


世帯人数 1人
表8

	1986年	1995年	2001年
データ数	3114	5046	4802
ジニ係数	0.3934	0.4084	0.4238
平均	0.3932	0.4082	0.4237
標準誤差	0.0063	0.0049	0.0065
変動係数	0.0159	0.0120	0.0154

プロロージビリティ測度

	1995年	2001年
1986年	0.9705	0.9999
1995年	-	0.9760

図8




世帯人数 2人
表9

	1986年	1995年	2001年
データ数	5091	7087	7045
ジニ係数	0.3625	0.3649	0.3669
平均	0.3623	0.3648	0.3668
標準誤差	0.0060	0.0046	0.0046
変動係数	0.0164	0.0125	0.0124

プロロージビリティ測度

	1995年	2001年
1986年	0.6327	0.7267
1995年	-	0.6230

図9




世帯人数 3人
表10

	1986年	1995年	2001年
データ数	5206	5453	4764
ジニ係数	0.2920	0.3165	0.3353
平均	0.2920	0.3164	0.3352
標準誤差	0.0041	0.0049	0.0056
変動係数	0.0141	0.0154	0.0168

プロロージビリティ測度

	1995年	2001年
1986年	0.9999	1.0000
1995年	-	0.9946

図10




世帯人数 4人
表11

	1986年	1995年	2001年
データ数	7145	5722	4352
ジニ係数	0.2629	0.2906	0.3159
平均	0.2628	0.2904	0.3157
標準誤差	0.0039	0.0045	0.0053
変動係数	0.0149	0.0154	0.0167

プロロージビリティ測度

	1995年	2001年
1986年	1.0000	1.0000
1995年	-	0.9999

図11




世帯人数 5人以上
表12

	1986年	1995年	2001年
データ数	5718	4605	3516
ジニ係数	0.2803	0.2894	0.2980
平均	0.2802	0.2892	0.2981
標準誤差	0.0048	0.0047	0.0055
変動係数	0.0173	0.0164	0.0185

プロキシビリティ測定

	1995年	2001年
1986年	0.9074	0.9934
1995年	-	0.8908

図12




家族類型 1986年
表13

	単独	夫婦	核家族	三世代	その他
データ数	3018	3995	13694	4137	1430
ジニ係数	0.3854	0.3613	0.2761	0.2817	0.3400
平均	0.3851	0.3612	0.2761	0.2815	0.3394
標準誤差	0.0066	0.0070	0.0027	0.0055	0.0095
変動係数	0.0171	0.0194	0.0097	0.0196	0.0281

プロキシビリティ測度

	夫婦	核家族	三世代	その他
単独	0.9928	1.0000	1.0000	0.9996
夫婦	-	1.0000	1.0000	0.9618
核家族	-	-	0.8135	1.0000
三世代	-	-	-	1.0000

図13




家族類型 1995年
表14

	単独	夫婦	核家族	三世代	その他
データ数	4703	5638	12359	3438	1775
ジニ係数	0.3857	0.3608	0.3063	0.2872	0.3757
平均	0.3856	0.3606	0.3063	0.2869	0.3754
標準誤差	0.0044	0.0050	0.0030	0.0052	0.0090
変動係数	0.0114	0.0139	0.0099	0.0182	0.0239

プロキシビリティ測度

	夫婦	核家族	三世代	その他
単独	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	0.8491
夫婦	-	1.0000	1.0000	0.9305
核家族	-	-	0.9992	1.0000
三世代	-	-	-	1.0000

図14




家族類型 2001年
表15

	単独	夫婦	核家族	3世代	その他
データ数	5403	5520	9885	2873	1698
ジニ係数	0.3984	0.3593	0.3288	0.2981	0.3941
平均	0.3983	0.3592	0.3288	0.2980	0.3936
標準誤差	0.0067	0.0053	0.0039	0.0059	0.0080
変動係数	0.0169	0.0148	0.0118	0.0199	0.0204

プロキシビリティ測度

	夫婦	核家族	三世代	その他
単独	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	0.6666
夫婦	-	1.0000	1.0000	0.9999
核家族	-	-	1.0000	1.0000
三世代	-	-	-	1.0000

図15




単独世帯
表16

	1986年	1995年	2001年
データ数	3018	4703	5403
ジニ係数	0.3854	0.3857	0.3984
平均	0.3851	0.3856	0.3983
標準誤差	0.0066	0.0044	0.0067
変動係数	0.0171	0.0114	0.0169

プロキシビリティ測度

	1995年	2001年
1986年	0.5262	0.9221
1995年	-	0.9480

図16




夫婦世帯
表17

	1986年	1995年	2001年
データ数	3995	5638	5520
ジニ係数	0.3613	0.3608	0.3593
平均	0.3612	0.3606	0.3592
標準誤差	0.0070	0.0050	0.0053
変動係数	0.0194	0.0139	0.0148

プロキシビリティ測度

	1995年	2001年
1986年	0.5127	0.5814
1995年	-	0.5836

図17




核家族世帯
表18

	1986年	1995年	2001年
データ数	13694	12359	9885
ジニ係数	0.2761	0.3063	0.3288
平均	0.2761	0.3063	0.3288
標準誤差	0.0027	0.0030	0.0039
変動係数	0.0097	0.0099	0.0118

プロキシビリティ測度

	1995年	2001年
1986年	1.0000	1.0000
1995年	-	1.0000

図18




三世代世帯
表19

	1986年	1995年	2001年
データ数	4137	3438	2873
ジニ係数	0.2817	0.2872	0.2981
平均	0.2815	0.2869	0.2980
標準誤差	0.0055	0.0052	0.0059
変動係数	0.0196	0.0182	0.0199

プロキシビリティ測度

	1995年	2001年
1986年	0.7630	0.9797
1995年	-	0.9209

図19




その他の世帯
表20

	1986年	1995年	2001年
データ数	1430	1775	1698
ジニ係数	0.3400	0.3757	0.3941
平均	0.3394	0.3754	0.3936
標準誤差	0.0095	0.0090	0.0080
変動係数	0.0281	0.0239	0.0204

プロキシビリティ測度

	1995年	2001年
1986年	0.9951	0.9999
1995年	-	0.9325

図20



家族類型 1986年
表21

		家族類型					総計
		単独	夫婦	核家族	三世代	その他	
ゆとり	very tight	558	396	1641	354	144	3093
	a bit tight	1025	1007	3983	950	322	7287
	standard	1272	2075	6889	2304	777	13317
	ok	137	436	1078	471	164	2286
	very good	26	81	103	58	23	291
総計		3018	3995	13694	4137	1430	26274

(実現値－理論値) ²		家族類型				
理論値		単独	夫婦	核家族	三世代	その他
ゆとり	very tight	115.67	11.74	0.52	36.33	3.52
	a bit tight	42.21	9.21	9.01	33.96	14.03
	standard	43.41	1.24	0.39	20.47	3.76
	ok	60.06	22.49	10.80	34.26	12.59
	very good	1.65	30.53	15.62	3.24	3.24

特化係数		家族類型				
		単独	夫婦	核家族	三世代	その他
ゆとり	very tight	1.57	0.84	1.02	0.73	0.86
	a bit tight	1.22	0.91	1.05	0.83	0.81
	standard	0.83	1.02	0.99	1.10	1.07
	ok	0.52	1.25	0.90	1.31	1.32
	very good	0.78	1.83	0.68	1.27	1.45

家族類型 1995年
表22

		家族類型					総計
		単独	夫婦	核家族	三世代	その他	
ゆとり	very tight	628	453	1741	404	209	3435
	a bit tight	1413	1373	4030	924	451	8191
	standard	2393	3332	5927	1888	981	14521
	ok	247	428	618	208	127	1628
	very good	22	52	43	14	7	138
総計		4703	5638	12359	3438	1775	27913

(実現値－理論値) ²		家族類型				
理論値		単独	夫婦	核家族	三世代	その他
ゆとり	very tight	4.19	83.59	31.85	0.86	0.41
	a bit tight	0.79	47.88	44.84	7.14	9.37
	standard	1.17	54.27	39.26	5.53	3.59
	ok	2.72	29.91	14.67	0.28	5.32
	very good	0.07	20.88	5.36	0.53	0.36

特化係数		家族類型				
		単独	夫婦	核家族	三世代	その他
ゆとり	very tight	1.02	0.61	1.08	0.90	0.90
	a bit tight	0.96	0.78	1.05	0.86	0.82
	standard	0.92	1.07	0.87	0.99	1.00
	ok	0.85	1.23	0.81	0.98	1.15
	very good	0.89	1.76	0.66	0.78	0.75

家族類型 2001年

表23

		家族類型					総計
		単独	夫婦	核家族	三世代	その他	
ゆとり	very tight	873	793	2258	601	314	4839
	a bit tight	1361	1545	3363	884	492	7645
	standard	2057	2831	3899	1283	797	10867
	ok	189	321	341	98	81	1030
	very good	23	30	24	7	14	98
総計		4503	5520	9885	2873	1698	24479

(実現値－理論値) ²		家族類型				
理論値		単独	夫婦	核家族	三世代	その他
ゆとり	very tight	0.33	81.49	47.27	1.93	1.40
	a bit tight	1.46	18.57	24.64	0.20	2.77
	standard	1.68	59.08	54.55	0.05	2.48
	ok	0.00	33.90	13.50	4.33	1.28
	very good	1.37	2.82	6.13	1.76	7.63

特化係数		家族類型				
		単独	夫婦	核家族	三世代	その他
ゆとり	very tight	1.05	0.78	1.24	1.14	1.00
	a bit tight	1.04	0.96	1.17	1.06	1.00
	standard	1.10	1.24	0.95	1.08	1.13
	ok	1.07	1.48	0.88	0.87	1.22
	very good	1.37	1.46	0.65	0.65	2.21

全体
表24

	1986年	1995年	2001年
データ数	26274	27913	24479
平均対数偏差	0.1793	0.2212	0.2447
平均	0.1793	0.2212	0.2447
標準誤差	0.0028	0.0029	0.0034
変動係数	0.0154	0.0132	0.0139

プロージビリティ測度

	1995年	2001年
1986年	1.0000	1.0000
1995年	-	1.0000

図24






表25

	1986年	1995年	2001年
若年	26.6%	20.4%	16.7%
壮年	59.0%	54.5%	49.1%
老年	14.4%	25.1%	34.2%
合計	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%


若年
図25



壮年
図26



老年
図27



第II-6章

こどものいる世帯の経済格差

白波瀬佐和子（東京大学）


子どものいる世帯の経済格差： 少子化の中の不平等

第79回日本社会学会
2006年10月28日(土)
立命館大学
白波瀬佐和子 (東京大学)

1

どうして少子化が進むのか？

- 合計特殊出生率の低下要因
 1. 若年層の晩婚化・未婚化
 2. 既婚カップルの出生率の低下



少子化への対策としての経済支援

2

予定子ども数が理想子ども数を下回る理由に経済的な理由をあげるものが約3分の2


理由	割合 (%)
子育てや教育にお金がかかりすぎるから	62.9
高年齢で生むのはいやだから	33.2
これ以上、育児の心理的、肉体的負担に耐えられないから	21.8
子どもがのびのび育つ社会環境でないから	20.4
健康上の理由から	19.7
自分の仕事に差し支えるから	17.1
欲しいけれどもできないから	15.7
家が狭いから	14.6
夫の家事・育児への協力が得られないから	12.1
自分や夫婦の生活を大切にしたいから	11.5
一番末の子が夫の定年退職までに成人してほしいから	9.6
夫が望まないから	7.2
その他	5.6

出所：「第12回出生動向基本調査：夫婦両者の結果概要」(国立社会保険・人口問題研究所)

3

本研究の背景にある問題意識

- 表1の結果を受けて、出産を抑える主たる理由として経済的要因をあげ、手当に代表される経済的子育て支援に注目が集まる。しかし、出産・育児に経済的な負担を訴えること、実際の出産行動との間に直接的な関係があるかどうかは慎重に検討すべきである。




リサーチクエッション

世帯の家計レベルと子どもの有無・子ども数との間にどのような関係が認められるのか。

4

理想子ども数とのギャップとマクロな経済的影響に関する意識の間には有意な関係が認められない。







出所：「第1回人口・家族・世代に関する世論調査」(毎日新聞社、2004年)

5

子どものいる世帯の経済格差

- データ：国民生活基礎調査所得票 (1986年、1995年、2001年)
- 分析対象：40代以下の世帯主世帯
- 経済的地位：等価可処分所得 ($\epsilon = 5$)
- 格差の指標：
 - ジニ係数
 - 低所得割合 ($<<$ 全体中央所得/2)


6




中学生をもつ世帯が生活が苦しいと訴える傾向にある

表 末子年齢別 家計に関する意識 (%)

	大変苦しい	やや苦しい	普通	ややゆとりがある	大変ゆとりがある
【1986年】					
未就学児世帯	11.70	33.94	48.76	5.21	0.39
小学生世帯	11.06	31.38	50.44	6.57	0.55
中学生世帯	13.58	28.69	49.95	7.09	0.69
【1995年】					
未就学児世帯	14.12	38.65	43.00	4.05	0.17
小学生世帯	15.65	34.74	45.08	4.16	0.37
中学生世帯	18.44	34.62	41.84	4.64	0.46
【2001年】					
未就学児世帯	22.04	35.95	38.95	2.84	0.22
小学生世帯	23.14	38.17	34.84	3.59	0.26
中学生世帯	25.25	38.78	33.48	2.37	0.11



高所得層は共働き割合が高く、子ども数も少ない



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分析結果 I

- 経済的に豊かな層ほど子ども数が多いわけではないので、経済的に支援することが子ども数を増やすことにつながるという単純な関係は見出せない。
- 経済的に苦しいと訴えているのは、幼い子をもつ世帯よりも中高生をもつ世帯に認められる。経済的な子育て支援については、幼い子のいる世帯だけにターゲットをあてるのは不十分である。

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分析結果 II

- 出産・育児に対するコスト感の中身は階層によって異なる。子どものいる世帯の中で、低所得層は高所得層に比べて子どもの数が多い。低所得層では共働き割合も低く、経済的な負担感を呈しやすい。
- 一方、高所得層では経済的に苦しいと答える割合は低いが、子ども数は少なく一人あたりの子育てコストが高いことが予想される。高所得層では、子育てにお金をかける、かけられるから、コスト感が生まれるとも解釈できる。

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考察 I

- 子どもをもつ世帯の経済状態、子どもの数、生活の苦しさ意識の関係はそれほど単純ではない。従って、子育てに経済的支援を提供しても、その効果が出生率に即時的に反映するとは限らない。
- しかし、ここで子育ての経済的支援を無駄であると言っているのではない。経済的支援の政策効果をどこに、どの時点にみるかは、慎重であるべきことを述べている。

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考察 II

- 子どもをもつ世帯と子どもを持たない世帯の経済的格差の縮小を手当てや税制上の優遇措置によって実行することは、出生率の上昇いかにかわらず重要である。

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第II-7章

Widowhood Later in Life in Japan

Sawako Shirahase (University of Tokyo)

**Widowhood Later in Life in Japan:
Considering Social Security System in the Aging Society**

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Widowhood Later in Life in Japan:
Considering the Social Security System in the Aging Society

Sawako Shirahase

1. Introduction

The falling birthrate and aging population give us a good opportunity to seriously examine the current social security system in Japan. A dramatic transformation of demographic structure has been led by a continuous decline in the total fertility rate and a sharp increase in the proportion of the elderly aged 65 and over and the expansion of longevity. The total fertility rate has declined particularly since the “1.57 shock” in 1990 and it was 1.29 in 2003. On the other hand, the proportion of the elderly aged 65 years and over in the total population has been continuously rising, particularly since 1980 and it became 19.1 percent in 2003. It took just 24 years for the proportion of the elderly to double from 7 percent to 14 percent in Japan, and its length is less than one-fourth of the corresponding figure in France where aging population took place with the slowest pace in Europe. A combination of continuously declining birthrate and fast aging population characterizes the recent demographic change in Japan. This speed of change is one of the main reasons why people became overly pessimistic and at the same time confused about the future. It is time to discuss seriously how to reform the social security system in Japan, while it is not wise to overly react to this rapid social change. First of all, we have to examine the current situation based on the empirical data and to see what has changed and what has not changed.

Figure 1 about here

Aging means not only an increase in the proportion of the elderly aged 65 and over in the total population, but also the extension of longevity (life-span extension). It changes health conditions, employment status and the household type among the elderly. Life expectancy at 65 years old rises for both men and women (Figure 1), and an important finding here is the widening difference in the life expectancy between men and women. In 1955, the life

expectancy of men after the age of 65 was 11.8 years and that of women 14.1 years, the difference being 2.3 years. In 2003, the life expectancy of men after the age of 65 was 18.0 years and that of women 23.0 years, the difference being more than double. This difference in life expectancy between men and women is associated with the change in the household structure to which they belong later in life. The most noticeable example is the increase in the proportion of the elderly living alone (hereinafter referred to as a single-person household). The proportion of male single-person households modestly increased from 2.2% in 1986 to 3.4% in 1998, while the proportion of female single-person households sharply rose 9.7% to 13.6% in the same period (Shirahase 2005b). However, becoming widowed for the elderly does not always mean an immediate shift to single-person households. People usually have another option of living with their children since the majority of married couples have child(ren) in their ages. Therefore, the difference in the proportion of single-person households between men and women cannot be explained only by the gender difference in life expectancy. Nevertheless, considering that women have longer life expectancy than men and that on average, wives are younger than their husbands, we can expect that the chances of the female elderly forming a single-person household are higher than their male counterparts.

Figure 2 about here

Figure 2 shows the trend of the distribution of household structure with the elderly aged 65 and over from 1975 to 2000. The largest increases over 25 years are found among the elderly living alone (single-person household) and couple-only households, while the proportion of the multi-generational households, typically three-generational households, sharply has declined. Many elderly used to enjoy basic life security through living with their children in three-generational households. However, the proportion of the elderly living with their children has decreased, while the rate of those living only with their spouse and the rate of those living alone have increased. As a result, where or how the elderly receive their basic life security has changed, and at the same time people's expectation towards the role of the social security system has increased. Nevertheless, the current social security system in Japan is not prepared to meet the high expectation. The Japanese social security system has depended on the role of the

family in which its members could receive the basic life security within the household. This was known as the Japanese-type welfare society (Liberal Democratic Party of Japan 1979). The social security system was built on the latent assets of the families (Harada 1988; Osawa 1993). However, the living arrangement has changed as represented by the change in the household structure in contemporary Japan. It means that we cannot expect as much safety net provided by the family as before.

In this study, I will examine the needs of the elderly people, focusing on the economic well-being of the elderly living alone compared with those who live with their family. People's social risks such as illness and poverty associated with aging would vary depending on their socio-economic situation: the higher the socio-economic status, the better they are ready for their potential risks of aging. The more the family members with whom they share the household, the better the level of receiving the basic life security within the household. The household can pool various social resources among co-residing family members with different generations, but if the elderly live alone, they will be more likely to face various risks directly. We will see how the elderly living alone are disadvantageous with respect to economic well-being and how much vulnerable to various risks later in their life in Japan compared with those in other nations.

This study consists of three major parts. In the first part, the change in economic well-being of the elderly living alone in Japan will be examined from the mid-1980s, to the beginning of the twenty-first century. Shirahase (2002) and Seike and Yamada (2005) pointed out that the elderly living alone are economically disadvantaged. I will examine if the level of socio-economic well-being for the elderly living alone has changed, corresponding to the increase in the number of single-person households among the elderly since the mid 1980s. In the second part, I will compare the extent of economic inequality for the elderly living alone at the beginning of the 21st century with that in other industrial nations. The nations which are compared with Japan in this study are Germany, Italy, Sweden, Taiwan, United Kingdom, and the U.S.

In the final part, focusing on the elderly who are under the long-term care, I will examine how much personal networks and personal resources are utilized in receiving the long-term care among the elderly living in different types of household structure. The expansion of longevity

implies a higher proportion of those aged 75 and over and the increase in those who face a higher risk of receiving the long-term care. When the elderly enter the latter stages of old age, the chance of deteriorating their health condition becomes higher and consequently a chance of requiring long-term care strikingly increases dramatically (Japan Ministry of Health, Labor, Welfare 2005). The work life of the elderly depends on their health condition and further it determines their level of economic well-being. We then like to examine how personal network and personal resources work in supporting the life of the frail elderly in Japan.

2. Economic Well-Being of the Elderly Living Alone

The Japanese data used in this study is the National Survey of Living Conditions (Kokumin Seikatsu Kiso Chosa), conducted by the Japan Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare in 1986, 1995 and 2001. The unit of the survey is the household, and the household with the elderly means the household where those aged 65 and over live and it does not necessarily mean that the head of the household is the elderly. The extent of income inequality is measured by disposable income, which is calculated by subtracting tax and social insurance payments from total gross income. In order to take into account the difference in the family size, I will use the equivalent scale of elasticity 0.5, following the previous study by Nishizaki et al. (1998). I assume that there is no difference in equivalence of elasticity between working adults and children or retired elderly. Behind this assumption, it is supposed that family members more or less equally share the economic well-being within the same household, regardless of differences in their life stages. Since the basic unit of consumption is the household, I believe that this assumption is in general reasonable in contemporary capitalist societies.

The other main variable in our analysis is the type of the household structure, and it is constructed by the number of the household members and their relationship to the head of the household. The household structures used in this study are divided into the following five categories: (1) the single-person household, (2) the couple-only household, (3) the household consisting of only the married couple and unmarried child(ren), hereafter the nuclear-family household (4) the three-generational household and (5) other household. In this study, I like to

focus on the elderly living alone (hereinafter referred to as the elderly single-person household) in Japan and other nations. The three-generational household in which most elderly used to live and the nuclear household whose number is increasing due to the delay in marriage among the adult child(ren) are sometimes combined into the a single category, called “other household.”

Figure 3 about here

First, in this section, economic well-being of the elderly living alone is examined with respect to economic inequality, indicated with the gini coefficient and the poverty rate which is the proportion of those whose disposable income is less than half of the medium disposable income of the total household. Figure 3 shows the trend of the gini coefficients among the total households, the households with the elderly, and the elderly single-person households since the mid-1980s. Shirahase (2005b) claimed that the degree of economic inequality by household type with the elderly converged; in the past, economic inequality in the male single-person household was the highest and that in the three-generational household the lowest. The extent of economic inequality used to be largely different by household type. However, the differences in the extent of economic inequality by household type with the elderly were becoming smaller, although the degree of economic inequality among the elderly single-person household remains high, compared with those among other types of the household with the elderly. The extent of economic inequality among the households with the elderly has improved primarily because the economic inequality among the male single-person household and the couple-only household has declined. However, the overall extent of economic inequality (including all households) has become worsened mainly due to the expansion in economic inequality among the households headed by the young- and middle-aged head since the mid 1980s.

The degree of economic inequality in the total households expanded from .2998 in the mid-1980s to .3718 in 2001. In contrast, the degree of economic inequality in households whose head is 65 years old and over dropped from .3668 to .3479. Japan has been characterized by a higher degree of economic inequality among households with the elderly than that among households without the elderly (Shirahase 2002), but economic inequality among households with the elderly in general declined from the mid-1980s to 2001.

Table 1 about here

One of the reasons for the decline in the extent of economic inequality among elderly households is due to a decrease in the rate of low-income households with the elderly (Shirahase 2005c). Table 1 shows the proportion of the households whose disposable income was less than 50 percent of the median disposable income of the total households among those aged 60s and 70 and over. The proportion of low-income (i.e. less than a half of the median) among single-person households aged 60s largely declined: the proportion of the low-income households declined from 56.1 percent in 1986 to 39.4 percent in 2001. The proportion of the low-income household whose head is aged 70 and over also declined from 69.7 percent to 44.9 percent. The extent to which the elderly face the economic risk represented by the low-income rate, thus, has recently reduced. The one of the reasons for this decline in the low-income rate among the household with the elderly is derived from the improvement of the social security system. Although the level of the social security benefits, as shown as its ratio to GDP, is not favorable in Japan, compared with Europe, it still did improved over the period and consequently resulted in the decline in the low-income rate among the households with the elderly.

Table 2 about here

Table 2 presents gini coefficients by the four categories of the households headed by those aged 60s and those aged 70 and over. The household categories shown in Table 2 are the single-person household, the couple-only household, the nuclear-family household, and the three-generational households. Among the households whose head is aged 60s, the degree of economic inequality is the highest among single-person households, that is, .04309 in 2001. On the contrary, economic inequality increases among nuclear-family households and among three generation households. The increase in the number of nuclear-family households with the elderly where unmarried children live with their parents is closely associated with the delay in marriage among the young people, and Yamada (1999) referred to them as “parasite singles.” Such households where the elderly parents and unmarried adult children co-reside increased regardless of different economic levels of the household: they can be found in both rich and poor families. The low-income rate among the households whose age of the head is in their 60s is also