の出生力が近い将来北西欧の緩低出生力水準まで回復するとは考え難い。

韓国の結婚力・出生力の低下は、日本よりさらに急激だった。おそらく圧縮的近代化のような構造的条件と、経済危機のような歴史事象の双方が影響しているのだろう。こうした人口変動の深刻さに比べ政策形成は遅く、育児サービスの拡充、父親による育児休暇取得、不妊治療の助成といった日本で採られている政策の導入が検討されている段階である。しかしこうした政策では不十分なことは明らかであり、政府が伝統的家族価値を保存しようとする限り家族価値・役割の過負荷は解消せず、それは出生力低下を含む脱家族化を促進し続けるだろう。東アジアにおける極低出生力の先頭走者として、韓国は出生力回復のためのより急進的な政策を模索する必要があろう。

Lowest-Low Fertility in Korea and Japan

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1. Lowest-Low Fertility in Europe and East Asia

Kohler et al. (2002) discussed the expansion of lowest-low fertility, defined as TFR (Total Fertility Rate) is 1.3 or less, in South Europe, Central and East Europe, and the former Soviet Union. In an early version, they listed Korea and Japan as candidates, suggesting that lowest-low fertility is going to spread also in East Asia (Kohler et al., 2001, p.5).

Table 1-1. Lowest-low fertility countries and candidates

Region	Country	TFR (1999)
South Europe	Greece	1.30
	Italy	1.19
	Spain	1.20
Central and East Europe	Bulgaria	1.23
	Czech Republic	1.13
	Estonia	1.24
	Hungary	1.29
	Latvia	1.16
	Romania	1.30
	Slovenia	1.21
The Former Soviet Union	Armenia	1.20
	Belarus	1.29
	Georgia	1.07
	Russia	1.17
	Ukraine	1.19*
Candidates	Croatia	1.38
	Lithuania	1.35
	Poland	1.37
	Slovakia	1.33
	Austria	1.32
	Germany	1.36
	Japan	1.34
	South Korea	1.42

Source: Kohler et al. (2001)
* 1998

The demographic conditions in these countries are so unstable that there were some changes in membership in 2000. While Belarus, Estonia, Hungary and Romania exit with swing-back of TFR over 1.3, Lithuania, Slovakia and Moldova entered to lowest-low fertility (Kohler et al., 2002, p. 613). Though Kohler et al. (2002) did not

refer to non-European countries, South Korea also entered with TFR 1.30 in 2001. While Japan still remained in candidate position with TFR 1.32 in 2002, Korea National Statistics Office reported that preliminary TFR value of 2002 was as low as 1.17 (통계청, 2003). Thus, Korea now has the full membership of lowest-low fertility club and is the top runner of fertility decline in East Asia except for metropolitan areas such as Hongkong or Singapore. It seems to be a matter of time that Japan enters the club because its fertility has been declining slowly but steadily. This paper compares Korea and Japan with European forerunners to investigate characteristics of East Asian lowest-low fertility.

2. Period Fertility

As shown in Figure 2-1, TFR in Japan and Korea declined dramatically to the replacement level in the 1950s and 1970s, respectively. However, the decline from the replacement level was relatively slow. Table 2-1 shows the years spent to move through each TFR range. There seems to have been a barrier between TFR levels 1.4 and 1.6 for countries in East Asia, South Europe and German speaking countries, while countries in East Europe and the former Soviet Union moved through the range very quickly. It is understandable that the fertility decline was drastic in the latter group that experienced the transition to market economy. However, East Asian fertility change is slower than South European countries that did not experience it.

Figure 2-2 shows the trend of mean age at childbearing (MAC) in Korea and Japan. Japan's MAC has been rising since the mid 1970s but the tempo of postponement slowed down in the late 1990s. The MAC in Korea started rising in the mid 1980s and the tempo of postponement has been faster than in Japan.

Table 2-2 compares years spent to move though each one-year age interval. The tempo of MAC change of Korea is as same as that in South Europe, while Japan is comparable with Germany and Austria. This table also indicates that, presently, the MACs in Korea and Japan are as late as in South Europe. Thus, recuperation of fertility at older ages is less plausible in these countries (Kohler et al., 2002, pp. 645-646).

Even though the postponement of childbearing in East Asia is not as impressive as in East Europe, it still raises an issue of tempo distortion. Figure 2-3 presents two adjusted total fertility rates (ATFRs) for Japan. The assumption of BF model (Bongaarts and Feeney, 1998) is simple. Age patterns by parity are assumed to shift linearly over time without any changes in shape, which means only the mean age by parity changes while higher order moments are held constant. In contrast, KP

Figure 2-1. TFR



Table 2-1. Tempo of TFR decline

Country	Length 2.0->1.8	Length 1.8->1.6	Length 1.6->1.4
Korea	1	4	6
Japan	4	5	9
Italy	3	3	6
Spain	3	3	5
Greece	3	3	4
Bulgaria	5	2	3
Czech Republic	10	3	2
Estonia	1	3	2
Hungary	4	4	3
Latvia	2	2	2
Romania	2	2	4
Slovenia	4	6	4
Belarus	3	3	2
Georgia	1	3	3
Russia	2	2	2
Ukraine	4	2	3
Croatia	19	6	2
Lithuania	3	2	4
Poland	4	2	4
Slovak	3	2	4
Austria	4	8	15
Germany	2	2	12

Sources: *KOSIS*, *Latest Demographic Statistics*,
Recent Demographic Developments in Europe

Figure 2-2. MAC



Table 2-2. Tempo of MAC rise

Country	Length 25->26	Length 26->27	Length 27->28	Length 28->29	Length 29->30
Korea			6	7	
Japan				9	
Greece			6		
Italy				7	6
Spain					5
Bulgaria					
Czech Republic	4	5			
Estonia		4			
Hungary	9	7			
Latvia		5			
Slovenia		5	5		
Croatia		5			
Austria			11		
Germany			9		

Sources: *Latest Demographic Statistics*, *KOSIS*, *Recent Demographic Developments in Europe*.

model (Kohler and Philipov, 2001) allows an exponential change of variance in addition to the linear change of the mean.

Because of the recent slow-down in postponement shown in Figure 2-2, the difference between TFR and ATFR has been narrowed. This implies that the recent very low fertility in Japan, slightly more than 1.3, is not a temporary phenomenon caused by tempo distortion. The difference between BF and KP models is small. As Zeng and Land (2001) discussed, BF method is robust except for abnormal conditions

such as the roller coaster fertility change in Sweden around 1990.

Figure 2-3. TFR and ATFR in Japan



Since the delay in childbearing is more rapid in Korea than in Japan, the tempo distortion in Korean fertility would be larger than that in Japan. In the 1990s, the mean age at childbearing in Korea annually rose by 0.17 years on average. If this rate were uniformly applied to all birth orders, ATFR in Korea would be about 20% higher than TFR. In this sense, ATFR value of 2.46 in 2000 (전광희, 2002, p. 108), which is 68% higher than TFR, should be taken for an outlier.

3. Nuptiality

Figure 3-1 compares female proportions single in 2000 between Korea and Japan. At this point of time, Korea has earlier and more universal pattern of marriage. Only 1.7% of Korean women aged 45-49 are single, while 6.3% of Japanese women stay never married.

The latest population projection for Japan assumed that, as the medium variant, the female proportion single at age 50 will rise to be 16.8% for 1985 birth cohort (国立社会保障・人口問題研究所, 2002, p. 18). Although such a projection is not available for Korea, it is possible that marriage squeeze caused by the imbalance of sex ratio at birth (변화순, 2002, p. 230) prevents female proportion single from rising rapidly.

Figure 3-2 shows female mean ages at first marriage in Korea and Japan. The change is faster in Korea and catching up Japan. As shown in Figure 3-3, crude divorce rate of Korea already overcame that of Japan. What impressive in these figures is drastic change after the IMF economic crisis in 1997. These sudden declines in nuptiality are explained by changing labor market conditions such as growing instability and uncertainty of employment and difficulty for the youth to find jobs.

Figure 3-1. Female proportion single (2000)



Figure 3-2. Female mean age at first marriage



Figure 3-3. Crude divorce rate



Thus, it is thought that the economic crisis not only accelerated the long term trend of nuptiality decline but also caused a perpetual change in marital behavior through labor market conditions (Eun, 2003).

4. Marital Fertility

In evaluating the change in marital fertility and its contribution to fertility decline, Korean demographers often rely on age specific marital fertility rates, the number of births by age of mother divided by currently married female population. They conclude that marital fertility rose in the 1990s and that it contributed little to the recent fertility decline (김승권· 외, 2002, p. 77; 전광희, 2002, pp. 90-94; Eun, 2003, pp. 13-15).

However, age specific marital fertility rates are erroneous (廣嶋, 2001). These rates are contaminated with compositional effect when there is a trend of marriage postponement. In old days when most women married by early twenties, age groups older than 25 were occupied by wives who had married for more than five years and were low in risk of births. As marriage is postponed, however, there are more newly wed wives with high risk of birth in these age groups. In this way, age specific marital fertility rates rise, especially in late 20s and older age groups.

The trend and contribution of marital fertility cannot be determined unless this compositional effect is removed. It is plausible that the situation of Korea is as same as Japan, where a simple decomposition using age specific marital fertility rates indicates that nuptiality decline dominantly explains the fertility change, while more sophisticated method shows that both nuptiality and marital fertility are important (廣嶋, 1999; 小川, 1999; 鈴木, 2000; 岩澤, 2002).

5. Cohabitation and Extramarital Births

Today, there is a negative correlation between fertility and extramarital childbearing in Europe (阿藤, 2000, p. 203; Dalla Zuanna, 2001, 136; Billari and Kohler, 2002, p. 17). The prevalence of births out of wedlock is especially low in Italy and Spain, two top runners of lowest-low fertility. Thus, slow emergence of such postmodern behaviors is an important aspect of lowest-low fertility.

Tables 5-1 and 5-2 show the prevalence of cohabitation and extramarital births in Japan and lowest-low fertility countries. The emergence of these new demographic behaviors in Japan is even slower than in Italy and Spain. Though Table 4-1 does not show the exact proportion cohabiting in Japan, a national survey in 1997 revealed that 1.0% of single women aged 25-29 cohabited (国立社会保障・人口問題研究所, 1999, p. 38).

If this is applied to the proportion single of this age group in the 1995 census (48.2%), the prevalence of cohabitation in the late 1990s is thought to have been 0.48%.

The prevalence of extramarital births is available in the vital statistics of Japan. The figure has been growing since the late 1980s but the change has been very slow. As a result, the proportion of births out of wedlock in 2001 was still as low as 1.7%. With this rate of change, it will take several decades for Japan to arrive at the level of South Europe today.

Table 5-1. Proportion cohabiting among women aged 25-29

	1991-93	1994-97
Japan		0
Italy	2	3
Spain	4	5
Bulgaria	0	
Czech Republic	11	
Hungary	2	
Romania	4	
Slovenia	14	15
Estonia	6	16
Latvia	8	11
Russia	3	
Belarus	4	
Poland	3	0
Austria	12	21
Germany	20	14
Lithuania	0	4

Sources: 岩澤(1999), ヴァン・デ・カー(2002).

Table 5-2. Proportion of extramarital births (%)

Country	Year	Proportion of extramarital
Japan	1998	1.4
Italy	1998	9.0
Spain	1996	11.7
Greece	1998	3.7
Austria	1998	29.5
Germany	1998	19.3

Sources: *Latest Demographic Statistics*, *Recent Demographic Developments in Europe*.

The data on cohabitation or extramarital birth are not available in Korea. It has been supposed that both new behaviors are very uncommon because of strong Confucian tradition (조병엽 · 외, 1999, pp. 38-39). On the other hand, some demographers assert that, without any evidence, premarital cohabitation is recently in increase (변화순, 2002, pp. 244-245; 전광희, 2002, p. 110). Considering the drastic

change in nuptiality after the economic crisis, it is possible that these behaviors have rapidly increased and are more prevalent in today's Korea than in Japan. It is very unlikely, however, that these are more frequent than in Italy and Spain. Thus, low prevalence of cohabitation and extramarital births could be mentioned as one of the most prominent features in East Asian demographic conditions.

6. Proximate Determinants

According to the result of the latest Korean national fertility survey in 2000, the prevalence of contraception among wives aged 15-44 sustained a high level of 79.3%, just a slight decrease from 80.5% in 1997 (金勝權・外, 2000, p. 142). Corresponding figure in Japan for wives aged 20-49 was 60.4% in 1997 (国立社会保障・人口問題研究所, 1998, p. 33). Contraceptive prevalence in Korea is thought to have reached the saturation level in the 1980s and explains little about recent fertility decline (鄭在九, 1997, p.82). Some decomposition analyses assert a significant effect of contraception on fertility decline (전광희, 2002, p. 90; Eun, 2003, p. 12). However, they are not reliable because they use the age specific marital fertility rates.

Table 6-1. Abortion

Country	Year	Abortion / birth ratio (%)
Japan	1997	28.3
Italy	1995	25.5
Greece	1994	12.2
Czech Republic	1997	49.7
Hungary	1998	70.9
Romania	1998	114.4
Estonia	1997	131.6
Latvia	1998	108.4
Russia	1995	202.8
Belarus	1998	156.9
Georgia	1993	73.3
Armenia	1997	57.5
Poland	1997	0.8
Slovak	1991	58.4
Germany	1995	12.8
Lithuania	1998	56.8

Source: *Latest Demographic Statistics*.

Table 6-2. Experience of abortion among currently married women

	Experience (%)	Frequency
Korea (1997)	44.2	0.7
Japan (1997)	22.8	0.32

Sources: 1997年 全國 出産力 및 家族保健實態調査, 第11回出生動向基本調査.

There is a surprisingly wide range in the prevalence of induced abortion among lowest-low fertility countries. As shown in Table 6-1, while there is practically no abortion in Poland, two of three pregnancies result in abortion in Russia. The ratio of abortion to birth in Japan (28.3%) is moderate and about the same as Italy.

It is understandable that Korea lacks data on cohabitation or extramarital

births, because these behaviors have been uncommon. However, it is strange that there is no exact number of abortions. This is why there are rumors on web sites that there are 1 or 2 million abortions in Korea every year. Since the numbers of births in the 1990s were 0.6 or 0.7 million, the ratio of abortion to birth would be more than 150% if these rumors were true. This is simply unbelievable.

The only available data on abortion is on experiences among currently married women. As Table 6-2 indicates, Korean wives experienced about twice as many abortions as Japanese wives. If this ratio were applied also to unmarried women, the abortion/birth ratio in Korea would be 50-60%.

Although the frequency of abortion is ambiguous, its impact is very obvious. The sex ratio at birth in Korea started rising in the 1980s and recorded 115.3 in 1993. The ratio declined thereafter but still unnaturally high, indicating that selective abortions are prevailing (전광희, 2002, p. 96; Eun, 2003, p. 4). About the same level of imbalanced ratio has been observed in China, and moderately high ratio in Taiwan (林, 2001, pp. 30-33).

Such an imbalance of sex ratio is not observed in Japan where the ratio has never deviated from the range between 105 and 108 since 1960. Curiously, there has been an increase in preference for daughters among Japanese wives (国立社会保障・人口問題研究所, 1998, p. 41). However, such an attitudinal change has never affected reproductive behavior. On the other hand, both strong preference for son and acceptance of sex check during pregnancy have been observed among Korean wives (李三植, 2001). The prevailing selective abortion and imbalanced sex ratio could be pointed out as an element of fertility decline in East Asia other than Japan. Full explanation of son preference and selective abortion might be difficult, but some cultural property common to Korea and China, such as the combination of Confucian thoughts and strictly patrilineal kinship system, could be working as an important factor.

7. Transition to Adulthood

Lowest-low fertility is a part of an overall postponement in transition to adulthood including graduating school, finding a stable job, leaving parental home, and union formation. In this line, Italy and Spain are characterized by lowest-low fertility and latest-late home-leaving (Billari and Kohler, 2002, pp. 13-14). Leaving home before marriage has been uncommon in South Europe and these two events have been considered to be inseparable (Reher, 1998, pp. 204-205). In fact, 76% of female cohort born around 1960 in Italy and Spain left home at marriage (Billari et al., 2001, p. 28).

Table 7-1 compares the timing of home-leaving in lowest-low fertility countries and Japan. The uniqueness of Japan is in its gender difference. Though a pattern that men leave earlier than women was observed in pre-industrial England and the United States during World War II, (Wall, 1989; p. 385; Goldscheider and Goldscheider, 1994, p.14), Japan seems to be the only country with this reversed gender pattern in the contemporary world.

This pattern comes from the difference in the proportion leaving at marriage. In most of the European and North American countries, the proportion is only moderately higher for women than for men. In Japan, however, the female proportion of leaving for marriage (52.9%) exceeds the male proportion (20.5%) by more than 30 points. This gender gap easily overcomes the difference in age at marriage and produces the reversed pattern.

Table 7-1. Median age at home-leaving of cohort born around 1960

Country	Male	Female
Japan	20.2	22.8
Italy	26.7	23.6
Spain	25.7	22.9
Czech Republic	23.8	21.2
Hungary	24.8	21.3
Slovenia	20.9	20.5
Latvia	24.1	21.3
Poland	25.8	22.5
Austria	21.8	19.9
Germany	22.4	20.8
Lithuania	20.3	19.8

Source: Suzuki (2002)

While Japanese men leave as early as North European males, Japanese females leave as late as South Europeans. Thus, it can be said that Japanese women suffer "postponement syndrome" (Livi-Bacci, 2001) as serious as Italian and Spanish women.

There is little data on home-leaving in East Asia other than Japan. The only empirical evidence that I could find is indirect estimates using census data by Zeng et al (1994). It is expected that the proportion leaving at marriage among Korean women is as high as in Japan, and that Korean women experience about the same level of postponement syndrome. This expectation needs to be tested directly with an empirical evidence.

8. Female Labor Force Participation and Gender Equity

McDonald stated in his proposition 5 that very low fertility appears where

gender equity is high in individual-oriented institution but low in family-oriented institution (2000, p. 437). This explains the positive correlation between fertility and female labor force participation observed among developed countries today (阿藤, 2000, p. 202; Billari and Kohler, 2002, p. 21). The low female labor force participation in lowest-low fertility countries, especially in South Europe, is attributable to conflict between childbearing and career attainment due to strong gender role distinction.

Table 8-1. Female proportion economically active (%) around 1995

Country	(A) 20-24	(B) 25-29	(C) 30-34	Differences (B)-(A)	(C)-(B)
Japan	74.1	66.4	53.7	-7.7	-12.7
Korea	66.1	47.8	47.5	-18.3	-0.3
Greece	54.6	66.1	63.0	11.5	-3.1
Hungary	47.8	50.9	65.5	3.1	14.6
Roumania	63.9	76.5	81.1	12.6	4.6
Slovenia	65.8	91.3	94.5	25.5	3.2
Estonia	52.7	68.9	82.0	16.2	13.1
Poland	60.0	71.1	79.7	11.1	8.6
Slovak	57.4	70.8	85.2	13.4	14.4
Austria	73.2	78.2	74.1	5.0	-4.1
Germany	70.8	75.5	73.6	4.7	-1.9

Source: ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics* 1996.

Figure 8-1. Female labor force participation (2000)



The difficulty of continuous work for mothers with young children in Korea and Japan is obvious from so called M-shaped curve in the proportion economically active. As shown in Table 8-1, in 1995, Japanese women had big drop of more than 10% between 25-29 and 30-34, and Korean women had between 20-24 and 25-29. Such a clear M-shape could not found in European lowest-low fertility countries. Only

moderate drops of less than 5% were found in Greece, Austria and Germany.

The pattern of female economic activity in Korea is changing rapidly. As Figure 8-1 indicates, the bottom of the M-shape shifted to age 30-34. The M-shape pattern in 2000 has become less clear than in 1995, especially in metropolitan area. However, there still is a strong negative correlation between the presence of a child and the labor force participation of a woman in 20s and 30s (민경희, 2002, pp. 419-420).

Table 8-2. Human Development Indices

Country	Human Development Index HDI	Gender-related Development Index GDI	Gender Empowerment Measure GEM
Korea	0.879	0.873	0.363
Japan	0.932	0.926	0.515
Italy	0.916	0.910	0.561
Spain	0.918	0.912	0.709
Greece	0.892	0.886	0.519
Bulgaria	0.795	0.794	
Czech Republic	0.861	0.857	0.579
Hungary	0.837	0.834	0.518
Romania	0.773	0.771	0.460
Slovenia	0.881	0.879	0.582
Estonia	0.833	0.831	0.560
Latvia	0.811	0.810	0.576
Russia	0.779	0.774	0.440
Ukraine	0.766	0.761	0.406
Belarus	0.804	0.803	
Croatia	0.818	0.814	0.534
Poland	0.841	0.839	0.594
Slovak	0.836	0.834	0.582
Austria	0.929	0.938	0.782
Germany	0.921	0.924	0.776
Lithuania	0.824	0.823	0.499

Source: UNDP, *Human Development Report* 2003.

Even though there was some improvement in the conflict between childbearing and labor participation, the gender inequality in Korea still seems to be serious. As demonstrated in Table 8-2, the Gender Related Development index that indicates equity in health, education and income is lower in Korea than in Japan and South Europe. Moreover, the Gender Empowerment Measure that displays equity in political and economic leadership is lowest in Korea among countries in the Table. This very low GEM is taken seriously by Korean feminists (박숙자).

9. Discussion

Demographers have failed to predict fertility changes in the developed world. When fertility decline to the replacement level was widely observed in the countries

that achieved economic development, the demographic transition theory anticipated that the fertility would fluctuate around the replacement level. However, the postwar baby boom in North and West European countries was followed by the secondary decline of TFR to below-replacement level. Since this new fertility decline was coincided with the emergence of cohabitation and extramarital births, the second demographic transition theory assumed the changing values toward individualism and secularism to be the main cause of the transition (van de Kaa, 1987). In the 1990s, however, lowest-low fertility appeared in countries where the emergence of new demographic behaviors is slow and the family values are robust. Thus, the task of demographers today is to develop a theory explaining the spread of lowest-low fertility in South Europe, Central and East Europe and East Asia.

It is not plausible that the demand for children in lowest-low fertility countries is lower than in other developed countries. The ideal number of children for married women in Korea and Japan has never dropped under 2.0 (金勝權・外, 2000, p. 307; 国立社会保障・人口問題研究所, 1998, p. 35). A negative attitude toward marriage accounts for only a small portion; 5.4% of Korean wives agreed that "one had better not marry" (金勝權・外, 2000, p. 297) and 4.9% of single Japanese women responded that they would never marry (国立社会保障・人口問題研究所, 1999, p. 19).

However, such demands for children and a spouse cannot be fulfilled for several reasons. As seen in M-shaped curve, the conflict between work and childbearing is still strong for Korean and Japanese wives. It seems that the increase in demand for quality of a child is endless, which leads to a continuous rise in the required level of human investments on health and education. As women obtain earning powers, the opportunity costs of marriage and childbearing become higher and higher. Ideological changes toward gender equity and parental altruism have been undermining benefits of marriage and parenthood.

One way to look at lowest-low fertility is to see it a normal response to socioeconomic changes in the postmaterial era. In this perspective, moderately low fertilities in developed countries in West and North Europe, North America and Oceania are seen to be exceptional and should be explained. These countries are characterized with weak family ties, developed public and private institutions for social welfare, and notion of contraction between family members (Reher, 1998). It is supposed that such characteristics promoted individualism and gender equality, and developed non-familial childcare activities by baby sitters, tutors, childcare services and other professionals. This might be why West and North European countries achieved high female labor participation rates while preventing fertility from declining to lowest-low level.

In West and North Europe, young men and women left parental home before marriage to work as servants (Reher, 1998; Wall, 1999). This tradition still remains today that the majority of men and women leave home before marriage (Billari et al., 2001, pp. 18-19). Premarital home-leaving is supposed to promote union formation through both consensual union and formal marriage, while South European adolescents are suffering from postponement syndrome that discourages autonomy and ability of decision making (Dalla Zuanna, 2000; Livi-Bacci, 2001).

It is likely that the tradition of individualism and weak family ties in West and North European societies are adaptive to the erosion of marriage institution and expansion of cohabitation and extramarital births. Although individualization and secularization lost explaining power for fertility levels but are still valid for new demographic behaviors. Thus, it is supposed that the disconnection between marriage and reproduction does not proceed easily in a society without highly developed individualism and exceptionally weak family ties. Compared with fertility decline or rise in divorce, emergence of new behavior is much more difficult to happen.

It is natural to infer that there were very specific traits in West European societies, especially in Anglo-Saxon society that endogeneously achieved the industrial revolution. Then, there is nothing surprising that lowest-low fertility countries outside of West and North Europe share common features such as strong family ties, robust marriage institution, late transition to adulthood, and enduring tension between female labor force participation and childbearing. More specifically, the difference from West and North Europe is expected to be wider in East Asia than in South, Central or East Europe because the latter regions are more closely affected by West European societies. This expectation was supported in terms of M-shaped curve and gender equity in Korea and Japan. A remaining task is to confirm empirically that Korean situation in terms of cohabitation, extramarital birth and female premarital home-leaving is more similar to Japan than to European countries.

In Japan, governmental efforts are made to relieve the tension between childbearing and mother's labor force participation, to subsidize childrearing costs, and to support medical treatment of infecundity. These efforts have failed to compensate the rise in expected cost of child, growing uncertainty in young people's perception of future, and continuous decline in benefit of marriage and parenthood. Taking very slow increase in cohabitation and extramarital births into account, it is unlikely that the fertility in Japan recovers to the moderately low level of West and North Europe.

Fertility and nuptiality declines are more drastic in Korea than in Japan. Probably both structural conditions such as compressed modernity (장경섭, 2002) and a

specific event such as economic crisis (Eun, 2003) are responsible for it. Policy treatment is slow to develop in Korea compared with seriousness of demographic changes, and it is proposed to introduce policies taken in Japan such as expanding childcare services, encouraging fathers to utilize parental leave, and subsidizing infecundity therapies (박상태, 2002, p. 653). However, such an effort is apparently insufficient. As far as the government is interested in preserving traditional family values, the emotional overloading of familial values and roles that promotes defamiliation including fertility decline cannot be solved (Chang, 2002). Korea, as the top runner of lowest-low fertility in East Asia, needs to explore more radical policy to recover the reproduction level.

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韓國과 日本의 極低出産力

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1990 年代에 들어, 南歐, 中東歐, 舊소聯圈에서는 合計出産率이 1.3 以下로 低下한 極低出産力을 記錄하는 國家가 많이 나타났다. 더욱 東아시아에서도, 韓國에서 2001 年 合計出産率이 1.30 으로 되어 極低出産力狀態에 進入하고, 日本도 곧 이水準으로 나자질 것으로 思慮된다. 本稿에서는 韓國과 日本의 出産力과 關聯要因들을 유럽의 極低出産力國들과 比較하여, 東아시아的인 特徵를 찾아내고자 한다.

晩産化에 의한 템포歪曲에 대해서, 韓日의 極低出産力이 一時的現象이 아니므로, 코호트出産力은 南歐처럼 低下될 可能性이 높다. 資料 不在때문에 一部 検証할수 없는 點도 있지만, 韓日은 同居・婚外出産의 不在, 母의 就業과 出産 兩立의 困難, 伝統的性役割의 殘存은, 유럽의 極低出産力國들과 比較하면 두드러진다. 또 成人移行遲滯는 南歐程度이지 않지만, 北西歐보다 두드러지고 있다. 同居・婚外出産의 出現이나 女子就業과 出産力間 正相關은 北西歐地域에서 文化的特異性에 基盤한 例外的事象인 反面, 그以外 地域에서는 極低出産力이 當然한 結果로 나타나고 있음을 論하고 있다.