

among households with unmarried children. For the thirties age group we may further observe a similar widening of economic differentials for households composed of childless couples, and even three-generation households have shown widening economic differentials in recent years. As for the forties group, economic differentials show relative stability across the three time-points, though here too a widening of differentials among nuclear families is a notable feature.

Turning now to households headed by people in their sixties and over, widening differentials may be observed within the categories of nuclear families and three-generation households. Nuclear families with household heads in their sixties [and over] often include unmarried adults still cohabiting with their parents. In that sense we may say that economic differentials have been widening among households that include unmarried adult offspring. A similar widening of differentials may be observed in three-generation families where the older generation typically relies upon the cohabiting younger generations for livelihood support. The three-generation household, long the representative living arrangement for older people in Japan, is rapidly declining in numbers compared with other forms of household constitution; within this dwindling category, economic differentials are steadily widening. For householders in their sixties, retirement from regular work may be followed by re-employment or by an immediate transition to life on a pension. The presence or absence of employment income leads to a greater variety of economic circumstances in this age range. It is when people are in their sixties that differences in working styles and living styles become most apparent, and hence this is where economic differentials are at their widest.

For householders in their seventies, economic differentials narrowed for almost all types of household during the period surveyed. For single-person households, the Gini coefficient fell from .392 in 1986 to .366 in 2001, while for households composed of married couples the decline was much bigger – all the way from .430 to .320. For nuclear families, Gini declined [from .371 to .327]. For the over-seventies, hitherto the group with the biggest economic differentials, there was a narrowing of differentials, clearly distinguishing the ‘old old’ from the ‘young old’ in their sixties, for whom differentials widened.

Economic differentials are one index for gauging the degree to which wealthy people and poor people are mixed together in a given population, but they do not constitute sufficient data to calculate the degree of economic risk actually afflicting people. For example, a population may be composed mainly of poor people, showing only small economic differentials within the group but still showing a high proportion of people with low incomes. With that in mind, let us now look at the degree of

economic risk for each type of household, taking the proportion of low-income households as an indicator of economic risk.

6. Differences in Economic Risk According to Household Composition

<Table 3 about here>

Table 3 shows changes across the survey period in the proportion of low-income households for each type of household composition. It is immediately striking how the proportion of low-income households rose for every type of household in the twenties age range. The rise was especially noticeable for single person households (15.2% to 24.6%), and for households with children (15.7% to 22.3% for nuclear families; 6.4% to 12.5% for three-generation families). For the thirties age range too the low-income proportion rose for every kind of household, albeit not as sharply as for the twenties group.

From the thirties upwards, all the age ranges showed a decline in the low-income ratio for single-person households, from 24.3% to 14.2% in the forties, 39.6% to 31.0% in the fifties, 56.1% to 39.4% in the sixties, and 69.7% to 44.9% in the seventies. We can therefore identify a lower level of economic risk in these categories, especially marked in the two oldest age ranges. Despite this improvement, however, old people are still exposed to a higher level of economic risk than young and middle-aged people: we cannot overlook the fact that nearly 40% of Japanese people living alone in their 60s, and almost half of those in their 70s and above, are in the low income bracket.⁹ The over-sixties still have the highest proportion of low-income households, although economic differentials are narrowing for this age group.

We can also observe a marked increase in low-income households where the householder is in his/her thirties, especially those with small children. We have already seen in table 2 above that economic differentials are widening for this age range, and the data in table 3 suggests that the increasing economic inequality among nuclear family households in this age range is [largely] caused by sinking economic fortunes at the bottom end of the economic pecking order, reflected in the increasing proportion of low-income households. The widening economic differentials among families with small children are a major background factor in the argument for [higher levels of]

⁹ Note in particular that elderly women in Japan are exposed to a higher level of risk than their counterparts in the industrialized countries of Europe and North America (Seike and Yamada 2004; Shirahase 2006).

social security to be extended to this group, as well as to the elderly (Tsumura 2002; National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2005b).

So far we have been looking at economic differentials and low-income ratios for all forms of household composition. One important point that emerges is that single-person households show large economic differentials and high ratios of low-income households for all age ranges. Let us therefore take a closer look at people who live on their own, and add a gender perspective to the discussion.

7. Economic Conditions of Single-person Households

What sort of people live alone in Japan? Let us look at the singleton population in terms of gender and age. As of 2001, 35.6% of them were male and 64.4% were female. This is a very strong female majority, although it has been coming down somewhat in recent years. Figure 4 shows that the female proportion of the singleton population only went up in the thirties age range during the 15-year survey period, and there only marginally. In other age ranges the female proportion stayed about the same or declined. The decline was particularly marked in the forties and fifties age ranges – or to put it another way, the proportion of men rose quite sharply for these groups. This reflects the growing numbers of men remaining permanently unmarried – up from 8.99% in 1995 to 12.57% in 2000¹⁰ (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2005a). The permanent non-marriage ratio for women has also been rising steadily, though not as fast as the male ratio. It stood at 5.82% in 2000 (*ibid.*).

<Figure 4 about here>

There are various ways people come to live alone, and table 4 shows the marital status for different age ranges of male and female singletons. [Not surprisingly,] the vast majority of those in their 20s are unmarried, and there has been no great change over time in the gender ratio for this group. However, the picture is rather different for female singletons in their thirties, where the unmarried proportion rose from 84% in 1986 to 92.8% in 2001. The fact that this age group alone shows an increase in the female ratio doubtless reflects the trend for women to postpone marriage (*bankonka*) or refrain from marrying altogether (*mikonka*). In 1986, some 15% of female singletons were divorced or separated; by 2001 [Js: 2000] that figure had halved and over 90% of

¹⁰ This study takes the percentage of men still unmarried at the age of 50 as a rough guide to the lifetime male non-marriage ratio.

these women were unmarried.

As for the men, we see no great change in marital status for the younger age groups, but for men living alone in their fifties and sixties there is an interesting rise in the number of bachelors. In 2001 over half of men in the fifties group were bachelors, while the proportion divorced or separated had fallen from 41.1% in 1986 to 35.5%. The proportion of bachelors also rose in the sixties group, but here there was also a big increase in divorced and separated men, which reached 40% in 2001. In the mid-1980s a strong majority of men living alone in their sixties were widowers, but there has been a massive change there, the proportion falling from 57.4% in 1986 to 36.6% in 2001. Going back to female singletons, we find that for them, age groups from the forties upwards have all seen a big increase in the divorced/separated proportion. In the fifties age range particularly, that group grew from 23.4% in 1986 to 46.7% in 2001.

<Table 4 about here>

In Japan the post-war baby boom generation is called the *dankai* generation.¹¹ [In 2001] these baby boomers were in their fifties, and some interesting differences were emerging between male and female members of the cohort. Though much discussed because of its sheer size, this group displays an internal variety of individual lifestyles hardly conveyed by the word *dankai*, originally meaning a lump or nodule of some geological substance. Traditionally in Japan, a man in his fifties was supposed to be the pillar of the household, the breadwinner of his family, and a reliable member of the middle management in the workplace, at or near the top of the remuneration pyramid. Such a man would be able to carry on supporting his children even if they remained economically dependent on him after reaching adulthood. However, in years to come a dwindling number of men in their fifties will match that profile. More and more men reach their fifties still unmarried; more of them are divorced or separated; and quite a few of them are struggling economically.

<Table 5 about here>

Table 5 shows the proportion of single-person households in the low-income

¹¹ The word 'dankai' was first applied to the baby-boom generation by novelist Sakaiya Tai'ichi, when he used it in the title of his 1976 novel *Dankai no Sedai* (The Dankai Generation). It most frequently refers to the approximately eight million people born in the three year 1947-1949, although some writers use the term more generally to refer to people born in the first decade after the war.

bracket, for men and women. One noticeable finding is the rise in the proportion of low-income households among men and women living alone in their twenties – a rise that was especially sharp in the six-year period from 1995 to 2001. It is equally evident that among people who live alone, women are far more likely than men to fall into the low-income bracket. For the entire population, no less than 42% of women are in the low-income bracket, almost double the figure for men. This massive gap cannot be accounted for simply in terms of gender differences in rates of employment. In the overall population of people living alone, the proportion holding jobs is generally high, and for women in their fifties the percentage holding down a job climbed from 70% in 1986 to 86% in 2001. Even if they have low incomes, most people who live alone do have a job. This indicates that high levels of economic risk among single-person households have more to do with low wages than unemployment.

<Figure 5 about here>

Very well – is it generally true that people living alone are suffering from a poor economic situation? Far from it. Figure 5 divides Japan's households into economic deciles, showing the percentage of single-person households in each decile as of 2001. The most interesting feature that emerges is that for singletons in their thirties and forties, the economic profile is U-shaped, with relatively high incidence at the bottom and top ends of the economic spectrum. Certainly there are plenty of poor people living alone, but we can also observe a 'bachelor aristocracy' of wealthy singletons in the ninth and tenth deciles.¹² However, once we move into the fifties and above, we find ever higher proportions of singletons in the bottom two or three deciles while the wealthy type becomes much rarer. As people grow older, the connection between single life and economic risk becomes ever closer. One naturally wonders what becomes of those wealthy singletons once they age beyond their forties. How many of them carry on living in solitary luxury into their old age? How many of them belatedly decide to get married or in some other way put an end to their solitude? I have no answer to these interesting questions at present.

As for people living alone in their twenties, the profile is not so much a 'U' as a [ragged] 'M,' with peaks observable at the third and eighth deciles. Compared with the older age groups, these young singletons show a more complex and varied relationship between lifestyle and economic circumstances.

¹² The data here covers both sexes, but it is a fact that a great majority of the wealthy singletons in their thirties and forties are men.

8. Economic Differentials Seen in Terms of Gender

We have seen that the economic implications of living alone vary considerably between men and women. What does this variation signify? I have set out two analytic perspectives for this chapter: one based on the household, the other on gender. People who live alone, especially those who stay that way into middle age and old age, deviate more than any other group from the stereotypical Japanese life course: spending ones childhood living with parents and perhaps grandparents, getting a job and living perhaps in the company dormitory, getting married and setting up a nuclear household with spouse and children. But the significance of the solitary life course differs between the sexes. [As we saw in table 5,] [singleton women] overall have somewhat improved their position, [with the percentage in the low-income bracket falling from 50.34% in 1986 to 41.95% in 2001]. Nevertheless, high economic risk is still a fact of life for a great many singleton women, especially those in their sixties and seventies. Here, then, I would like to consider what it actually means to be a female head of household.

<Table 6 about here>

Table 6 presents data on householder gender for different kinds of household composition. In 2001, 60% of households headed by a woman consisted of that woman alone, and another 24% were single-parent families. Childless couples and nuclear families added up to just 6% of the total. This profile speaks to the traditionally subordinate role of a woman in Japanese society: living with her parents until marriage, then in a household headed by her husband where she bears children and brings them up, later to live out her old age in one of her children's households if widowed. She [is never head of household, and] is always living in someone else's household – parents, husband (or husband's parents in some cases), children. However, as Japanese women have taken to marrying later and later in life, if at all, and as their life expectancy has steadily risen, the proportion of women living alone has grown. We also observe a richer variety of lifestyles, seen for instance in the climbing divorce rate. However, despite this growing variety, it remains the case that women are virtually excluded from householder status unless they live alone or are single mothers.

<Table 7 about here>

Finally, let us take a look at the economic circumstances of parents bringing up children alone, in terms of differentials between men and women. Table 7 compares median incomes for two-parent families and single-parent families led by the father and mother respectively. In the data for 2001 we see that income for male single-parent families averaged 77.9% of income for two-parent families, showing a considerable deterioration from 1995, when the corresponding figure was 98.3%. One reason for that appears to be the rapid decline in income for male single-parent families in recent years, shown by the decline in median incomes for this type of household from 258 in 1995 to 191 in 2001. This kind of household has seen a sharp decline in economic fortunes since the mid-1990s, having enjoyed incomes close to those of two-parent families up until then.¹³

Female single-parent families also suffered a widening negative disparity relative to two-parent families during the survey period, although it was a fairly marginal deterioration, from 49.5% of two-parent family income in 1986 to 47.8% in 2001. More to the point is the fact that women bringing up children on their own struggled to make half the income of two-parent families throughout the period. The economic handicap that comes with being a single parent is massively bigger for women than for men. In 2001 the average income for female single-parent families was just 61.4% of that for male single-parent families, though this figure did show an improvement from the 52.6% registered in 1995. This change was largely due to declining incomes for male single-parent families, suggesting that there may be a latent need for some kind of economic support for male single-parent families, a group that has tended to be neglected by researchers.

<Table 8 about here>

Table 8 shows the percentage of low-income family households (defined, as before, as having less than 50% of median income for all households), categorized into two-parent families, male single-parent families, and female single-parent families. That

¹³ In trying to explain why male single-parent families have suffered this widening of economic differentials vis-à-vis two-parent families, we may guess that having to bring up children alone has had a [greater] negative economic impact on these men [than in the past]; or that a higher proportion of low wage-earners are appearing in the population of men bringing up children on their own. Traditionally men in this situation have often had one or both of their parents living with them to assist with child-rearing [in that case wouldn't they be classified in "3-generation households"?] (Shirahase 2005a), and there has been no great decline in the incidence of that form of living arrangement.

final category consistently had more than 50% of its members in the low-income bracket throughout the 15-year survey period. Single-parent families headed by mothers evidently suffer higher levels of economic risk than those headed by fathers. However, we should not overlook the sharp rise in low-income households among the latter: by 2001, nearly a quarter of male single-parent families were in the low-income bracket.

Iwata (2004) proposes indices for 'standard lifestyle[s]' and suggests (p. 224) that people with experience of poverty are more likely to deviate from the standard lifestyle. If we take the two-parent family as a standard, then single-parent families may be described as having deviated from the standard lifestyle. If we take the life course experienced by the majority of the population as 'typical,' then single-person households and single-parent households are both examples of deviation from that typical life course. Deviation from the typical entails higher levels of economic risk, and that risk is higher still for women. Clearly the very concept of deviation from the typical is a highly gendered one. Indeed, the distribution of household types is totally different for men and women, and it is still fairly rare for households to be headed by women. That said, the problems associated with deviation from the typical are not restricted to women. For men, too, permanent bachelorhood and divorce/separation bring higher levels of economic risk.¹⁴ The question of how these atypical minorities should be socially supported forms one of the key issues facing anyone trying to think about policies to guarantee social security in an aging society with a falling birthrate.

9. Economic Risk and Households/Gender

If we look at the degree of economic inequality at each stage in the life course, we find that for old people in Japanese society, economic differentials have actually narrowed and a smaller proportion are suffering from low incomes. True, households headed by elderly people are still more likely to suffer from low incomes than those headed by young or middle-aged people. However, it will be difficult to carry on with a welfare policy that provides high levels of care to old people just because they are old. The time is coming when old people will no longer be able to assume complacently that they will be looked after by the state. Meanwhile younger people, especially those living alone,

¹⁴ These issues naturally raise questions of cause and effect. Does divorce increase the risk of falling into the low-income bracket, or is it that people highly at risk of falling into the low-income bracket are also more likely to get divorced? I make no attempt to address this question here. Doing so would require an entirely new research project, ideally a large-scale panel survey that would track family fortunes dynamically. For now, I merely wish to emphasize the close connection between divorce/separation and a higher risk of experiencing low income.

are experiencing ever higher levels of economic risk. The fact is that the time has come to reassess Japan's social security system, which has been heavily biased in favor of elderly people. The reassessment I have in mind would not be a simple matter of indiscriminately cutting support to old people in general. Rather, I would emphasize the need to construct a welfare system based on a thoroughgoing social design that takes account of problems at every stage in the life course, including youth and middle age.

Hitherto Japan's social security system has been developed with the elderly as the center of attention. From now on, however, the younger generation is also going to need support, for households with young children etc. From a demographic perspective, what we need is a shift in approach toward a distribution of welfare services that provides a decent level of support to minority groups throughout society. The number of old people is going to rise. From a majoritarian point of view, there is nothing particularly strange about designing social security to prioritize the needs of this particularly big group. But as the working population supporting the welfare system gradually contracts relative to the growing number of old people benefiting from the system, the whole concept of expecting the young and middle aged to support the elderly is becoming unrealistic. In the coming years the question of how to support Japan's various social minorities within the overall population will become very important, necessitating great efforts to win a national consensus on how to go about that.

In thinking about the low birthrate/aging society, we need to pay careful attention to the fact that the 'standard model' of household is becoming less and less applicable to social reality. Specifically we are seeing a major decline in nuclear families and three-generation families, and an increase in single-person households, single-parent families and childless couples. We have seen that families where the two parents do not live together (single-parent families), and people that do not live with their families (single-person households) are both associated with unfavorable economic circumstances. The gender issue further complicates matters, with women – especially old women living alone and single mothers – having to battle with elevated levels of economic risk.

Nowadays there is a huge amount of talk about how lifestyles have diversified in Japan, and yet there is still not enough support for people whose lifestyle deviates from what is considered 'standard.' The question of how society supports those who deviate from the standard model, who have made choices different to those made by the majority, is going to take on increasingly pressing importance as the implications of the low birthrate and aging society gradually sink in. Decisions made by the majority, for

the majority will not produce a suitable principle for distribution of wealth in these changed social conditions. A new principle is called for – one that takes full account of the interests of minorities. The central challenge facing us in designing a workable society with a low birthrate and aging population is that of breaking up the privileges of those who conform to the ‘standard model,’ and distributing support more fairly among those who have most need of it. The low birthrate and aging society are here to stay; our task is to respond to that fact by thinking up social security systems that aptly reflect the greater variety of life ways now developing within the greatly changed circumstances of society today.

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Figure1 Changes in household composition by age of householder




Table1 Changes in degree of inequality, by householder age group and household composition

	20代			30代			40代		
	1986年	1995年	2001年	1986年	1995年	2001年	1986年	1995年	2001年
single	47.0	61.5	54.5	7.2	13.7	14.4	4.8	6.8	8.3
couple-on	16.4	13.1	13.0	7.9	13.2	13.2	4.5	5.7	5.6
paretns+ki	29.0	20.4	25.9	69.1	61.3	59.7	66.6	61.3	60.0
one-paretn	0.8	1.1	1.1	2.6	2.9	5.1	4.8	5.9	5.6
three-gene	1.9	0.6	0.6	11.5	6.6	5.1	17.5	16.6	16.5
other	5.0	3.3	4.9	1.6	2.3	2.4	1.8	3.7	4.0
total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	50代			60代			70代		
	1986年	1995年	2001年	1986年	1995年	2001年	1986年	1995年	2001年
single	5.9	8.2	9.8	14.0	13.9	16.9	27.8	28.7	29.0
couple-on	15.7	16.2	15.9	29.7	34.9	32.9	34.4	36.1	38.0
paretns+ki	47.7	48.3	43.3	22.0	23.9	25.2	11.0	9.7	9.8
one-paretn	5.9	6.4	6.6	4.4	5.6	5.4	5.3	5.6	6.4
three-gene	17.4	13.6	16.0	20.1	12.0	9.9	16.3	13.6	10.4
other	7.4	7.4	8.4	9.7	9.7	9.6	5.2	6.2	6.5
total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Basic Survey of the People's Living Conditions (Kokumin Seikatsu Kiso Chōsa), 1986, 1995, 2001

Figure2 Changes in age distribution of householders and Gini coefficients



gini




Figure 3 Poverty rates by age group




Table 2 Changes in degree of inequality (gini), by householder age group and household composition

	20s			30s			40s		
	1986	1995	2001	1986	1995	2001	1986	1995	2001
single	0.2148	0.2410	0.3054	0.2764	0.2600	0.2702	0.3461	0.3288	0.3512
couple-only	0.2109	0.2595	0.2637	0.2317	0.2301	0.2537	0.2744	0.3075	0.3100
nuclear	0.2190	0.2157	0.2530	0.2188	0.2346	0.2647	0.2387	0.2652	0.2780
three-generation	0.2104	0.2467	0.1912	0.2312	0.2376	0.2515	0.2870	0.2562	0.2817
other	0.2443	0.3036	0.3744	0.3165	0.2941	0.3027	0.3042	0.3092	0.3439
	50s			60s			70s		
	1986	1995	2001	1986	1995	2001	1986	1995	2001
single	0.4143	0.3984	0.4052	0.4215	0.4119	0.4309	0.3920	0.3826	0.3660
couple-only	0.3360	0.3243	0.3597	0.3847	0.3775	0.3711	0.4303	0.3549	0.3200
nuclear	0.2882	0.2939	0.3215	0.3319	0.3462	0.3621	0.3714	0.3834	0.3269
three-generation	0.2822	0.2878	0.2911	0.2877	0.2949	0.3161	0.2935	0.2930	0.3053
other	0.3012	0.3308	0.3513	0.3279	0.3456	0.3490	0.4193	0.3490	0.3713

Note: Degree of inequality is expressed by Gini coefficients.

Source: Basic Survey of the People's Living Conditions (Kokumin Seikatsu Kiso Chōsa), 1986, 1995, 2001.

Table 3: Changes in low-income ratio, by householder age group and household composition

	20s			30s			40s		
	1986	1995	2001	1986	1995	2001	1986	1995	2001
single	15.20	15.97	24.61	12.82	14.03	11.06	24.26	15.80	14.21
couple-only	4.23	7.12	7.88	3.50	3.32	4.84	8.48	7.30	9.09
nuclear	15.71	21.14	22.32	8.76	9.39	13.93	7.99	9.24	9.81
three-generation	6.45	15.38	12.50	9.03	9.16	11.11	10.61	7.34	6.40
other	14.29	23.64	42.86	13.10	14.12	20.29	8.85	9.09	8.92
total	12.96	16.17	22.20	8.74	9.32	12.32	9.29	9.24	9.84
	50s			60s			70s		
	1986	1995	2001	1986	1995	2001	1986	1995	2001
single	39.64	31.96	30.95	56.10	40.62	39.37	69.70	56.50	44.89
couple-only	10.43	7.30	8.92	16.47	14.56	15.41	37.23	22.57	16.65
nuclear	8.42	8.00	10.15	12.36	13.13	14.56	25.50	25.00	19.52
three-generation	8.88	6.62	6.66	6.95	9.12	10.84	8.02	9.47	10.19
other	14.37	10.09	9.19	17.11	15.51	14.94	36.61	27.34	22.40
total	11.08	9.80	11.32	19.09	17.18	18.69	39.57	31.21	25.00

Source: Basic Survey of the People's Living Conditions (Kokumin Seikatsu Kiso Chōsa), 1986, 1995, 2001.

Figure 4 Changes in the female proportion of single-person households, by age group




Table 4 Marital status of householders living alone, by gender and age group

	male			female		
	1986	1995	2001	1986	1995	2001
20s						
never-married	99.0	99.4	98.7	99.8	99.1	99.5
widowed	0.0	0.2	0.0	2.1	0.3	
divorced	1.0	0.4	1.3	1.1	0.6	0.5
30s						
never-married	93.9	95.7	92.5	84.0	87.2	92.8
widowed	1.5	0.3	0.5	1.6	1.4	
divorced	4.2	4.0	7.1	14.4	11.5	7.2
40s						
never-married	75.6	77.2	76.9	67.4	52.2	58.4
widowed	2.3	2.3	1.6	8.7	9.9	8.0
divorced	22.1	20.5	21.5	23.8	37.9	33.6
50s						
never-married	43.2	57.4	57.4	31.2	25.8	31.1
widowed	15.8	11.6	7.0	45.4	38.2	22.1
divorced	41.1	31.0	35.5	23.4	36.1	46.7
60s						
never-married	15.7	22.3	23.0	15.4	15.3	14.3
widowed	57.4	50.2	36.6	69.0	68.6	65.1
divorced	27.0	27.5	40.4	15.6	16.0	20.5
70s						
never-married	5.1	7.1	7.8	4.0	6.8	8.6
widowed	82.8	84.0	78.9	91.7	86.3	84.4
divorced	12.1	9.0	13.3	4.3	6.9	7.0

Source: Basic Survey of the People's Living Conditions (Kokumin Seikatsu Kiso Chōsa), 1986, 1995, 2001.

Table 5: poverty rate for single-person households, by age group and gender

	poverty rate		
	1986	1995	2001
20s			
male single	13.13	13.66	21.94
female single	18.95	19.38	28.64
30s			
male single	7.95	10.09	9.36
female single	23.2	21.62	15.22
40s			
male single	16.79	8.75	13.98
female single	29.65	27.95	25.55
50s			
male single	29.47	25.16	25
female single	43.05	36.06	36.68
60s			
male single	46.96	30.81	29.79
female single	58.44	45.03	43.95
70s			
male single	52.53	40.57	28.52
female single	73.08	61.02	48.68
total			
male single	21.58	18.79	21.59
female single	50.34	44.54	41.95

Source: Basic Survey of the People's Living Conditions (Kokumin Seikatsu Kiso Chōsa), 1986, 1995, 2001.

