

#### (6) 一家庭あたりの子ども数：州別データ

1家庭あたりの子ども数を州別に示す。ユタ州では、1.46 と圧倒的に高い。次に高いのはアラスカの1.20、アイダホの1.111である。そのほか、1以上の州は、ニューメキシコ、ノースダコタ、サウスダコタ、ワイオミングである。子どものいる家族だけを取り出して平均子ども数を見ると、やはりユタ州が2.46 と高い。2人以上の州はアイダホとサウスダコタ、逆に低い州は、コロンビア特別区で1.71、そのほか、1.75以下の州はケンタッキー、メリーランド、ノースカロライナ、テネシー、ヴァージニア、ウエスト・ヴァージニアである。

ユタ州は、モルモン教徒が人口の多くを占めており、その影響であると考えられるが、他の州の場合は、どのような人口学的あるいは社会的な要素が関わっているのかを明らかにする必要がある。

表 19 一家族あたりの子ども数及び子どものいる家族の平均子ども数 (州別データ)

	全家族あたり の子ども数	子どもがいる家 族あたりの子ど も数
United States	0.89	1.86
Alabama	0.85	1.69
Alaska	1.20	1.95
Arizona	0.94	1.98
Arkansas	0.8	1.82
California	0.96	1.92
Colorado	0.94	1.85
Connecticut	0.80	1.80
Delaware	0.83	1.80
District of Columbia	0.69	1.71
Florida	0.72	1.78
Georgia	0.89	1.78
Hawaii	0.90	1.89
Idaho	1.11	2.13
Illinois	0.91	1.90
Indiana	0.91	1.85
Iowa	0.92	1.93
Kansas	0.94	1.92
Kentucky	0.86	1.75
Louisiana	0.99	1.90
Maine	0.88	1.80
Maryland	0.82	1.75
Massachusetts	0.83	1.83
Michigan	0.92	1.89
Minnesota	0.99	1.95
Mississippi	0.95	1.89
Missouri	0.88	1.85
Montana	0.98	1.95
Nebraska	0.98	1.97
Nevada	0.87	1.85
New Hampshire	0.90	1.80
New Jersey	0.80	1.80
New Mexico	1.03	1.94
New York	0.85	1.84
North Carolina	0.79	1.71
North Dakota	1.02	1.98
Ohio	0.89	1.86
Oklahoma	0.89	1.84
Oregon	0.89	1.88
Pennsylvania	0.81	1.84
Rhode Island	0.81	1.80
South Carolina	0.86	1.79
South Dakota	1.04	2.04
Tennessee	0.81	1.73
Texas	0.99	1.90
Utah	1.46	2.46
Vermont	0.93	1.83
Virginia	0.83	1.74
Washington	0.92	1.87
West Virginia	0.82	1.75
Wisconsin	0.95	1.94
Wyoming	1.07	1.98

出典: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population, 1990 CP-1-1, "General Population Characteristics," United States, table 263. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census Internet release date: December 11, 1998

#### 4. 労働力率と出産 (表 20)

1993-94 年にかけて産まれた子供の母親で就労している割合をみると、大卒以上の母親では 87%が就労しているのに対し、高卒の場合は 48%になっている。また、高卒未満の場合は 34%であった。ヒスパニックの母親の 37.5%が就労しているのに対し、非ヒスパニックでは 56%であった。

表 20：過去一年間に出産した女性の数および労働力率、属性別 (1990 年と 1994 年 6 月) (千人単位)

属性		1993-1994		1989-1990	
		総数	労働力率	総数	労働力率
全体		3890	53.1	39136	52.8
教育レベル	高卒未満	832	33.5	816	31.5
	高卒	1303	48.1	1588	51.9
	1年以上	1754	66.2	1509	65.3
	学位なし	679	59.9	777	62.8
	2年(準学士)	302	71.1	N/A	N/A
	4年制卒以上	773	69.7	732	68
年齢	15~19歳	397	39.3	338	42.8
	20~24歳	938	51	1038	45.5
	25~29歳	1054	54.5	1192	55.3
	30~44歳	1501	57.1	1346	58.9
人種	ホワイト	3107	55.4	3148	54.5
	ブラック	567	47	615	46.9
	アジア系	112	53.4	101	48
ヒスパニック	ヒスパニック	644	37.7	491	43.8
	非ヒスパニック	3245	56.2	3422	54.1
婚姻地位	既婚、夫あり	2798	54.5	2826	56.4
	死別、離婚、離別	199	52	319	50.9
	未婚	892	47.9	769	40.4

出典：1994 Fertility of American Women: June 1994

#### 5. 親の就労状況

##### (1) フルタイム就労の親 (表 21)

両親と暮らしている子どもの 76%は、最低1人の親がフルタイムで就労している状況にある。1997 年では、2人親と暮らしている子どもの 88%は、最低どちらかの親がフルタイムで年間つとめていた。しかし、シングルファザーの子どもの 70%、シングルマザーの子どもの 41%は、親が年間をとおしてフルタイムでつとめている。

通年フルタイムで勤める親を持つ割合は、黒人・非ヒスパニックの子どもで 58%、ヒスパニックの子どもで 67%、白人の子どもで 82%で、人種による差がかなり大きい。1980 年から 1997 年にかけて、両親と暮らしていて且つ両親とも働いている子どもは、17%から 31%に増加した。

表 21 最低一人の親がフルタイムで就労している 18 歳未満の子どもの割合

年次	80	85	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97
<b>2人親</b>										
全体	70	70	72	71	71	71	72	74	75	76
白人非ヒ	75	77	79	78	78	79	80	81	82	82
黒人非ヒ	50	48	50	49	49	49	52	54	56	58
ヒスパニック	59	55	60	57	57	57	59	61	64	67
6歳以下	67	67	68	67	66	67	68	69	71	72
6-17歳	72	72	74	73	74	74	75	76	77	78
<b>夫妻家族</b>										
全体	80	81	85	84	84	85	86	87	88	88
白人非ヒ	81	83	86	86	87	85	86	89	90	91
黒人非ヒ	73	76	84	82	81	80	86	85	87	85
ヒスパニック	71	70	74	71	71	72	76	77	79	80
6歳以下	76	79	83	82	83	83	85	86	87	87
6-17歳	81	82	85	85	85	86	86	87	88	89
<b>母のみ</b>										
全体	33	32	33	33	33	33	35	38	39	41
白人非ヒ	39	39	40	40	41	39	43	43	47	46
黒人非ヒ	28	25	27	27	27	28	31	33	35	39
ヒスパニック	22	22	24	24	24	24	23	27	27	34
6歳以下	20	20	21	22	20	21	23	24	27	28
6-17歳	38	37	40	40	41	39	42	45	45	47
<b>父のみ</b>										
全体	57	60	64	64	60	61	61	67	67	70
白人非ヒ	61	62	68	67	62	61	64	72	69	72
黒人非ヒ	41	59	53	56	60	67	56	64	60	67
ヒスパニック	53	53	59	57	51	58	55	58	66	68
6歳以下	48	57	58	57	55	55	55	54	61	62
6-17歳	59	62	67	68	63	65	63	74	70	74

\*通年フルタイム雇用は、年間 50 週以上、通常フルタイム（週 35 時間）で働いている状態をいう。母のみ：結婚していないパートナー関係もここに含まれる。

出典：America's Children: Key National Indicators of Well Being (Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics, 1999)、U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, March Current Population Survey より作成。

(2) 両親（一人親の場合はその親）共就労している家族（表 22）

過去 30 年間で一人親家族は増え、婚姻地位に関わらず、母親の就業率は増えているので、結果としてフルタイムで家にいる親を持つ子どもが減った。1985 年から 1997 年にかけて、同居している親が働く親を持つ子どもは 59%から 68%に増加した。

6 歳未満の子どもがいる家庭では、6 歳以上 17 歳以下の子どもがいる家庭に比べ、両親（1 人親の場合は、1 人親）が働いている割合が 10%低い。1985 年から 1990 年にかけては、すべての人種グループの親の就業率が上がった。1990 年から 1996 年にかけては、黒人とヒスパニックの子どもで親が就業している割合は増加したが、白人は同じくらいだった。1996 年から 1997 年にかけては、どのグループでも増加した。1997 年には、白人の 68%、黒人の 71%、ヒスパニックの 54%の子どもが、一緒に暮らしている親の全てが就労している、という状況にあった。

表 22 一緒に暮らしている親の全てが就労している子どもの%：  
年齢、家族構成、人種、ヒスパニック別（1985-1997 年）

年次	1985	1990	1994	1995	1996	1997
<b>全員</b>	59	63	64	65	66	68
6 歳未満	51	55	56	59	58	61
6-17 歳	63	67	68	69	70	71
<b>夫妻家族</b>	57	61	63	65	64	65
6 歳未満	51	54	57	59	58	58
6-17 歳	61	65	67	68	67	69
<b>母のみ</b>	61	63	62	64	66	72
6 歳未満	49	51	52	54	56	65
6-17 歳	67	70	68	69	72	76
<b>父のみ</b>	89	88	86	88	88	88
6 歳未満	90	90	85	86	86	89
6-17 歳	89	88	86	88	89	88
<b>白人</b>	59	63	64	66	66	68
6 歳未満	51	55	57	59	58	61
6-17 歳	63	67	68	70	70	71
<b>ブラック</b>	60	63	62	64	64	71
6 歳未満	54	55	56	57	58	68
6-17 歳	63	67	66	67	68	73
<b>ヒスパニック</b>	45	50	49	50	50	54
6 歳未満	40	44	41	44	43	49
6-17 歳	48	54	54	54	55	57

出典：Trends in the Well-Being of America's Children and Youth (March Current Population Surveys を元に Child Trends および U.S. Bureau of the Census が計算。)

### (3) こどものいる夫妻カップルの就労状況

子どもの有無あるいは年齢に関わらず、夫のみが就労するカップルが少なくなり、共働きが増えている。全体(表23)では夫妻とも就労している割合は、1986年では50%以下であったが、年々増えつづけ、1998年には56.3%になった。一方で夫のみ就労の割合は減少し、5組に2組の夫妻に過ぎない。

6歳未満の子どもがいる夫妻の場合(表25)、夫のみが働いているカップルは、34.6%とかなり高い。共働きも6割以上で、6歳未満の子どもがいてもかなりの夫妻が共働きをしている事が分かる。18歳未満の子どもがいる夫妻をみると、共働きの割合はさらに多く、67.9%である。

子どものいる夫妻には(表24)、どちらも無職と言うケースが極めて少ない。これは年齢的なことも関係していると考えられる。全体でみると、全ての年齢の夫妻が含まれるのですでに退職している場合もある。

表23：夫妻の就労状況

	夫妻とも就労	夫のみ	妻のみ	どちらも無職	総数
1986	49.9%	28.8%	4.6%	16.6%	50,933
1987	51.4%	27.4%	4.5%	16.7%	51,537
1988	52.1%	26.5%	4.6%	16.8%	51,809
1989	53.2%	25.5%	4.5%	16.8%	52,100
1990	53.6%	24.9%	4.7%	16.8%	52,317
1991	54.0%	24.3%	4.7%	17.0%	52,147
1992	54.5%	23.4%	5.0%	17.1%	52,457
1993	54.3%	23.1%	5.3%	17.3%	53,171
1994	55.1%	21.9%	5.8%	17.2%	53,171
1995	55.7%	21.9%	5.7%	16.8%	53,858
1996	55.9%	21.8%	5.3%	17.0%	53,567
1997	56.8%	21.2%	5.4%	16.6%	53,604
1998	56.3%	21.3%	5.7%	16.7%	54,317

表24：18歳未満の子どもがいる夫妻の就労状況

	夫妻とも就労	夫のみ	妻のみ	どちらも無職	総数
1986	59.3%	36.2%	2.1%	2.4%	24,630
1987	61.8%	33.9%	2.1%	2.2%	24,645
1988	63.0%	32.6%	2.2%	2.2%	24,600
1989	63.7%	32.1%	2.0%	2.3%	24,735
1990	64.3%	31.2%	2.3%	2.2%	24,537
1991	64.7%	30.9%	2.4%	2.0%	24,397
1992	65.7%	29.6%	2.4%	2.3%	24,420
1993	65.0%	30.1%	2.8%	2.2%	24,707
1994	66.4%	28.1%	3.0%	2.6%	25,058
1995	67.4%	27.2%	3.0%	2.4%	25,241
1996	67.3%	27.6%	3.0%	2.1%	24,920
1997	68.4%	26.8%	2.9%	1.9%	25,083
1998	67.9%	27.1%	3.0%	1.9%	25,269

表 25：6 歳未満の子どもがいる夫妻の就労状況

	夫妻とも就労	夫のみ	妻のみ	どちらも無職	総数
1986	52.6%	44.3%	1.3%	1.8%	11,924
1987	55.3%	41.3%	1.7%	1.7%	11,966
1988	55.8%	40.9%	1.5%	1.7%	11,915
1989	56.4%	40.5%	1.2%	1.9%	12,011
1990	57.5%	38.9%	1.6%	2.0%	12,051
1991	58.4%	38.0%	1.8%	1.8%	12,100
1992	58.5%	37.6%	1.8%	2.1%	11,925
1993	58.1%	38.0%	1.9%	2.0%	11,942
1994	60.1%	35.7%	2.1%	2.1%	12,118
1995	62.0%	34.0%	1.9%	2.1%	11,951
1996	61.0%	35.3%	1.9%	1.7%	11,782
1997	61.7%	34.7%	2.2%	1.4%	11,584
1998	62.1%	34.6%	1.9%	1.4%	11,773

出典：U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P20-515。

"Household and Family Characteristics: March 1998 (Update)" and Reports に基づいて計算。

#### (4) 母親の就業率 (表 26)

最後に母親だけを見てみる。母親の就業率は、1980 年では 53%、1990 年では 63%、1996 年では 66%と、増加し続けている。1996 年では 3 歳未満の子どもがいる母親の 55%は就業しており、3-5 歳の母親は 63%、6-17 歳の母親では 74%であった。

1996 年では、白人の 67%、黒人の 63%、ヒスパニックの 49%が就業していた。フルタイムの割合が高いのは黒人で 52%がフルタイムで勤務している。婚姻地位による違いでみると、離婚した母親が最も高い割合でフルタイム勤務している。結婚している母親のフルタイム割合は、62 から 68 パーセント、未婚で子どもがいる女性は 40 から 49 パーセント、離婚した女性は 75 から 79 パーセントに上がった。

就業している母親の 71 パーセントは、フルタイムで勤務していた。3 歳未満の子どもを持つ親の場合は 66%、6-17 歳の場合は 74%がフルタイムで、小さい子どもを持つ親のほうが、フルタイムで働く率が低いことがわかる。

表 26 子どものいる女性のうち、就労している割合 (%)

	年次	1980	1988	1990	1994	1995	1996
全体		53	60	63	64	66	66
フルタイム		-	44	46	45	46	47
パートタイム		-	16	17	19	19	19
末子 3 歳未満		37	47	50	52	54	55
フルタイム		-	32	34	34	35	36
パートタイム		-	15	16	18	19	19
末子 3-5 歳		50	57	61	60	62	63
フルタイム		-	40	43	41	42	43
パートタイム		-	17	18	19	20	20
末子 6-17 歳		60	70	70	72	73	74
フルタイム		-	53	53	53	53	55
パートタイム		-	17	17	19	19	19
結婚、夫就労		62	63	66	67	67	68
フルタイム		-	43	44	45	45	46
パートタイム		-	19	19	21	22	21
未婚		40	45	46	48	48	49
フルタイム		-	32	36	34	35	35
パートタイム		-	32	36	34	35	35
離婚		75	75	74	77	77	79
フルタイム		-	66	6	63	64	66
パートタイム		-	9	9	11	13	13
白人		52	62	63	65	67	67
フルタイム		-	44	44	45	46	47
パートタイム		-	18	19	20	21	21
ブティック		54	56	61	58	62	63
フルタイム		-	48	53	47	50	52
パートタイム		-	8	8	11	11	10
ヒスパニック		42	49	50	48	49	49
フルタイム		-	38	39	36	37	37
パートタイム		-	11	11	12	12	12

出典：Trends in the Well-being of America's Children and Youth. Bureau of Labor Statistics, March Current Population Surveys を元に計算。）

表 27 就労している母親の数とフルタイムの割合 (末子年齢、婚姻地位、人種)

(千人単位)	フルタイム	パートタイム	合計	フルタイムの割合
母親全て	16712	6673	23386	71
末子 3 歳未満	3431	1791	5222	66
末子 3-5 歳	3007	1363	4370	69
末子 6-17 歳	10274	3519	13794	74
既婚	11737	5398	17136	68
未婚	1317	512	1829	72
離婚	2420	460	2880	84
白人	13246	5918	19164	69
黒人	2644	525	3170	83
ヒスパニック	1654	523	2177	76

出典：Trends in the Well-being of America's Children and Youth. Bureau of Labor Statistics, March Current Population Surveys 1996 を元に計算。）



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## Family relationships in Australia: the conservative-liberal-radical debate

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### On definitions

For official statistical purposes, a family in Australia is defined as two or more persons, one of whom is at least 15 years of age, who are related by blood, marriage (registered or de facto), adoption, step or fostering, and who are usually resident in the same household (McEwin 1998: 16).

In everyday language, we use the word 'family' in ways that are not consistent with this statistical definition. The most obvious way that our everyday concept of the family differs from the statistical definition is that almost all of us frequently refer to people living in other households as members of our family. If we are adult, our siblings, our parents, our grandparents and our children would often be described as 'family' even though they live elsewhere. If we are a child, then we are likely to see our grandparents, our parent or sibling who lives elsewhere and even our cousins and aunts and uncles as family. In some uses of the word, we refer to our in-laws as 'family' but at other times they will be 'your family'. At more ceremonial occasions, such as weddings and funerals, family might be used in a much broader sense to include cousins, uncles and aunts. The widespread interest in genealogy has extended the concept of family in other directions, most notably, to an ancestor and his or her descendants. The people we consider as family in everyday terms varies according to the purpose and to our life cycle stage. Co-residence is just one of several criteria we may employ in making use of the word 'family'. Other criteria include our personal circumstances, cultural norms, the nature of the relationship that we have with related persons (closeness, sense of obligation, etc.) and the context.

On the other hand, we might not use the word 'family' to describe situations that are considered a family in the official statistical definition. Two sisters sharing a household might not describe themselves as 'a family'. Even a couple with no children might not in conversation refer to their household unit as 'my family'. In popular parlance, there is a sense in which 'family' is something more than two people of the one generation in the one household.

The statistical definition is limited because it requires co-residence. It is also limited because it is static whereas 'family' is dynamic. The people we consider as members of our family change as our circumstances change. We are continually adding and subtracting people to the conception of family that we use for different purposes as we move through life. Family type in the statistical definition is a structural type. We live in one-parent families, two-parent families, couple families, or 'other' families. More precisely, these are forms of living arrangement rather than forms of 'family'. For example, most children who live in a one-parent family have another parent living

elsewhere whom they would describe as part of their family. Thus, it seems more appropriate to describe 'family' in terms of the changing nature of relationships between people that can be considered to be 'family' relationships. This implies a more functional approach to the consideration of families in contrast to the structural approach used in the statistical definition.

### **On theories**

My approach to the family has been classified by the sociologist, Michael Gilding, as neo-functional and liberal (Gilding 1997: 37, 254). As evidence, he quotes me as follows:

As society changes, the lives of individuals and families will also change. The centrality of family relationships, however, will remain because the family will always be the place in which most people find the care and intimacy that is part of their being (McDonald 1995: 65).

Gilding portrays the liberal, neo-functional approach as follows:

The liberal position is comfortable with the family as a social institution which changes over time. It does not hark back to a glorious past, when life was simpler and people kinder. Nor does it insist upon a narrow definition of family. On the contrary, liberals acknowledge the enduring importance of long-term relationships and children, and the changing meanings attached to these relationships. The account is consistent with the fact that most Australians in the 1990s nominate the family as the most important aspect of their lives. In close connection, Australians also define families in more diverse ways than was once the case (1997: 254).

Gilding describes two other theoretical perspectives, the conservative and the radical. The conservative view is reflected in the following quotation:

It is simply false to argue that there is no relatively fixed definition of "family". The human record, honestly confronted, shows that the family is a natural, universal, and irreplaceable community rooted in human nature. The "family" in all ages and in all corners of the globe can be defined as a man and a woman bonded together through a socially-approved covenant of marriage to regulate sexuality, to bear, raise, and protect children, to provide mutual care and protection, to create a small home economy, and to maintain loyalty and continuity between the generations, those going before and those coming after (Carlson 1996: 8).

Although not stated in this definition, the conservative approach also normally specifies rigid role segregation of husbands and wives with husbands being responsible for income earning and wives for the care of children and for household maintenance (Bogle 1996). Conservatives see the family as being in a state of decline because, based on the statistical definition, a much smaller percentage of people today live in the conservative form of family than was the case at the beginning of the 1970s. In 1974, approximately

40 per cent of Australians lived in married couple families with dependent children where the husband was in the labour force and the wife was not in the labour force. In 1998, the equivalent figure was about 13 per cent (derived from ABS 1974 and ABS 1998).

In the radical perspective, the family is not about intimacy and caring but about power, oppression, abuse and conflict. The family is seen as changing but the changes are very slow in regard to the establishment of equal and cooperative forms of family relationships. The radical perspective sees the family as rooted in patriarchy. This perspective does not see change as necessarily heading in one direction, but as chaotic, fragmentary and uncertain. In the extreme, the radical approach does not mourn the passing of 'the family' (Stacey 1993).

In contrast to the United States and Britain, according to Gilding (1997: 254), the liberal position achieved widespread influence in Australia in the 1980s, 'marginalising the conservative position in terms of religious fanaticism and "backward provincialism"'. The liberal position also generally held sway in the official pronouncements from the United Nations during the 1994 International Year of the Family:

Families assume diverse forms and functions from one country to another, and within each national society. These express the diversity of individual preferences and societal conditions (Paragraph I.3.b, United Nations Proclamation on the International Year of the Family 1994).

Gilding considers the radical perspective to be the most marginal in public debate in Australia to the extent that 'in the 1990s, feminist and gay activists are more likely to frame their critique in liberal terms, upholding the diversity of families' (Gilding 1997: 256).

Another theoretical theme that crosscuts the conservative-liberal-radical paradigm is the public-private dichotomy. The liberal agenda is one in which private agendas are public in the sense that they should be supported in the public sphere, philosophically, legally and financially. In the liberal agenda, individual wellbeing is seen as the end product of a partnership between government, employers and families. In the conservative agenda, the family is played out in the private sphere but governed by norms and rules determined in the public sphere. The public sphere addresses the family through its agent, the father and husband. The principal roles of government in the conservative agenda are to protect the privacy and the stability of the family and to ensure the economic wellbeing of the breadwinner. The position of the radical agenda in relation to the public-private dichotomy is less clear. Sometimes, for example, in regard to sexual relationships, the radical stance will be that the state has no role in the private affairs of individuals. At other times, it will call for state recognition of homosexual marriages or for the removal of abusive fathers from their wives and children. Gilding (1997: 256) points out that in some areas such as new reproductive technologies, the conservative and radical agendas have coalesced around the need for state restriction.

In this paper, I consider the main changes that have taken place in the nature of family relationships since 1970 using the conservative-liberal-radical paradigm. The discussion will also consider the public-private dichotomy and, consequently, the role of public policy. I address the two main family relationships: intimate couple relationships and parent-child relationships.

### **Intimate couple relationships**

By intimate couple relationships, I am referring to relationships through which people obtain both sexual and emotional intimacy. Marriage has been the common form of such relationships, but other forms exist. Survey evidence suggests that most people value such relationships and would prefer to be in such a relationship. The conservative perspective specifies marriage as the one and only acceptable form of intimate relationship. Other intimate relationship types are considered inadequate or inappropriate in some way. The liberal perspective emphasises the individual's need for such intimacy, but is not necessarily prescriptive about the legal status of the relationship. Intimate relationships imply trust and commitment and these may be more or less likely in one form of relationship than in another. The conservative claims that trust and commitment are inherent in marriage. On the contrary, some with a radical perspective argue that, because marriage is a well-established form of patriarchy, freely-given intimacy and commitment are more likely in forms of relationship other than marriage. The liberal view is that it is the trust and commitment in the relationship that is important, not the form of the relationship.

Consistent with the views of most people, there is a tendency in all three perspectives to favour living in some form of intimate relationship. However, a choice not to be in a relationship, considered to be deviant in the 1950s, is now less an issue of concern for all three perspectives. The conservative may see singleness as an unfortunate but tolerable outcome. The liberal may see singleness as a legitimate choice but not one that would suit most people. The radical might see singleness as the inevitable outcome of a society that does not offer people equality within relationships.

The statistical evidence (Table 1) shows that, in both 1971 and 1998, marriage was the dominant way in which most Australians lived through the central ages of adult life (30-59 years), however, there have been substantial changes in the proportions married at both the younger and the older ages.

Table 1: Percentages legally married and not permanently separated by age and sex, Australia, 1971 and 1998

Age group	Males		Females	
	1971	1998	1971	1998
15-19	1.4	0.2	.8.7	0.7
20-24	35.1	5.8	62.0	13.4
25-29	71.5	31.2	84.3	44.3
30-34	82.6	54.8	88.6	63.0
35-39	85.0	65.5	88.8	69.1
40-44	84.8	70.2	87.0	70.9
45-49	84.6	73.1	84.1	72.1
50-54	84.1	75.4	79.2	72.8
55-59	83.1	77.0	72.3	72.2
60-64	80.7	77.8	61.8	68.8
65-69	76.5	77.1	49.7	61.2
70-74	70.4	75.6	36.1	50.8
75-79	62.5	71.8	24.1	37.8
80-84	51.3	64.2	14.0	23.2
85+	35.5	49.0	6.0	10.5

Sources: 1971 *Census of Population and Housing, Demographic Characteristics Australia*, Table 1, Bureau of Census and Statistics Australia; *Marriages and Divorces Australia 1998*, Table 4.3, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue No. 3310.0.

Note. The published 1998 percentages for currently married have been adjusted to currently married and living together using proportions married but permanently separated by age and sex obtained from the 1996 Census of Population and Housing. It is assumed that the proportion of married persons who were permanently separated was the same in 1998 for each age and sex group as it was in 1996.

Relationships in the Negotiating the Life Course Survey include same-sex relationships. The information was obtained by asking people: Are you married, or in a relationship? If the answer was 'yes', the respondent was asked the sex of the partner. Less than one per cent (0.9 per cent) of all relationships were same-sex relationships. The 1996 Census also had an approach to identifying same-sex relationships. The incidence identified by the Census was much lower than that found in the Negotiating the Life Course Survey. Until better estimates are obtained, we must conclude that same-sex relationships in which the couple lives together are a very small fraction of all intimate couple relationships.

#### *Intimate relationships: the youngest adult ages: 20-29 years*

At the youngest ages (less than 30 years), the fall in the proportion married is massive. In 1971, 62 per cent of women aged 20-24 years were married but, in 1998, only 13 per cent were married. This is the result of a powerful movement away from the early marriage pattern that characterised the 1940-1970 period. This is not an area of controversy in the



family debate. The conservative perspective does not call for a return to early marriage and would tend to support the notion that there is a 'proper time to marry' which involves establishment of economic security and emotional maturity. The liberal perspective would strongly support the shift to later marriage on the grounds that years of experience of adulthood prior to marriage provide young people with a better appreciation of the options open to them. In the liberal way of thinking, later marriage provides women with the opportunity to establish themselves in career terms and hence to be in a position to enter marriage on more equal terms. For the radical, later marriage gives young people time to realise for themselves that marriage is patriarchy and that other options may be preferable.

Has the movement away from marriage among young people in their twenties been associated with a burgeoning of other forms of relationships? We can address this question in a static or dynamic way. In the static approach, the living arrangements of 20-29 year-olds at a point in time are examined. Four living arrangement types are shown in Table 2. At a point in time, the proportion that are living together without being married is the smallest of the four possible states. The most prominent state for young people in their twenties is not being in a relationship, followed by marriage and 'living apart together' relationships. Thus, from the static viewpoint, the alternative of living together without being married does not appear to be widespread.

Table 2. Living arrangements of men and women aged 20-29 years, Australia, 1996/97

Living arrangement	Males	Females
	%	%
Not presently in a relationship	44	31
In a relationship, but not living together	15	20
Living together, not married	13	16
Married and living together	28	33
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Negotiating the Life Course Survey, 1996/97

The dynamic approach considers people's experience during their lifetime, rather than their circumstances at a point in time. Table 3 shows a selection of measures that indicate the experience of young Australians of various relationship situations. There is little difference between the proportions who are currently married and living with their spouse (Table 2) and the proportions who have ever been married (Table 3). Also, the proportions who have married more than once are very small. That is, breakdown of their own marriage is not an important feature of the lives of 20-29 year-olds. However, the dynamic approach provides a very different perspective to the static approach in relation to the frequency of living together relationships. Almost 50 per cent of all men and women aged 20-29 years have lived together without being married, including those who

lived together before their marriage. Among those who have married, 71 per cent of men and 55 per cent of women had lived together with their spouse before the marriage. Thus, a dynamic approach shows that living together relationships occur much more commonly than we would conclude from the static approach. The implication of this is that living together relationships are not lasting relationships.

Table 3. Relationship experiences of men and women aged 20-29 years, Australia, 1996/97

	Males	Females
All persons: % ever married	29	36
All persons: % previously married but not now married	2	..3
All persons: % married now but married more than once	0	..1
All persons: % who have ever lived together without being married	46	50
Ever married: % lived together with spouse before first marriage	71	55
Ever remarried: % lived together with spouse before second marriage	*	*
Ever married: % has lived together with someone other than a spouse	16	14

Source: Negotiating the Life Course Survey, 1996/97

The Negotiating the Life Course Survey shows that about 90 per cent of living together relationships contracted in the late 1980s had been ended by separation or marriage within about eight years of formation and only 24 per cent were intact after about four years (McDonald 1998). Hence, while, in Australia, living together may be a short-term alternative to marriage, it appears not to be an alternative form of permanent relationship. There may be a small number of people whose preference is for a sequence of short-term, non-marital relationships and a small number who have lasting living together relationships, but, in general, living together in Australia is not an alternative to marriage. Instead, for a high proportion of people, it is an integral part of the process of getting married. This is counter to the standpoint of both conservatives and radicals. Both portray living together as if it was an alternative form of permanent relationship, one seeing it as an inadequate alternative, the other seeing it as a desirable alternative. For the majority who live together before they marry and for whom living together is part of the marriage process, an anti living together agenda is effectively an anti marriage agenda. Conservatives, therefore, tend to marginalise their message about the importance of marriage by not recognising that a sizeable majority of people enter marriage via a living together relationship.

Those who do not live together before marriage are identified by their ethnicity and their religiosity. People of Mediterranean origin and Asian origin are much less likely to live together before marriage than other groups. For example, only 16 per cent of people whose mother had been born in a Mediterranean country lived together before marriage. Also, the percentage who live together before marriage rises as the level of religiosity

falls. For people for whom religion was not at all important in their lives, 80 per cent lived together before marriage. This fell to 33 per cent for those for whom religion was very important in their lives (McDonald 1998). In 1996/97, religion was important or very important in the lives of less than 30 per cent of Australians aged 20-29 years.

Over the past 30 years, there has been an important change in relationship patterns at this age. The 1996/97 Negotiating the Life Course Survey has shown that, over time, first living together relationships have become more likely to break up than to end in marriage. Facilitated by the availability of reliable methods of birth control, a pattern of young people living together prior to marriage began to be prominent in the 1970s. At that time, most living together relationships led on to marriage. More recently, however, these first living together relationships have been more likely to break up than to lead to marriage. The shift to later ages at marriage is both a cause and a consequence of this trend. The longer marriage is delayed, however, the less likely it is to occur at all, and, certainly, the proportion of Australians who ever marry has fallen sharply since the early 1970s.

This recent trend presents something of a dilemma for the liberal. If the most desirable end result for most people is marriage, is there a question about a trend in behaviour that clearly makes marriage less likely to occur? The trend may sustain the case of the radical that the gender inequality inherent in relationships or the unfavourable nature of institutional structures relevant to young people (employment, housing) leads to fragmentation and uncertainty. The conservative case that people should simply marry without living together is not well supported by this trend. First, as already indicated, most people would not marry at all unless they had lived together beforehand. Second, we could not expect that couples whose living together relationship broke up would have stayed together if they had married without first living together, and the trauma of ending a marriage would have been greater.

#### *Intimate relationships: persons aged 30-39 years*

The married state is much less common in 1998 than in 1971 for people in their thirties (Table 1). This is where the political debate about marriage heats up. The conservatives would prefer to see most people in their thirties in the married state. They would be particularly concerned if people in their thirties were living in some other form of relationship. The radicals would be happier with even lower percentages married and would approve if the shift away from marriage was related to a shift into other, more egalitarian forms of relationship. Liberals are ambivalent and uncertain about the situation. They have a strong sense that being in a relationship is a good thing and, as marriage is by far the most common form of intimate relationship for people in their thirties, perhaps the percentage married, ideally, should be higher. On the other hand, liberals would be loath to make pronouncements in individual cases and would defend the reasons why people in this age group are not married.

The main alternative to being married in this age group is not being in a relationship at all. (Table 4). Only eight per cent of people were living together without being married and between 3 and 7 per cent were in relationships but not living together.

Table 4. Living arrangements of men and women aged 30-39 years, Australia, 1996/97

Living arrangement	Males	Females
	%	%
Not presently in a relationship	17	14
In a relationship, but not living together	7	3
Living together, not married	8	8
Married and living together	68	75
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Negotiating the Life Course Survey, 1996/97

The dynamic view of the relationships of this age group is shown in Table 5. Marriage breakdown is now a feature of the history of relationships. For example 23 per cent of all women in this age range (26 per cent of all ever married women) have been previously married or married more than once. This is well on the way to the estimated 40 per cent of first marriages that end in divorce. The rise in the rate of divorce took place over a short period of years, mainly in the 1970s. In the past 20 years, there has been little further increase in the rate of divorce.

The high incidence of marriage breakdown is abhorred in the conservative perspective. Indeed, reduction of the divorce rate is a rallying cry of the conservative perspective on the family. The liberal would probably like to see a lower divorce rate, but achieved by means other than making divorce harder to obtain. The liberal would also say that, while it is a good thing to provide supports to marriage so that relationships continue, a high divorce rate is inevitable and we must adjust to this situation. The radical looks upon a high divorce rate as a consequence of all that the radical perspective says is wrong with the institution of marriage, that is, as a justification of the radical position. The debate about marriage breakdown is at the centre of the differences between the different perspectives in the conservative-liberal-radical paradigm.

The dynamic view provided in Table 5 also shows that 60 per cent of all 30-39 year-olds have lived together with a partner to whom they were not married at some time in their lives. This again is a very different picture to that provided in the static analysis of Table 4. In most cases, the respondent later married the person with whom they had lived, but 28 per cent of men and 21 per cent of women in this age group had lived with someone that they did not marry.