the United Kingdom or the Nordic States. He does note, however, that the rise in fertility rates in the 1940s was greater in France than in the rest of Europe and that the decline in the 1970s was not so marked as elsewhere.

Chesnais (1985) uses comparisons of the net reproductive rate in France and the averaged in other West European countries to demonstrate how the difference between France and the other countries in the region rose to 25% after the Second World War, whereas until 1930 the French rate was 10% below them. Family allowances had been introduced in France during this period and accounted for 14.5% of social spending in 1950. Chesnais also tracks the relationship between benefit levels and the increase in fertility rates and finds that the degree of fit between the two dimensions is so close as to rule out any doubt about the validity of the finding. He quotes Sauvy's argument that, in Italy and Spain where the Church had a powerful influence, fertility rates were lower than in France showing that family allowances were more effective than faith..

The second body of literature looks at the impact of family policies on different social categories (Febvay, 1959; Festy, 1981, 1993). Originally family allowances in France were retricted to civil servants; from 1939, they were extended to all wage earners. The self-employed were still not covered by the scheme. Although completed fertility rates for couples who married after the war were found to be higher than for pre-war marriages, the increase was greater among wage-earners than among the self-employed, due to the higher incidence of third order births. The rate was also found to be higher in the private sector where family allowance were an innovation.

The third body of literature (Schwartz, 1989) compares fertility rates in the Sarre region before and after its return to the Federal Republic of Germany. After it again became a German Land, the population lost their right to French family allowances. From being the region with the highest fertility rates within marriage in Germany, it fell to bottom place. Policy differences between the Länder are also shown to match exactly disparities in fertility rates.

A FIGHT AROUND AN INDEX

In France, nobody contested the influence of family policy on fertility and the legitimacy of state intervention in family life. In 1949, the French population surveyed by Girard (1950) expressed the almost unanimous (97%) view that family allowances had played a critical role in increasing fertility rates, and it has become a tradition in France to defend family policy.

Since the late 1980s, however, a number of dissenting voices, mainly ultra-liberal economists, have been highly critical of pro-natalist policies. At the theoretical level, they are opposed to compulsory retirement, when it is used to justify paying family allowances to those raising children who will be future contributors to pension funds, and they contest the principle of transferring resources to couples who choose to improve their own standard of living by other than material means (Lemmenicier, 1988). They also argue that the demographic situation in France is not a cause for concern, and that the evidence evoked to demonstrate that fertility is falling is misleading because the wrong indicator is being used. If total period fertility rates, which are the subject of media comment as soon as they appear, are seen to fall below replacement level, this can be explained, they claim, by the fact that women in the baby-boom generation (born after 1945) have been postponing the births of their two children, or more precisely their 2.1 children. Indicators for completed fertility rates for women in their forties, the youngest of whom were born in 1951, are, however, equal to 2.1 children per woman. They argue, moreover, that, if a model is used that shows the fall in completed fertility from 2.6 for the generation born in 1930 to 2.1 for women born in 1950, and takes account of postponed childbirths, all the trends observed since 1955 are replicated by current data (Le Bras, 1991).

The discrepancies in findings are due, in no small part, to the fact that indicators for total period and completed fertility rates measure different phenomena. For example, if every women has two children, the first at the age of twenty and the second ten years later, for the purposes of calculating the total period fertility rate, it is assumed that every woman in a given age cohort behaves in the same way as the women currently in that cohort, even though the women in question were actually born ten years before those whose first birth is being recorded. If, in 1980, the prevailing circumstances meant that all women in the 20 year-old cohort decided to delay their first birth by one year, no births would be registered in that year for women aged twenty having their first child. In the following year, if conditions returned to normal, total period fertility rates would record births to

women aged twenty and to those women aged twenty-one who had postponed their first birth, as well as the second child for women aged thirty. The result would be that women in this cohort would be calculated as having three children each, which would explain why, after the Second World War, the indicator for total period fertility rose abruptly, as women compensated for delayed births at the same time as women born in the 1930s began having their children at an earlier age.

This last cohort also had a larger number of children: 2.6 children per woman. There is, however, no reason to suppose that subsequent generations of women who decide to postpone motherhood will follow the same pattern. If births are delayed for too long, the 'right moment' may never come. The actual childbearing behaviour of women can, in any case only be recorded once they have reached the end of their period of fertility. If, after twenty years, any fall in total period fertility rates is not compensated for by a rise in the number of births, the overall effect is a lower completed fertility rate. Even though a constant fall in the number of births may be due to women continuing to postpone the age of motherhood, the population growth rate depends on fertility rates at a given point in time and not on completed fertility (Leridon, 1990). In tracking the impact of polices, demographers therefore need to be able to distinguish between intensity and timing of births.

THE FALLACY OF INCREASED TOTAL FERTILITY RATE

The two Germanys have been used as a laboratory by researchers to observe the impact of different socio-cultural and political regimes on demographic behaviour.

In the mid-1970s both East and West Germany were displaying similar total period fertility rates (1.54 East, 1.45 West). In 1976, the Democratic Republic of Germany reacted to the relatively low level by a policy designed to encourage family building: family allowances were increased and paid leave was granted to women at the birth of their second child. Chesnais (1985) notes a spectacular rise in the birthrate and in the fertility rate as a result. A few years later, Monnier(1989) used an analysis of fertility for different age groups to show that the timing of births had been changed: women were having their children at an earlier age than they would otherwise have done, but completed fertility was also 10% above what it might otherwise have been. The difference between the figures for East and West Germany, where rates continue to fall, has, in addition, been attributed

to the larger number of deaths outside marriage, a practice more readily accepted in East Germany. After German unification, the fertility rate in East Germany fell steeply to 0.84 by 1995, illustrating the importance of the policy-making environment. East German had become accustomed to combining family life and employment; faced with an economic crisis and the closure of nurseries have opted not to have children (Schulze, H J ; et Kunzler J. ,1997).

Reliable analysis of the effectiveness of policies in influencing reproductive behaviour is made difficult for two reasons: firstly, because trends in fertility rates may have an effect on family policy, for example when the fertility rate is considered by government to be sufficiently high; secondly, because family policy may only accelerate trends that are already present if parents are planning to have children. In addition, researchers are not able to take full account of all the factors that may influence decisions about whether or not to have children. Theories about the possible impact of policies on behaviour are generally based on the assumption that the choices made by couples are dependent on materialistic arguments which lead them to make rational choices. Even here, it is clear that the woman's earnings play an important part and that family policy can do no more than tinker at the edges. Any direct links between policy and behaviour remain to be proven: even very generous family policies may not prevent fertility rates from collapsing if they are in competition with female labour market activity.

RELIABLE INFERENCE MUST BE DRAWN FROM A MODEL.

Blanchet (1987) has produced a theoretical model to explain the fall in fertility in France between 1962 and 1981. If it is assumed that parents decide how much of their income they are prepared to devote to their children, they will have the number of children they can afford. The estimated cost takes account of the price of childminding and foregone earnings for women who stop working. Fertility and economic activity rates can be used in calculating the cost of a child. By simulating any reduction in cost arising from the amount covered by the state, a hypothetical measure can be produced of the efficiency of various family policy measures for a child of a given rank, and it can be shown that a particular policy measure is less effective if it covers too large a number of children who would have been born in any case (as for the first child), or if it reaches too small a number of people (fourth child or above). According to this line of thought, policies targeting the second and third child

are justifiable, and their effectiveness does not depend on women's earnings: 1 franc spent on an economically active woman (for childminding) has the same impact as 1 franc spend on women who are housewives. The model shows a linear variance for family policy on total period fertility rates and an inverse relationship with female earnings. This theoretical model has been tested in empirically (Ekert-Jaffé, 1986 ; Blanchet and Ekert-Jaffé, 1994), using a linear model which combines fertility rates, earnings and family policies.

According to economic family theory, fertility rates vary according to women's earnings for two reasons: firstly, any increase in women's earnings is directly related to increases in their economic activity rates and to the greater opportunity cost of any break in employment in order to raise children, all of which leads to a decline in fertility; secondly the increase in female earnings is also a sign of the increase in value of the time women spend on domestic labour, children being big consumers of time (Becker, 1981; Cigno, 1994).

On the first point, it has been shown that, in France, the loss in lifetime earnings is equivalent to six years of earnings for one child (Ekert, 1983). However, more than 50% of mothers with children aged under three remain in the labour force, and free nursery schooling is available for most children below that age. In Britain, where childminding depends much more on private provision, the loss of earnings in equivalent to ten years (Davis et Joshi, 1994).

On the second point, if a women do take a break from employment, it is because the value of their domestic labour is greater than their earning power in the labour market: the opportunity cost of children is at least equal to lost earnings (Gronau, 1977).

The negative influence of women's earned income on fertility is complex and does not mean that, if women were to return to being homemakers, fertility rates would automatically increase. The indirect effect of the cost of a child on earned income is modified by the effect of the level of income. For example, women may deliberately choose to reduce fertility even more to avoid a further reduction in their standard of living if legislation is introduced that might restrict female economic activity.

The relationship between policy, fertility and labour market behaviour has been investigated in single-country and comparative studies. A study carried out in ten of the EC member states – Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (the study also included Norway) – used measures of purchasing power parity that have been available since 1969. Legislation adopted during the period 1969–83 on family allowances was examined, and data were collected on changes in earned income. The findings were compared with fertility indicators for the period 1971–85 to take account of the effects of policy measures two years after implementation, since two years are generally needed from the time when couples decide to conceive to the point when the mother gives birth (Deville, 1976).

At the beginning of the period, the increase in female earnings was found to explain the fall in fertility in the countries studied. Despite the absence of family policy measures, British women were observed to have more children than French women, because their lower earning power provides less of an incentive to pursue an employment rather than a family career. When family policy measures are introduced into the model[19], and economic activity and opportunity costs are held constant, family policy is found to produce a positive coefficient, indicating a small but not negligible impact. A contribution to the cost of raising children as provided in France in 1981 accounted for +0.27 children per woman, compared to 0.21 in 1975, which can be expressed as a 10% increase. When compared to Britain, the difference in family allowances can be said to account for 0.19 children per woman. If women in France are observed to have the same number of children as in Britain, it is because family policy increases their fertility rate.

Gauthiert and Hazius (1997) have used the same method on European data, covering a larger number of countries (22) and a longer period of time (1970–90), but their study does not use the Purchasing Power Parity to convert local currencies. Their findings were, nonetheless, the same: the effect of family policy in the long term corresponds to 0.28 children per woman. The authors identify an overall increase of 25% across Europe in the amount paid out in family allowances, using weighted average benefits over the amount received for families with one, two or three children, divided by the average male wage in manufacturing, and converted into dollars. This measure

[19] The family benefits index, established when writing these articles, is the weighted average of the sums received for each of the children, the coefficients of the weighting being the degrees of effectiveness forecasted by the theoretical model for the corresponding rank, taking as basis the fertility per rank observed for the year 1975

produces an increase in total period fertility of 0.07. The transfer payments involved (in terms of family allowances) represent 6% of the total wages of an average manual worker in Europe or 1.5% of the total wage bill[20].

3.2 THE EFFECT OF FRENCH FAMILY POLICY ON FERTILITY BY RANK.

Resuming this line of reasoning, we propose to infer the extent of the effectiveness of the policies deployed based on the history of French family policy between 1960 and 1980[21]. We will then use it to forecast the influence of the possible harmonisation of European policies on French fertility towards the year 2040. However, the results – or absence of results – in this field suppose that there is a certain degree of variability in family measures. In effect, in the absence of changes in benefits, the variable policy becomes a constant factor to which fertility variations cannot obviously be correlated. In this respect, if the extent of effectiveness inferred from the study of policies implemented in eleven European countries is more reliable than the results based on the sole French example, it is important for the steps taken by us to bring out the differential effects of family policy depending on the rank of birth and social category. However, before this, it is essential to examine the previously described changes in trend, on which (in addition to the elements of variability in French policy) our analysis will be based. In relation to the foregoing, the distinction between the public and private sector is shown to be particularly pertinent.

PUBLIC SECTOR VERSUS PRIVATE SECTOR

From 1918, benefits were first given to civil servants. The public sector is essentially a space of relative liberty where the State may apply its ideas on social policy, wage structure or economic policy. Since it is relatively not affected by the laws of the market and its productivity requirements, it is in a position to promote more social justice within it. This justice is concentrated in non-commercial areas at the service of the community . The motto of its agents is "Serve the State" contrary to the private sector motto "Produce more and make more profit". Recruitment is carried out mostly through competitive examinations considered to be the most democratic mode of entry. For equivalent jobs, the degrees required are higher than in the private sector (Pohl et al, 1983)

[20] Other conclusions about the rank impact of benefits, drawn by this study are problematic because they use total period fertility rates and draw conclusions whereas the births were not distinguished by rank.

[21] This study is based on the simulation of couple's life cycle. It cannot fit to the post 1980 huge amount of out of the wedlock births.

Thus, wages are strongly structured with career plans and seniority promotions and while they are largely based on the nature and level of the competitive examination taken, they are also very concentrated; the differences in wage scales are twice as low as in the private sector, (Quarré 1985). This is due to the virtual absence of workers[22], the absence of very high and very low wages, the very slight differences in wages within a specific category as also to the fact that executive wages are much lower than in the private sector. Supplementary social advantages compensate, however, for the relatively low wages. Thus, in 1941, Petain extended the "decisions" of the 1939[23] Family Code and set up the family wage supplement, an amount paid over and above the wage, added to the family allowances within a general wage-freezing context[24]. Resumed in 1945 on more egalitarian bases on the creation of the housing benefit, this supplement has continued till our days.

Since 1955, it comprises a fixed amount which has been re-evaluated four times in twenty years together with an amount that varies in proportion to the wage[25] with a minimum for low wages and a maximum equal to the family supplement corresponding to the 621 index. Hence, the family supplement is indexed to wages and its amount has not stopped increasing as compared to family benefits which are re-assessed periodically in accordance with the trend in prices.

Apart from the family supplement, the changes in French family policy trend which successively favoured the second then the fourth child –between 1973 and 1978 – and finally the third child till 1982, bring out the connection between changing economic and fertility conditions. Thus they allow for a fresh assessment of the effectiveness of family policy.

TECHNICAL ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING THE VARIABLES OF THE MODEL

The variables will be calculated in accordance with the husband's status (private sector or public sector) and social category – senior executive, junior executive, employee.

[22] Except a few very skilled workers in the National Printing Press, better paid than the employees

[23] By transforming the allowance paid to the mother staying at home: equal to 10% of the monthly basis, it was replaced by the single income allowance for employees and its amount was then equal to 25% of the basic wage for families of two and three children/ The rate of family allowances passed from 20 to 30% of this income for children of rank 4 or over.

[24] The income-related rates were on a sliding basis and decreased by half according to the bracket in the same manner as income tax on natural persons. For low wages, it was then equal to 5% of the income for two children and 10% per extra child.

[25] Since 1962, the rate is 3% of the basic wage for two dependent children, 8% for the third and 6% for each additional child

The family benefits taken into account herein cover 82% of the total benefits paid by the family allowance funds in 1978. Benefits financing specific expenses (housing allowance removal allowance etc. - representing 11.8% of the total è and the allowances to single parents, the disabled etc. (which fall more within the scope of social aid) have been excluded. Because of the same calculation problems, the family quotient, based on 1978 data simulations representing 10% of the funds' budgets, has not been taken into account (Coutière, 1981, Ekert-Jaffé, 1984) (fig. 2).

Fig. 1 : Family benefits per social category in the private sector: annual amounts in 1988 FF.



Fig.2 Family benefits index per social category and status: mean annual amounts per child in 1988 francs



For each social category, an average annual benefit per rank has been calculated. Birth allowances and increases for age are taken into account in proportion to their value in the total amount of the benefits paid for each child between his birth and his sixteenth birthday. And since 66% of senior executive families of the public sector with three children received the family complement in1978, the latter shall be accounted for 66% of its value[26]. These average benefits were deducted from the distribution of the salaries and wages for the year 1978, updated thanks to INSEE's indices using a recently developed procedure (Ekert, 1983). The survey "Family life, professional life (Euvrard and al., 1985) gives the income of couples where both work as compared to the wages of heads of families where the wife stays at home –(and it shows that the formers average wage is 10% higher than that paid to husbands with working wives)[27]. The multiplying coefficients of total income for dual earners compared to single earner are respectively 1.83 for employees, 1.64 for intermediate categories, 1.26 for private sector senior executives and 1.44 for those of the public sector[28]. The benefits, calculated separately for working and non-working persons are then evaluated for all

[26] In a life cycle perspective, children are presumed to be confronted throughout their life with the conditions of one year. This makes it possible to obtain an index reflecting the year's policy and varying with the rank of the child and the social category of the head of the family.

[27] The difference is 20% for senior executives, 17% for junior executives and –10% for employees.

[28] We integrated the multiplying coefficient of this category into that of teachers.

couples on the basis of the rates of feminine activity per social category and family charges obtained from the census records and adjusted between two censuses (by a logistics law).

Due to the great many population changes, the monthly values of the average benefits were first calculated followed by the annual values in volume taking into account monthly price variations.

RESULTS : A MODEST BUT TRUE EFFECT MOSTLY ON THE THIRD BIRTH.

Table 1 shows the regression in the total fertility rates (TFR) of women married once. The explanatory variables – women's wages calculated from the table showing the wives' social category in relation to their husbands' and the family policy index (Blanchet & Ekert, 1988) – are given in 1988 francs. Other regressions show the contribution of each rank of birth to the TFR in accordance with women's wages and the average benefits for the given rank.

An analysis of fertility in France in relation to economic conditions confirms and specifies the results obtained from a study of European policies : the influence of family benefits on fertility is slight but sure (table 1). An increase of 1000 francs in 1988 per year and per child, i.e. one-sixth of the total 1977 benefits was associated with an increase of 0.073 child per woman in the TFR

child, second births were all the same affected by the family policy index, i.e. by the general environment favourable to the growing family between 1978 and 1982 (table 2). The absence of effect referred to above was no doubt due to the fact that the sums received for the second (and also the fourth child) were increased for workers and employees between 1972 and 1977. This was precisely when the down trend in fertility noticeable in all the social categories – from 1965 for executives – particularly affected low income groups. Due to possible backlash bearing in mind that a birth decline is an inducement to a strong family policy – statistics are powerless with regard to bringing out whether the decline would have been greater in the absence of any policy. The re-orientation of the policy in favour of the third child in 1979 particularly affected low income classes in their decision to procreate since – excluding the senior executives of the sample – the influence on births of this rank doubled (table 2).

Thus, it is clear that a family policy is not devoid of influence on fertility but that such influence is exercised only at the margin and in so far as the policy is adapted to the environment and to in-depth fertility tendencies. In France, its action - which is slight but non negligible - concerns rank 3 births, i.e. the first to have been truly affected by the decline in fertility. If the statistical validity of our results

herein are to be relied upon, 13% of women gave birth to a third child which they would not have had in the absence of a family policy.

Table 1 : Influences of family policy on fertility : results of multiple regressions of the total fertility rate (TFR) and the contribution of children of order 2-4 to the TFR. – coefficients and Student's test.

Explanatory variables	Total fertility rate	Contribution of children of order		
		2	3	4
Constant	2.95 (12.5)	0.996 (6.5)	0.712 (23.9)	0.493 (22.7)
Women's wages in thousands of 1998 francs	-0.024 (-9.6)	0.0028 (-4.52)	-0.009 (-11.6)	-0.004 (-8.5)
Private sector executives	0.51 (2.9)	0.019679 (0.4)	0.18 (4.8)	-0.035 (-1.1)
Private sector intermediate categories	0.14 (0.95)	-0.058939 (-1.3)	0.03 (1.3)	-0.09 (-3.5)
Private sector employees	0.09 (0.67)	-0.098517 (-2.2)	0.021 (0.8)	-0.068 (-2.8)
Public sector senior executives	0.207 (2.5)	0.06 (1.6)	0.127 (5.7)	0.082905 (6.4)
Public sector intermediate categories	0.017 (0.25)	0.023 (0.9)	0.02 (1.5)	0.006702 (0.6)
Family benefits per rank of birth in thousands of 1988 francs	0.073 (2.6)	-0.0067 (-0.5)	0.013 (4.43)	-0.003 (-1.75)
R^2	0.61	0.25	0.71	0.82
R^2 adjusted	0.59	0.21	0.69	0.81
Degrees of liberty	109	109	109	109

What would then be the effect of a decrease in benefits if such a reduction was slowly brought down to the European level? The non-reassessment of the policy, assuming a 4% rate of inflation, would give rise to the benefits losing 58% of their purchasing power around 2009 and 88% from now to

2039. Maintaining the reassessment of the allowances at the present rhythm (less drastic) would lead to an annual 1% decrease between 1988 and 1989 and between 1986 and 1987 bringing about an 18% loss of purchasing power in 2009 and 40% in 2039. Under this assumption and based on the model projections, the present fertility of 1.8

Table 2 : Influences of family policy on fertility : results of the regressions in the total fertility rate –executives excepted – ,and the influence of the global family policy index on fertility by birth order.

Explanatory variables	Total fertility rate	Contribution of birth of order		
		1	2	3
Constant	2.8 (9.6)	0.918 (8.3)	0.756 (9.05)	0.596 (8.5)
Women's wages in thousands of 1998 francs	-0.3 (-9.8)	0.0038 (-3.1)	-0.004 (-4.6)	-0.008 (-10.8)
Private sector executives		0.015 (1.3)	0.16 (2.6)	0.16 (3.1)
Private sector intermediate categories	0.38 (2.05)	-0.093 (-1.3)	0.06 (1.2)	0.04 (0.95)
Private sector employees	0.29 (1.7)	0.07 (1.1)	0.016 (0.3)	0.03 (0.72)
Public sector senior executives		-0.08 (0.2)	0.29 (1.0)	0.085 (3.5)
Public sector intermediate categories	0.075 (1.2)	-0.006 (0.2)	0.15 (0.6)	0.01 (0.5)
Family benefits total index in thousands of 1988 francs	0.12 (3.2)	0.026 (1.95)	0.021 (2.1)	0.022 (2.7)
R^2	0.61	0.11	0.28	0.67
R^2 adjusted	0.59	0.05	0.24	0.65
Degrees of liberty	109	109	109	109

would become equal to 1.7 in 2009 and 1.52 in 2039. In the total absence of assessment, the TFR would fall to 1.9 and 1.17 on these same dates. Under these conditions, the total population in 2039 would pass from 56 million for a total fertility rate equal to 1.8 to respectively 54 million for 1.6 child

per woman in 2020 and 48 million (for 1.25), i.e. a loss of 2 and 8 million inhabitants respectively. With regard to the active population, it would respectively lose 0.5 and 2.8 million. Hence even if a family policy has a relatively small influence on the level of fertility, its effects on the size of the population may prove to be considerable in the long term.

However, a policy which does not affect the family complement reserved for families of three children would make it possibly to limit strongly and even cancel out the drop in fertility assuming that part of the decrease would be used to increase the family complement.

Hence in the long term, the effects of family policy depends as much on directing it towards targeted families as also on the total sums invested. The manoeuvre margin is high in this respect.

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フランス女性の地位と家族政策の基調ー最近の家族国民会議から

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一　はじめに

フランスでは1994年7月25日の家族に関する法律によって、家族政策を国民の前に明らかにするとともに、国民的合意のもとに家族政策の形成をめざす「家族国民会議」の開催が義務づけられた。法律第４１条では「政府は家族運動やそれにふさわしい組織を動員するために、毎年「家族国民会議」を開催しなければならない」と規定し、この家族会議は公権力にとって家族政策の基本方針を提示する場であるとともに政府にとっては政策の進展状況を示す場としても考えられている。家族会議には、首相を始め、関係省庁の大臣、UNAF（フランス家族団体国民連合）に属する家族運動に関わる社会保護団体、民間団体、社会的パートナーの代表者、国会議員および地方公共団体の議員、賢人会議のメンバーや農業社会相互中央金庫の総裁、国民議会の家族予算に関する報告者などの有力者が加わっている。、毎年一回開催されることになっている家族会議は、1998年以降、政府決定を明らかにし、家族政策の将来を展望するという意味において重要な位置を占めるようになってきている。

1998年以降家族会議の課題は、家族手当や課税額の基準となる家族指数の問題を解明し、社会的正義を実現するためのいくつかの施策を明らかにすることにおかれている。社会的正義という課題は、あらゆる不平等や差別が対象となるが、とりわけ男女平等を目指して男女共生社会（mixité）を実現するための具体的政策は中心的な課題となっている。もちろんその中でも最も重要な施策のひとつは、政治参加における平等であるといえよう。政党の被選挙人の数を男女平等にするパリテと呼ばれるこの政策は、先の地方選挙においてすでに実施に移された。そして家族をめぐる重要な政策課題は、家庭生活と職業生活の調和という問題に向けられることになる。家庭生活と職業生活の調和という課題は、端的に言って子育てと職業との両立の問題にほかならず、少子化問題にとってもっとも基本的な課題といえる。

本報告では、フランスで現在家族領域が多様化していくという現実がある一方で、職業領域が階層や労働時間との関係でがどのようなコンテクストの中におかれ、推移しているかを確認するとともに、そのような状況を前にして、家族政策がどのように模索され実施されようとしているかを明らかにしていく。

そこで、まず女性の置かれた家庭生活と職業生活との両立の可能性を決定づけるコンテクストを見たうえで、フランス家族政策を決定するために1996年来開催されている「家族会議」における2000年を中心とした近年の方針を検討し、そこで模索される具体的な家族政策を確認するとともに、そこに現れた家族観の変化を明らかにしていくことにする。

二　フランス女性の職業生活

フランスの女性は、労働に関して伝統的に持続性を持ちつづけており、フランスはヨーロッパの中でも女性労働に対する寛容な心性を保持している代表的な国であるということができる。すでに19世紀初頭においても、フランスの女性労働者は労働者の1/3をしめており、1,200万人の労働者のうち、450万人が女性労働者であった。1911年には、労働

の女性化といわれる時代が到来し、女性労働者の数は第一のピークをむかえ、労働者の36%が女性となり、女性の半数が働くようになっていた。戦時下の一時期をのぞいて、女性の労働者は減少傾向を示すが、1962 年を境に再び増加の傾向をたどり、それ以降女性労働者の数は年々増加していき、しかも今回の増加は、革命的ともいえる特徴的な変化を示すようになっている。というのも、それまでの女性労働者は、独身者かあるいはM字型といわれるように、子どもが産まれる前か、産まれたあとには仕事を中断するタイプのものであったのに対して、５０年代に生まれて７０年代に仕事に就いた女性たちは仕事を出産後も仕事を継続するようになっていったからである。職業活動は、女性にとっても生きるための普通の形となり、みずからのアイデンティティを作りあげていくための基本的な手段となったのである。

労働の中年化

この労働の「女性化」といわれる現象は、労働の「中年化」といういまひとつの特徴をともなっている。労働の中年化現象は、EU 各国の中でも特にフランスに特徴的に見られる現象であるが、フランスの全労働者の実に 80%が２５歳から５４歳の年齢層に集中している。これは１９６０年にこの年齢層の労働者の占める割合が 60%であったことと比較すると、急激な中年化が進んでいるということができる。これを就業年齢と退職年齢の変化からみてみると、1968 年の平均就業年齢が 17 歳半であったのに対して、1993 年には 20 歳半に上昇しており、反対に退職年齢は 62 歳から 58 歳へと下がっている。女性の職業活動は、25 歳から 29 歳がピークであるが、その後も 40 歳から 50 歳まで高い水準を維持しつづけている。フランスの女性は、他のヨーロッパ諸国に比べてより遅く労働市場に登場し、より早く市場から退場する。したがって、中年においてはより多くのものが職業活動を行っているということなのである。このような様相は、男性のライフコースときわめて近似したものであり、女性はさまざまな経過をたどって一旦職業活動にはいると、もはや自らはそこから退くことはない。このようなフランス女性の職業活動のあり方は、家族生活との調和をはかる際の基底的な要因となっているのである。

女性の高学歴化

職業活動の「中年化」とともにある「女性化」がもたらされた要因のもっとも大きなものは、女性の高学歴化にある。

フランスでもたとえば 1938 年の指導要領にあるように伝統的に「若い娘は、自分たちにふさわしい家事という仕事や母親という仕事をよく理解すべきである。その手仕事はいつでも養育のためにとっておかねばならない。いかなる場合においても、娘達は特別な職業に就きたいと思ってはならない」との考えが支配的であった。フランスで男女共学が一般化されたのは、1963 年にすぎない。しかしながら、いまでは女性の進学率は飛躍的に向上し、男性を上回るようになっている。

1950 年代のはじめに産まれた世代においてはじめてバカロレアの合格者の数が男性を上回って以来、女性の合格者の数は恒常的に男性よりも多く、1955 年以降に産まれた女性は高等教育を受けることがより頻繁になり、現在 30 歳になる 1970 年生まれのものでは、第二期課程（修士程度）かあるいはそれ以上の学歴に達するものの数は男性と同じ程度に

なっている。しかも、若い女性は長い間学業につくようになっているばかりでなく、試験の成績も男性を上回るようになっている。たとえばバカロレアの合格率を見ると 1998 年では、男性の合格率は 76.5%であるのに対して、女性は 81.2%になっている。

また高学歴の女性の失業率は、同じ学歴の男性よりも低く、女性就業者の 25%は高学歴であるのに対して、男性就業者の 20%が高学歴にあるにすぎない。また完全雇用にある給与所得者のうち 44%の女性が少なくともバカロレアの資格を持っている。これに対して男性は 30%にすぎない。このことは、女性の完全雇用と学歴の高さは比例していて、女性にとっては男性以上に学歴資本を身につけることが、職業確保のための基本戦略となっていることが示されている。

このような戦略のもとに学歴資本を身につけていく女性は、しだいに社会の底流にある男女差別を変革していく原動力となり、また知識や技術、教養といった知的資質の問われる現代社会において、女性は人的資源としても優位の位置に立ちつつあるということができる。

女性労働の現実

女性の職業活動は拡大し、学歴資本も向上し、社会の人的資源としての資質を備えていっていることは歴史的に不可逆的な事実なのである。、しかしながら、他方では、労働市場の位置づけにおける差異は厳然として存在し続けている。とくに失業という現実において、そのことは深刻である。　2000 年の失業率は全体で 10%であるが、男性の失業率が 8.5%であるのに対して、女性の失業率は 11.5%となっている。この割合は、1994 年が男性の失業率が９%であったのにたいして女性の失業率は 14%であったことから比較すると、その格差は相対的に減少しているとはいえるが、依然として女性の失業率は男性よりも上回っている。

女性の失業率が高いことの原因としては次のようなことがあるといわれている。景気の後退と産業構造が鉱工業からサービス化へと転換していくことによって、雇用を喪失する女性が増えたことが第一にあげられる。それればかりでなく、サービス産業においてはむしろ雇用はのびており、その分野では増大しているといえるのであるが、レジ、掃除婦、ウエイトレスといった仕事には、若い女性が多く、その雇用形態も期限付き雇用とパートが一般的と行った状態である。その上、この分野の就業形態は安定したものではなく、出入りが激しく、失業も多くなる。サービス業の雇用形態は、不安定で暫定的で、キャリアもなく、報酬も少ないというのが常態である。それゆえ、サービス業への就労は、逆に失業をもたらしているのである。

女性の雇用は、景気の動向に関わらず、増大を続けているものの、その内容は、常に失業というリスクをともなったものであり、また女性も均質性を保っているというわけではなく、女性間の格差をも拡大している。たとえば、学歴の面からこれを見ると、学歴のないものの失業率は 9%から 31%へと変化しているのに対し、第二課程の大学卒業資格を持つものは 5%から 17%へ、高等教育機関の卒業資格を持つものは 4%から 12%になっている。失業率の伸びは、同じように高いが絶対数は学歴のないものが圧倒的に多いといわねばならず、また学歴間格差は女性においてとくに大きいとされている。性差による格差は、相対的に縮まっているのであるが、反対に女性間の有資格者と資格者との間の格差の方が