下로 定義되는 極低出産力은 2000年代에 들어와 東北亜로 波及되었다. 日本과 韓國의 경우, 모두 最近의 出産力 低下에 結婚力의 低下와 함께 結婚出産力의 低下도 寄與하고 있는데 日本에서는 結婚出産力의 低下는 性交頻度 低下와 不妊 增加에 起因한 것으로 생각된다. 配偶者나 子女에 對한 需要는 반드시 낮은 水準이라고 할 수 없으며 子女費用의 急上昇, 青年 勞動市場의 悪化, 不確實性의 增加, 女性의 勞動力 參加 等이 이들 需要의 充足을 妨害하고 있는 것으로 보인다. 兒童手當, 育兒休職, 保育서비스 等 出産奬勵對策들의 效果는 期待만큼 크지 않는 것을 確認한다. 北西 유럽이나 英語圏 先進國들과의 出産力 差異는 政府努力의 差異보다는 文化類型의 差異에서 찾아야 한다.