

場合も否定する場合も、学習時間の階層差はほとんどみられないのである。ここには、学校の社会的役割についての社会意識の影響を越えて、どの階層出身者にも学校的な努力を促す規範が存続していることが示唆されている。

4 結語

以上の分析から、国家・社会への貢献意識の衰退が、日本において、高校生の学習時間の階層差を拡大している可能性が示唆された。社会の趨勢が、国家や社会に貢献しようとする意識を弱まっていくと、学習時間の階層差が拡大する。価値観の変化が誰にでも同じような行動を引き起こすわけではなく、「努力」の階層差を押し広げる変化である可能性が示唆されたのである。

一方、シンガポールにおいては、そのような関係は見られなかった。しかも、社会や国家への貢献意識自体、日本に比べシンガポールの若者たちはいまだ強い意識を保持していた。しかも、貢献意識の違いによって、学習時間の階層差が広がるといった現象も見られなかった。国家屋社会への強い貢献意識を持っていることが、出身階層によらず、「努力」することを後押しする力となっていると考えられるのである。

このように見ると、現代日本における国家・社会への貢献意識の希薄化が、どのような問題を生みだしているのかがわかる。第1に、学習への動機づけが一般的に弱まるという現象が生じているわけではない。階層上位グループの生徒は依然として高い学習意欲を持ち、学習を継続している。国家や社会への貢献意識が弱まる結果、学校での努力の意味を見失ってしまうのは、低い階層出身の生徒たちである。「豊かな社会」の到来や自己中心的な価値の広がりによって、学校で学ぶことの社会経済的な意味が薄れたとしても、そのことによって努力の産出を抑制させるのは、出身階層の低い生徒たちなのである。その意味で、「豊かな社会」が、どの子どもたちにとっても学ぶことの意味を見失わせるとする一般論は誤りである。

第2に、ここでの知見は、学校教育に依拠した日本型メリットクラシーが、多くの人びとの努力と意欲をかき立てることに失敗しつつあることを示している。特定の社会的背景を持った人びとの努力と意欲を高めることはできても、多くの若者たちを学校的な努力につなぎ止めることが困難になってきている。貢献すべき「公」が見えにくくなる中で、学校を通じた「メリット」の発現の機会に階層差が生じつつあるということである。学校以外のルートを通じた社会貢献の方法が見つかり、それに向けたウォーミングアップが作動しない限り、メリットクラシーのイデオロギーに依拠した社会の活性化は困難を来すだろう。意欲や努力の格差の拡大を伴いながら、全体としての意欲や努力の水準が低下していく可能性が示唆されたのである。学校以外に、平等な機会を公正に提供できる、社会的貢献へのルートが見つからない限り、日本型メリットクラシーの困難は続くだろう。

そうだとすれば、第3に、メリットクラシーが機能しなくなったあとの社会において、結

果的に生じる財の配分の格差はいかにして正当化できるのだろうか。意欲や努力の階層差を、何の制約も受けない主体による自由な判断の結果とみなす「自己責任」論に立つのか。それとも、高校生の段階に至るまでのさまざまな生育歴や教育歴の中で、ここでみたような学校的努力の階層差が生じているとみるのか。それによって、格差の正当性への信頼は異なってくるだろう。

今回、詳しい分析はできなかったが、調査の中で、「どんな家に生まれたか（生まれ）に関係なく、いい職業に就くチャンスは誰にでも開かれている」という意見に賛成する（「とてもそう思う」と「まあそう思う」の合計）高校生は、日本では61.1%であったのに対し、シンガポールでは75.7%であった。4割の日本の生徒は、出身階層によって職業機会が制約されていると思っている。シンガポールに比べれば、機会の制約感は強いといえるだろう。今後、さらに意欲や努力の階層差が拡大していけば、機会の制約感を感じる人びとが増えていくかもしれない。そうなったときに、はたして財の不平等な分配がどれだけ正当なものとして認められるのか。社会経済的格差の正統的な根拠自体が疑われるようになる可能性がある。

最後に、教育政策について、今回の分析結果から得られた知見の意味を述べておきたい。個性重視の教育は、ややもすれば、個人と社会との結びつきを見えにくくする。その反動で、国家への貢献意識をやみくもに育てればよいという主張は危険である。しかし、「自分探し」を助けるばかりでは、かえって社会の不平等を招く可能性もある。自己中心的な言説や、学校知を否定する言説に影響を受けやすいには、階層下位グループの生徒に多いのである。ここにも、階層的な視点を欠いた、理想主義的な個性尊重教育の陥穽が見て取れる。学校の社会的役割を軽視するのであれば、学校以外に、公正で到達可能性の見えやすいメリット発揮の機会が提供されない限り、依然として学校での成功を利用できる階層上位グループとの格差が広がるばかりである。一見、優しさの表明に見えるヒューマンな言説が、それを受け取る社会の側のフィルターが存在を見失うことで、思ってもみない現象を生み出してしまふ。教育言説に特徴的な社会的作用がここでも働いているのである。

（荻谷剛彦）

<注>

1) ここでいう社会全体の功利が何であるか、それへの貢献をどのように測定するか、貢献の程度に応じて報酬の際をどれだけつけるかという問題も、それぞれの社会のルールによって決められる社会学的な問題である。人びとの限界効用を賃金とみなすように、経済学が仮説として設定している場合以上に、社会的な合意やルールがそこには埋め込まれている。

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図表1 学校外での学習時間の平均(分) 学校ランク別・階層別<全体>


学校ランク	日本			シンガポール			シン-日本			
	階層	平均値	度数	S.D.	平均値	度数		S.D.		
普通科上位(JC)	下位	187.73	33	78.94	158.09	57	157.38	14.69	-14.37	-29.63
	中位	189.38	48	79.11	143.23	83	94.54			-46.15
	上位	202.41	87	87.58	143.73	202	111.97			-58.69
	合計	195.80	168	83.38	146.01	342	116.78			-49.80
普通科中下位(ポリテ)	下位	74.45	163	94.03	96.30	164	92.66	37.28	-7.12	21.85
	中位	80.50	180	88.28	92.91	169	89.07			12.41
	上位	111.73	165	94.35	89.18	120	95.30			-22.55
	合計	88.70	508	93.37	93.15	453	91.89			4.45
専門学校(ITE)	下位	20.64	101	53.91	89.02	148	93.48	6.50	26.17	68.37
	中位	20.34	73	48.44	79.72	121	85.24			59.37
	上位	27.14	42	60.66	115.19	53	101.79			88.04
	合計	21.81	216	53.35	89.84	322	92.42			68.04
合計	下位	68.74	297	94.23	102.95	369	107.87	57.74	19.28	34.21
	中位	83.27	301	94.67	99.85	374	92.04		22.38	16.58
	上位	126.48	294	104.87	122.23	375	108.05			-4.25
	合計	92.67	892	100.91	108.38	1118	103.30			15.70

階層差=上位-下位

図表IV-2 学校外の学習時間(平均・分)を規定する要因(重回帰分析・国別)

	日本		シンガポール	
	B	ベータ	B	ベータ
(定数)	78.267	***	103.913	***
男子タミ一	8.194	0.041	-26.036	-0.125 ***
普通科上位(JC)	102.625	0.398 ***	49.739	0.222 ***
専門校(ITE)	-64.465	-0.274 ***	-2.766	-0.012
階層下位G	-2.873	-0.013	7.431	0.034
階層上位G	23.290	0.109 **	6.200	0.028
日本	N=892, 自由度=5, F=87.935, sig=.000, AdjRSquire=.328			
シンガポール	N=1118, 自由度=5, F=18.053, sig=.000, AdjRSquire=.071			
***:p<.001, **:p<.01, *:p<.05, +:p<.10(以下の表も同じ)				

図表 3
階層グループ別「将来、自分は社会の役に立つと思う」




図表 4 将来社会での役立ち感と学習時間(重回帰分析)

	日本		シンガポール	
	B	ベータ	B	ベータ
(定数)	52.310		84.857	
男子ダミー	7.670	0.038	-25.287	-0.122
階層下位G	-2.615	-0.012	7.473	0.034
階層上位G	22.418	0.104	5.500	0.025
普通科上位(JC)	101.302	0.392	49.812	0.222
専門校(ITE)	-64.313	-0.273	-2.263	-0.010
将来社会に役に立つ	11.370	0.093	6.067	0.036

N=889, 自由度=6, F=76.250, sig=.000, AdjRSquire=.337

N=1108, 自由度=6, F=15.017, sig=.000, AdjRSquire=.071

図表5 国家・社会への貢献度別に見た階層グループの学習時間への影響(階層上位グループとの差の推定値、分)



□ 階層下位グループ □ 階層中位グループ

図表6 「学校に行かなくても知識や技術は手に入れられる」別に見た学習時間への階層の影響

	日本		シンガポール	
	B	ベータ	B	ベータ
反対				
(定数)	72.719	***	78.208	***
男子ダミー	4.224	0.021	-23.338	-0.11 *
普通科上位	101.055	0.411 ***	63.838	0.276 ***
専門校	-74.963	-0.298 ***	-5.621	-0.025
階層下位G	-14.607	-0.067 +	2.871	0.013
階層中位G	-12.302	-0.057	-6.228	-0.028
社会で役に立つ	13.514	0.104 **	9.427	0.052
賛成				
(定数)	83.339	***	109.822	***
男子ダミー	14.852	0.080	-24.068	-0.121
普通科上位	86.792	0.299 ***	13.654	0.067
専門校	-39.770	-0.200 ***	10.442	0.046
階層下位G	-52.093	-0.270 ***	-1.992	-0.01
階層中位G	-43.686	-0.223 ***	-7.677	-0.037
社会で役に立つ	4.918	0.048	0.742	0.005

従属変数: STUDYHR

日本・反対 N=610, 自由度=6, F=58.065, sig=.000, AdjRSquare=.360

日本・賛成 N=279, 自由度=6, F=16.580, sig=.000, AdjRSquare=.252

シンガポール・反対 N=816, 自由度=6, F=16.467, sig=.000, AdjRSquare=.102

シンガポール・賛成 N=293, 自由度=6, F=1.025, sig=.409, AdjRSquare=.001

**Social Inequality and Subjective Social Status:
A Cross-national Study of Japan, United States and Germany**

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社会的格差と階層帰属意識の国際比較

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1. Introduction

There has been a resurgence of interest in issues of social inequality in Japan in the 1990s. Popular books describing the increased level of income inequality and the barriers to mobility became best-seller. For example, Toshiaki Tachibanaki, a noted economist, argues in his book, *Japan's Economic Inequality* (1998) that the extent of income inequality in Japan has risen sharply and has even reached the level equivalent to that of the United States. Similarly, Toshiki Sato, a sociologist, claims in his book, *Japan as an Unequal Society* (2000), that the entries into the upper white-collar employment has become more closed in the 1990s. However, the renewal in the interests of social inequality does not necessarily imply revival of class analysis. Even in Sato's work, which uses the notion of class, his argument focuses on increased barriers to the upper white-collar employment and does not talk generally about the changing shapes of class structure.

Class has not occupied the central position in the sociological discourse of Japanese society. Except for Marxist sociologists who always advocate the primacy of the concept of class in understanding Japan (see, for example, Hashimoto 2003), sociological discussions of social inequality usually focus on differentiation by occupational status, education, and income. Social inequality is often viewed by sociologists as the unequal distribution of various resources, and individuals are located on a hierarchy of occupational status, education, and income. Differences in individual positions in this hierarchy are thus expressed as the quantitative difference in the amount of socio-economic resources they possess. The notion of social class does not usually enter into the sociological investigation of Japanese inequality.

Indeed, authors from many perspectives have displayed deep skepticism regarding class analysis in Japan. One of the most provocative critics has been Chie Nakane, a social anthropologist, whose book *Japanese Society* was widely read by both Japanese and foreign audience. She claims that the dominant mode of group formation and group inter-relationships is "not that of horizontal stratification by class or caste but of vertical stratification by institution or group of institutions" (Nakane 1970, p. 87). The Japanese society is not characterized by the relationship between different social classes but instead by relationships between business enterprises. People who work for a particular firm are therefore organized

against those working for another firm. The notions of stratification developed in the West, such as that of class, are too foreign to be applied to the Japanese case. "Even if social classes like those in Europe can be detected in Japan, and even if something vaguely resembling those classes that are illustrated in the textbooks of western sociology can also be found in Japan, the point is that in actual society this stratification is unlikely to function and that it does not really reflect the social structure" (1970, p. 87). Nakane dismisses class analysis because it is too universalistic, ignoring indigenous social relationships.¹

Ken'ichi Tominaga, a prominent sociologist, casts doubt on class analysis not because it does not take into account Japanese cultural specificity but rather because it ignores the universal process of industrialization. As a strong believer of the industrialism thesis (Kerr et al. 1960), Tominaga claims that class analysis is outdated and neglects the developmental logic of industrialism which brought "openness" and "fluidity" in postwar Japanese society (Tominaga 1979, p. 83). The postwar transformation of the Japanese stratification system, according to Tominaga, followed closely the course of development predicted by the industrialism thesis. Through rapid industrialization, urbanization and accompanying reforms, the barriers to social and geographical mobility have weakened substantially and a more open form of stratification, not based on class origin or kinship, but on achievement has emerged in contemporary Japan (Tominaga 1988). In the end, as far as the criticism against class analysis is concerned, Tominaga's argument echoes that of Nakane by concluding that the concept of social class based on the particular historical experience of West European societies does not accurately map out differentiation in Japanese society. The West European-type of the working class never fully emerged in Japan and that the rapid economic growth in postwar Japan undermined the development of the working-class consciousness and the working-class culture (Tominaga 1988, chapter 4).

These criticisms are primarily directed against Marxist writings, but the scope of the criticisms clearly go beyond Marxism and seriously question the usefulness of the concept of class of any kind. Class is not a monopolized concept of Marxist scholars. Class analysis does not always have to resort to the Marxist conception of class which assumes the antagonism between capitalists and the working class or the historical mission of the working class to transform capitalist society. Class categories can be operationalized by employment relations in the labor

market, representing qualitatively different locations in the class structure. The key to class analysis is the recognition of the existence of different social groupings within the labor market. The differentiation correspond to ownership of the means of production, as Marxists would emphasize, but it may also be manifested in the possession of marketable skills, including educational qualifications, as Weberians would point out. The characteristics of the class analytic approach can be seen readily when it is contrasted with the gradational approach to social inequality. The gradational approach often used by sociologists views social inequality along a unidimensional status hierarchy and defines mobility as movement up or down the hierarchy. Differentiation among people occupying different positions in the status hierarchy is recognized as quantitative difference, such as a person having a score 10 points higher than another person in the occupational prestige hierarchy. In contrast, the class analytic approach conceptualizes social inequality as class structure composed of qualitatively distinct groupings in society; mobility is seen as detachment from a particular group and attachment to another group, though the approach does not resort to any notion of upward or downward movements. For example, those in the professional-managerial class have different source and level of income, employment security, and access to fringe benefits than those of the non-skilled manual working class. Class analysis, therefore, takes qualitative (and often relational) differentiations seriously and is concerned with examining the relationship among class structure, class mobility, and class-based consciousness and culture.

This paper presents quantitative analyses of large-scale social surveys conducted in Japan, the United States, and Germany. Its aim is to show the continuing relevance of class analysis in understanding contemporary Japanese society, with comparative findings from American and German societies. It is crucial to present cross-national evidence because we would like to examine whether class “works” in a similar fashion in the Japanese society, in comparison to other societies. Three sets of empirical analyses are presented. First, this study examines whether socio-economic resources are unequally distributed along the class line. If class is not a relevant concept in contemporary Japanese society, various resources are less likely to be distributed among different class categories in Japan than in other societies. Second, this study addresses the question of intergenerational class mobility – the movement of people in different generations across the class structure. The detailed pattern of

intergenerational mobility is examined in Japan and then compared to those in the United States and Germany. The study will examine whether class origins affect people's mobility chances in a similar way in three societies. If class does not "function" in the Japanese society, we expect that class origins do not shape people's life chances, at least the chances of mobility across generations.

Third, this study takes up the subjective aspect of social stratification. When Japanese respondents are asked in a public opinion poll, almost invariably over 90% of the respondents say that they belong to the middle stratum. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was commonly said that all 100 million Japanese were in the middle (ichioku sochuryu), and Murakami invented the term "the emergence of the new middle mass" (Murakami 1984). However, it is not clear whether the Japanese are the only people who choose to identify themselves as "middle." This study will examine the responses to survey questions about subjective perception of status when the question is asked cross-nationally comparable manner across the three countries. It will then ask whether social class influences how people perceive their positions in society. In particular, we will examine whether social class plays a more important role in explaining people's subjective perception of status than education, occupation or income. If class does not matter in Japan, social class should not influence how people place themselves in the society.

2. Data and Variables

The data sets used in this study derive from national surveys conducted in the 1980s and the 1990s in the three countries. They contain information about the respondents' and their fathers' employment, respondents' education, occupation, and income, as well as respondents' subjective social status. The Japanese data come from the 1995 Social Stratification and Social Mobility Survey (SSM) and the 2000 and 2001 Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS).² The U.S. data come from the 1983 to 2000 General Social Survey (GSS). The German data come from the 1990 to 2000 German General Social Survey (ALLBUS).³ The analyses are restricted to respondents aged 20 to 69. The age range is determined by the 1995 SSM survey, which had the most restricted age range.

Social class is operationalized using the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) class schema (Erikson, Goldthorpe,

and Portocarero 1979; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Goldthorpe 2000). Although there has been a continuing debate over the optimal form of social class categories in the sociological literature (see, for example, Goldthorpe and Marshall 1992; Marshall et al. 1988; Grusky and Sorensen 1998; Grusky and Weeden 2001; Portes 2000; Sorensen 2000; Wright 1985, 1997), the EGP class schema has become one of the most prominent and widely-used classifications, especially in cross-national studies (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Evans 1997; Hout 1989; Ishida, Goldthorpe, and Erikson 1991; Ishida, Muller, and Ridge 1995). The validity of the EGP class schema has been tested (Evans and Mills year?), and its theoretical justification is grounded in the literature of economics and sociology (Goldthorpe 2000; Erikson and Goldthorpe 2002). The analyses are based on the six-category version of the EGP schema: the professional-managerial class or the service class (I+II), the routine non-manual class (III), the petty bourgeoisie (IVab), the farming class (IVc+VIIb), the skilled manual class (V+VI), and the non-skilled manual class (VIIa)⁴. Social class variable is constructed using four questionnaire items: employment status (employer, self-employed, employee, or family worker), occupation, managerial status (manager, supervisor, or non-management), and firm size (large or small firm). Information about the respondents' current employment is used to construct class destination, and information about the fathers' employment is used to construct class origin.⁵

Education is represented by a four-category variable: (1) primary level, (2) high school level, (3) junior college level, and (4) university and graduate school level. For the analyses of the relationship between class and socio-economic resources, education is operationalized as the proportion of college graduates.⁶ Occupation is measured by international standard occupational prestige scores (Treiman 1977). The detailed occupational categories of each nation are converted to the international prestige scores, which represent the ranking of occupational hierarchy. Income is expressed as the log of annual individual income (after applying the appropriate exchange rate). In some analyses, occupational prestige and income are expressed by four quarterly groups. In the analysis of the determinant of subjective social status, in addition to the father's class, the father's and mother's education level (measured in the same manner as the respondent's education) are included as social background.

3. Social Class and the Distribution of Resources

The first set of analyses reports the relationship between social class and various socio-economic resources, including education, occupational status, and income. The main purpose of the analyses is to examine whether social resources are unequally distributed along class lines, and if so, whether class differentiation in socio-economic resources is less pronounced in Japan than in other societies.

Table 1 shows the distribution of education, occupational status, and income by class categories. First, regarding the distribution of education — that is, the proportion of college graduates — the professional-managerial class (I+II) stands out in all three nations. For both men and women in the three countries, the proportions of college graduates among the professional-managerial class are often more than twice as much as those of other classes. In order to enter professional occupations and management ranks, educational credentials are often considered to be a pre-requisite, especially among younger cohort members. Indeed, the proportion of college-educated among the professional-managerial class is much higher for the younger cohort than the older cohort (table not shown). In Japan, in addition to the professional-managerial class, men who are in the routine non-manual class (III) are composed of a relatively high proportion of college graduates, though this is not true of Japanese women in the routine non-manual class. This is because male college graduates are hired into white-collar occupation (clerical jobs) and continue to occupy non-management position for several years before they are promoted (Ishida, Spilerman, and Su 1997; Ishida, Su, and Spilerman 2002; Koike 2000). The clerical job is used as a training ground for male managerial prospects, but most women in clerical jobs remain in the clerical position for the rest of their career, except for the small minority who were hired into the managerial-track (especially after the enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act in 1985). In contrast, in the United States and Germany, college graduates normally occupy managerial positions soon after they join a firm, if not immediately after their entry. In Germany, the advantaged position of the professional-managerial class is most conspicuous. College graduates are rarely found in other classes, with the exception of the petty bourgeoisie. In Germany, some segments of the petty bourgeoisie have technical skills and are well-educated.

Shifting our attention to the distribution of occupational prestige

across different class categories, we find a clear rank hierarchy with the professional-managerial class at the top and the non-skilled manual working class at the bottom. The hierarchical ranking of prestige scores is similar not only between men and women and but also among three nations. Regarding the distribution of income (the average log of income), we find a clear income gap between different class categories. The professional-managerial class occupies the highest end of the income distribution, and the non-skilled manual working class or the farming class occupies the lowest end. However, for the rest of classes, there seem to be some subtle cross-national differences. In Japan and Germany, the urban petty bourgeoisie have attained an average income level equivalent to the professional-managerial class, so the self-employed and small employers in these countries are relatively well-off. It is worth noting, however, that the coefficient of variation, which is the measure of the variation in income within class categories, is high among the the petty bourgeoisie and farming class, suggesting that there is wide variation in income among the self-employed both in the farming and the non-farming sectors. In the United States, the income level of the skilled manual class is higher than the routine non-manual class, so skilled manual workers are highly paid in this country despite their relatively low educational level. In Germany, the income gap between the skilled and non-skilled manual workers is very small. In fact, the income distribution (as expressed by the coefficient of variation for the total sample) seems to be most equal in Germany, followed by Japan and then by the United States.

We next examine the strength of the relationship between social class and socio-economic resources using a simple statistical measure, correlation coefficient⁷. This measure expresses the degree or strength of association between the two variables and ranges from -1.0 to +1.0. When the coefficient is either plus or minus 1.0, it implies that there is a perfect correspondence. A coefficient of zero implies that the two variables are not related at all. Table 2 reports the correlations among the four variables -- education, occupational prestige, income, and class. The coefficients above the main diagonal are for men, and the coefficients below the main diagonal are for women. The main findings can be summarized as follows. First, for both men and women, correlations involving class are high in all three nations. In particular, the correlations between class and occupation are higher than 0.7. Occupational prestige also has high correlations with education and income in three nations. Second, for both men and women,

the pattern of correlations is similar across three societies. Correlations involving class are relatively high, and correlations involving income are relatively low in all three nations. The only cross-national difference that emerges from the analyses is that in Germany the correlations are generally higher than in Japan and the United States. Third, there is no clear difference in the pattern of the correlation matrix between men and women. Although the pattern is similar between genders, most correlations are higher for men than for women. This result suggests that the crystallization or the consistency of the indicators of social status is higher among men than women.

In summary, socio-economic resources are distributed unequally by social class in all three nations. The professional-managerial class is the most advantaged and the non-skilled manual class is located toward the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy. The pattern of the ranking of class categories is very similar across three nations. There is no evidence to suggest that class lines are less determining of the distribution of socio-economic resources in Japan than in the other nations. The correlations between social class and other resources indicate that class is highly related to education, occupational prestige, and income in three nations. The findings do not lead us to the conclusion drawn by previous research on status inconsistency in Japan that various status indicators are more inconsistent in Japan. A direct comparison of these findings with the existing literature, however, is not warranted because our method of using correlations is different from the clustering methodology used by previous studies which report that the majority of the respondents belong to the status-inconsistent clusters (Imada and Hara 1979; Tominaga 1988).

4. Intergenerational Class Mobility

We now move to the topic of intergenerational movement of people within the class structure. Our analyses are based on class mobility tables, which are the cross-classification of class origin (father's class) by class destination (respondent's class), separately for men and women in three nations.⁸ In order to examine the pattern of class mobility, we use three indicators of mobility. First, we compute the total mobility rate: the proportion of people who changed class position between the two generations. The total mobility rate indicates the gross total amount of mobility that is observed in a particular table. Second, the patterns of outflow and inflow rates are

examined. Outflow rates show where the members of a particular class origin are found in the next generation, whereas inflow rates show where the current members of a particular class destination originated. Third, the chances of mobility and inheritance from members of different class origin are compared. These relative inheritance and mobility chances show how class origins affect the chances of mobility and immobility. In other words, these relative rates suggest the extent to which class origins make difference in life chances. The stronger the effect of class origin, the larger the difference in life chances between class categories.

We first examine men's total mobility rates, which imply mobility between fathers and sons. The proportion of men who attained class positions different from those of their fathers is 0.693 in Japan, 0.660 in the United States, and 0.581 in Germany. Japan shows the highest rate. About two-thirds of male respondents experienced mobility between generations in Japan and the United States. The main factor increasing the total mobility rate derives from the changes in class structure between the father's and the son's generation. Table 3 reports the distribution of class origin and class destination by gender and nation.⁹ Among men in Japan, the father's generation is dominated by the petty bourgeoisie and the farming class, which together constituted the majority of the class origin distribution. In contrast, in the son's generation, the professional-managerial class and the routine non-manual class, the two white-collar segments, constitute the majority. In order to understand the magnitude of the changes in class structure that took place between the generations, we compute the index of dissimilarity between the class origin and the class destination distribution. The index ranges from 0 to 100 and indicates the percentage of cases that must be re-classified in order to make the two distributions identical. In Japan, the index of dissimilarity is 31, whereas the same index is 15 in the United States and 16 in Germany. In other words, the scope of the changes in the class structure in postwar Japan is much larger than in the United States and Germany, and the high total mobility rate in Japan must have been affected by these large structural transformations.

Total mobility rates among women are 0.793 in Japan, 0.741 in the United States, and 0.876 in Germany. German women experienced the highest mobility, followed by Japan and then by the United States. It should be noted that women's total mobility rates are substantially higher than men's rates in all three nations. This finding derives from the fact

that the difference in the class origin and the class destination distributions involve not only the difference in generations but also the difference in gender. In other words, the kinds of positions that can be attained by men and women differ in the labor market, and gender segregation in the labor market induces mobility among women. When we compute the index of dissimilarity between the class origin and the class destination distributions, the index is highest in Germany (42%), followed by Japan (40%) and the United States (39%). These indexes are related to the total mobility rates.

We next examine the pattern of outflow rates. Table 4 (first three columns) shows the rate of intergenerational stability for class origin categories — that is, the proportion of those who remained in the same class as their fathers. For example, the rate for Japanese men of the professional-managerial class origin is 57.9. This implies that 57.9 percent of Japanese men with professional-managerial class origin remained in the professional-managerial class. We begin with the rates for male respondents. Although the rate of intergenerational stability is similar for the professional-managerial class in three nations, other rates show some cross-national differences. The stability of the routine non-manual class (24.0) and the petty bourgeoisie (28.4) is higher in Japan than in the United States and Germany. In contrast, if we group the skilled and the non-skilled manual working classes together and compute the rate of intergenerational stability (not shown in Table 4), the Japanese rate (43.8) is lower than those found in the United States (54.6) and Germany (62.9), suggesting that the Japanese manual working class possesses relatively weak intergenerational stability. These distinctive features are related directly to the cross-national difference in the class destination distribution. Japanese class destination is characterized by the relatively large routine non-manual class and petty bourgeoisie, and by the relatively small skilled and non-skilled manual working classes. Therefore, the intergenerational stability of the routine non-manual and the petty bourgeoisie tend to be high, while that of the two manual working classes to be low.

When we shift our attention to women respondents, we find another distinctively Japanese pattern in the very low extent of intergenerational stability of the professional-managerial class. Only 28 percent of women whose fathers belonged to the professional-managerial class reached the same position. In contrast, the same rate for the United States is 57.1 and for Germany is 65.2. In the United States and Germany, the intergenerational stability of the professional-managerial class is about the