

FIGURE 21

ABORTIONS PER 100 LIVE BIRTHS AND TEENAGE FERTILITY RATE F(15-19) ; 1996-97.





FIGURE 22

TEENAGE FERTILITY RATE AND PERCENTAGE NON-MARITAL BIRTHS -- 1996-97



20, but teenage fertility still remains incompatible with the proper completion of schooling everywhere. Furthermore, high abortion figures indicate that in these countries many pregnancies occurring to teenagers are undesired. In addition, the contraceptive use-effectiveness profiles for these countries show either a low overall use (below 60 percent of couples in Latvia, Lithuania, Romania or Belarus for example) or a high reliance on non-supply methods (more than 20 percent of users in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, or the Slovak Republic for instance). It is to be noted that a few western countries too still have high reliance on coitus interruptus or rhythm methods, such as Ireland and Italy.

The plot of teenage fertility against the proportion of non-marital births to all births (Figure 22) shows the development of three patterns among industrialized countries. In the pattern labeled "West & North" there has been a steady increase of the share of extra-marital births, but this occurs in combination with low levels of teenage fertility. This is a pattern of non-marital fertility at older ages and occurring mainly to cohabiting couples. The second pattern is that of the so-called "Anglosaxon" countries with much higher teenage fertility and higher out-of-wedlock fertility. In this group, Ireland and Australia are found at the lower end and New Zealand is located at the upper end. In the third group, high proportions of non-marital births are associated with the highest teenage fertility. This is typically the Eastern European pattern. The most remarkable feature, however, is that the US not only typically belongs to this Eastern group but outpaces countries such as the Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation and Bulgaria on both counts, i.e. with respect to both high teenage fertility and high non-marital fertility. This illustrates once more the anomalous position of the US within the set of western countries.

The link between lone mother households and the proportion children living in such households on the one hand and the poverty rates of such households on the other can be gleaned from the data in Table 4. The poverty rates and the proportion of children in lone mother households are drawn from the "Luxemburg Income Survey" (LIS) (reported by Bradbury and Jäntti, 1999:27)¹⁰ and the proportion of women heading single parent households stem from the Fertility and Family Surveys (FFS). Poverty levels are measured with the half overall median poverty line after adjustment with household size equivalent scales. From Table 4 it appears that lone mother households have up to 11 times the poverty rates of two parent households, with a median equal to 2.5 times. For the countries with more than 10 percent of children living in single mother households, this median is worse, i.e. 3.3 times more poverty. The US again stands out with a very high percentage (60) of lone mother households in poverty and it has the highest proportion of children below 18 living in such households as well. Figures between 30 and 50 percent of lone mother household living below the poverty lines are found in Western and Eastern European countries, with both Germany and the UK scoring particularly high, but we should bear in mind that the UK has twice as many lone mother households than Germany. Poverty rates of lone mother households tend to be lowest in the Scandinavian countries, but a

¹⁰ Alternative figures from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) are reported in J. Ditch et al. (1998:35-45) for EU-member states.

Table 4: Poverty rates and the incidence of lone mother households in selected industrialized countries (mostly 1990s)

	Poverty rates (%) in:			Percentage of children LT 18 in lone mother household	Percent of women heading one parent household by age (FFS)	
	lone mother households	two parents households	ratio		20-24	25-29
USA 94	60	17	3.5	15	na	na
Canada 94	45	12	3.8	11	7	7
Germany 94	43	9	4.8	9	4	9
UK 95	40	18	2.2	19	na	na
Australia 94	38	15	2.5	9	na	na
Austria 87	33	3	11.0	10	6	11
Russian Fed. 95	31	26	1.2	8	na	na
Ireland 87	30	17	1.8	3	na	na
Netherlands 91	30	7	4.3	8	1	3
France 89	25	8	3.1	7	4	7
Spain 90	25	12	2.1	2	2	3
Switzerland 82	21	5	4.2	7	1	2
Italy 95	20	21	1.0	2	0	1
Hungary 94	12	11	1.1	6	4	6
Belgium 92	12	6	2.0	7	1	3
Denmark 92	11	6	1.8	13	na	na
Norway 95	10	3	3.3	14	5	7
Czech Rep. 92	9	1	9.0	7	na	na
Slovakia 92	8	2	4.0	5	na	na
Finland 91	6	3	2.0	9	4	6
Sweden 92	5	4	1.3	15	5	10

Source: B. Bradbury & M. Jäntti (1999): 27 (table 3.4); and FFS-surveys, appendix tables 4.1.

number of Eastern European countries (Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) also have poverty rates below 15 percent). Hence, Scandinavian countries score high on the incidence of lone parent families, but their welfare states correct income deprivation to a high degree as well. In Eastern European countries poverty of lone mothers is partially avoided as a result of coresidence of these mothers in their own parental household, which *inter alia* facilitates their labor force participation and avoids extra housing costs, and by the fact that the overall adjusted median income is so low that few households, irrespective of type, fall below the 50 percent of this median threshold. If poverty were to be measured in Eastern Europe on the basis of an absolute rather than a relative indicator, i.e. using a consumption basket method instead, the result would be quite different.

Last but not least, it should be stressed that the Eastern European pattern of high teenage fertility and illegitimacy, in tandem with the decline of the public health sector, has led to sometimes dramatic rises in the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases (syphilis, HIV) since 1989 and in the institutionalization of abandoned children (Unicef, 1999).¹¹

3. Home leaving and household formation: destandardization and growing diversity

The most salient characteristics of the "second demographic transition" are all associated with the destandardization of patterns of home leaving and household formation. Destandardization refers to the fact that the standard ordering of transitions during the life course, and particularly in the age bracket between 18 and 30, has been abandoned. The classic sequence of finishing school, entry into the labor force, home leaving linked to marriage and subsequent parenthood is being reordered in ever larger segments of the population. New phases of single living, sharing dwellings with age mates, premarital cohabitation, and fertility prior to marriage with or without a partner have been added, and these can occur before the end of education or before an entry into the labor force as well.

The destandardization is predicated on both structural and cultural factors (cf. Liefbroer, 1999), but these tend to act differentially on the various ingredients of the new pattern and they do not always operate in the same direction. In other words, historical context seems to matter quite a bit. In order to give a more structured overview we shall consider factors associated with:

- (i) independent living and premarital cohabitation, versus prolonged staying in the parental household and marriage;
- (ii) the general postponement of first marriage.

¹¹ The newly registered number of syphilis cases has doubled between 1989 and 1997 in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Latvia, and almost tripled in Russia and Moldova. The number of children aged 0-3 in institutional care (mainly orphanages) increased in the same period by 30 to 75 percent in Moldova (31%), Slovakia (44), Bulgaria (46), Romania (56), Russia (64), Latvia (72), and Belarus (75). In Estonia this figure more than doubled (115%). In Lithuania and the Czech Republic there has been a status quo, and solely in Hungary has there been a decline (-25%) (Unicef, 1999:17-20).

3.1. *Independent living and cohabitation: main determinants*

Factors that are systematically associated with independent living and premarital cohabitation versus prolonged home staying and marriage are:

- (i) *the expansion of the welfare state*, which has fostered earlier partial or complete economic independence of younger people via income supplements (e.g. study allowances, reduced tuition, guaranteed minimum incomes or other social security benefits) or via specific services or facilities often targeted at specific groups (such as students or lone mothers). The logical consequence of this is that earlier independence and premarital cohabitation are in fact state subsidized, and have expanded most in nations with advanced welfare systems, and least in nations where individuals are left to fend for themselves or remain more dependent on the parental generation. This also implies that the spread of early single living and cohabitation is more dependent on the type of development of the welfare state than on the growth of economic prosperity in general.
- (ii) *the prolongation of education and the "democratization" of access to advanced education*, which not only lead to greater subsequent economic autonomy for women and hence to less reliance on marriage, but also to the creation of greater distance to parents, to a stronger orientation to peer groups, and above all to values favoring individual freedom and gender equality. It is not surprising that premarital cohabitation started among the better-educated student population in many countries and spread to other strata subsequently. Opting for single living or cohabitation is well predicted on the basis of values concerning gender roles (e.g. Liefbroer, 1991; Clarkberg et al., 1993; Lesthaeghe and Moors, 1995), but conversely, the experience of single living or of cohabitation further strengthens autonomy and more egalitarian gender roles (Moors, 1999).
- (iii) *the emergence of a more libertarian culture with greater tolerance for alternative life styles*, which has followed in the wake of the overall weakening of authority and of trust in institutional regulation. As such, this feature is a correlate of the cohortwise progression of the so-called "post-materialist" value orientations, which stress grass roots democracy, self-actualization, tolerance and ethical autonomy. These values have spread through education, but via reverse socialization they have now reached the older generations too. The progression towards this more libertarian culture is fostered by a Protestant rather than Catholic or Orthodox tradition and by continued economic prosperity (cf. Inglehart, 1970; Lesthaeghe, 1995). The innovators of premarital cohabitation have often been persons with sympathies for the "new left" during the 1960s and 1970s (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986), and even today, premarital cohabitation has remained a correlate of secularism, tolerance for minorities, relativism in ethics, non-conformist education values, and a preference for leftist or green parties in countries such as Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium (Lesthaeghe and Moors, 1995, 1996).

- (iv) *the intergenerational transmission of family instability* has also repeatedly been identified as a crucial factor associated with earlier home leaving, single living, cohabitation and lone motherhood. Not only the actual experience of problems in the parental household, such as divorce, remarriage or parental cohabitation, is a correlate of these phenomena (e.g. Kiernan, 1992; Cherlin et al., 1995), but also weaker familistic values in the parental generation seem to be transmitted across generations (e.g. Axinn and Thornton, 1991). As a consequence certain social strata in particular countries can generate subcultures in which family instability becomes a characteristic trait.

3.2. *Determinants of marriage postponement*

Marriage postponement is not induced solely by the growth of alternative living arrangements: it has also occurred in countries where independent living and cohabitation are largely absent. The following factors are frequently associated with the trend reversal in nuptiality since the 1960s or 1970s:

- (i) *advanced education* which has firstly, a mechanistic effect in postponing household formation in general, and secondly, a set of additional effects such as higher female economic autonomy and less reliance on economic support from male partners, a longer search on the marriage market in systems with high educational homogamy (e.g. Oppenheimer, 1988), and shifting value preferences in the direction of more gender equality;
- (ii) *growing labor market flexibility* leading to less secure and less structured career development and hence to the weakening of the economic basis of marriage;
- (iii) *cycles characterized by weakened economic opportunities for new cohorts*, with increased youth unemployment leading to prolonged economic dependence on the parental household;
- (iv) *unfavorable housing conditions*, caused by either a structural housing shortage or by higher rents or purchase prices;
- (v) *rising consumerism* leading to higher aspirations with respect to material comfort and to higher minimal material standards for establishing a new household;
- (vi) *greater distrust in the institution of marriage itself*, fostered partially by ideational change but also by rising divorce probabilities;
- (vii) *the social diffusion of alternative living arrangements* from early innovators to all other population strata;
- (viii) *more idiosyncratic or culture specific factors*, such as rising individual and autonomous partner choice replacing arranged marriages in Japan (cf. Ogawa et al., 1993; Tsuya and Mason Oppenheim, 1995; Retherford et al., 1996).

Finally, it should be stressed that these factors hardly ever operate in isolation but often produce powerful combination effects.

3.3. The household positions of young women

The differences in patterns of household formation in the industrialized world can be documented by comparing the household positions of women aged 20-24. It is in this age group that the unfolding of the different life cycle paths starts. In what follows, we shall make use of the results of the Fertility and Family Surveys (FFS) for the 1990s and various additional sources that give orders of magnitude of premarital cohabitation (cf. Kiernan, 1999a, 1999b).

First of all, the plot of the percentage of non-marital births to all births against the proportion of women 20-24 currently cohabiting as shown in Figure 23 reveals for a large number of countries that there are essentially four patterns:

- (i) *low extra-marital fertility coupled with a low prevalence of premarital cohabitation*: this pattern is found in Mediterranean countries (Italy, Greece, Spain and presumably also in Malta or Cyprus), in Poland and in Japan. In these instances, the proportion of extra marital births is below 15% and there are fewer than 5 percent of young women currently cohabiting. However, in Spain and even more in Portugal, the percentage of non-marital births has noticeably increased during the late 1980s and 1990s, whereas the incidence of cohabitation for women prior to age 25 has remained low. Italy is the most striking example: despite rapid rises in female education, premarital cohabitation has hardly followed the Western European trend, not even in the northernmost provinces, and the increase in non-marital fertility has been much slower than on the Iberian peninsula as well. In other words, premarital cohabitation as a distinctive trait of the second demographic transition has so far stopped at the Alps. However, the mean ages at first marriage in these Mediterranean countries, and also in Japan, have risen quite substantially as in the other western populations.
- (ii) *low prevalence of cohabitation but high non-marital fertility*: this pattern is typically the lone mother variant and it is encountered in Eastern European countries, but also in Portugal, Ireland, the UK and the US. However, not all lone mothers must show up in their own separate households, but they can also be coresidents in their parental household. The FFS published data do not permit the identification of the latter type, and it may well be that the lone motherhood phenomenon in Eastern Europe is underestimated as a consequence of such three-generation coresidence. Also, women may pass through the lone motherhood stage for a shorter time only and move quickly

into marriage. This would equally lead to a combination of higher non-marital fertility and low premarital cohabitation.¹²

- (iii) *high prevalence of cohabitation combined with low non-marital fertility*: this combination is typical for the more conservative Western European nations where cohabitation has risen but where parenthood is still postponed until after marriage. This pattern is very typical for Switzerland for instance, where a quarter of women 20-24 are currently cohabiting but in combination with less than 10 percent of births being extra-marital. Belgium, the Netherlands and West Germany also tend to follow this pattern, but extra-marital fertility has, especially during the 1990s, risen well above the 10 percent level. This indicates increased parenthood among cohabiting couples.
- (iv) *high prevalence of cohabitation combined with parenthood*: this last type has been typical for a long time now for the Scandinavian countries, with Sweden, Denmark and also Iceland being outliers with more than 40 percent of women 20-24 currently in a cohabiting union. A few other western countries, such as France or Canada and one Baltic country, Estonia, have evolved in this direction. In these cases, most non-marital fertility occurs to cohabiting couples, and these tend to be either more stable or are quickly succeeded by partner changes and transitions to a next consensual union.

More detailed data for 19 FFS-countries and Japan (census of 1990) are brought together in Table 5. For these countries we are able to make a distinction between the following household positions of women 20-24:

- (i) *resident in the parental household* (Res Paren), which is mostly as a single person in western countries, but could also be as a lone mother or as a married person in Eastern Europe;¹³
- (ii) *living alone* (Alone), i.e. no partner and no children;
- (iii) *cohabiting without children* (Coh + 0), i.e. not currently married but with a partner;
- (iv) *cohabiting with children* (Coh + child), i.e. not currently married but with a partner and one or more children;
- (v) *lone mother* (Lone Moth.), i.e. no partner but at least one child, and being in a separate household (others may be coresident in other households, but cannot be identified in the FFS country reports).

¹² For Ireland and Portugal, this is a possible explanation for their high non-marital fertility coupled to the relative scarcity of cohabiting unions. However, further analysis is needed to draw more light on this issue.

¹³ This anomaly is the cause of the fact that the sum of percentages in the various positions does not equal 100%. An alternative for "Res Paren" would be to define it as the complement of the sum of all other positions (ii) through (vii). These alternative figures for "Res Paren" are typically lower in Eastern Europe and about equal or higher in Southern, Western and Northern Europe.

FIGURE 23

PERCENTAGE OF NON-MARITAL BIRTHS BY PERCENTAGE WOMEN COHABITING 20-24 ; 1996-97




Table 5: Distribution of women aged 20-24 according to household position; 19 countries FFS 1990s and Japan (census '90)

	Resident with parents*	Living alone	Cohabiting, no children	Cohabiting with children	Lone Mother (not coresiding)	Married, no children	Married with children
A. Southern							
Italy (N=904)	87%	1	1	0	0	4	7
Spain (376)	71	1	3	1	2	6	13
Portugal (979)	75	1	3	0	4	8	18
<i>Mean</i>	79	1	3	0	2	6	13
B. Eastern							
Bulgaria (374)	50	1	2	2	5	8	33
Poland (610)	55	1	0	0	3	14	37
Latvia (408)	54	7	5	4	11	7	29
Lithuania (524)	51	6	2	1	5	14	38
Slovenia (421)	54	3	8	9	4	4	25
Hungary (756)	46	3	4	3	4	12	34
Germany GDR (202)	30	15	8	8	6	5	27
<i>Mean</i>	49	5	4	4	5	9	32
C. Western							
Belgium/Flanders (642)	54	3	10	2	1	23	9
Netherlands (914)	44	15	20	1	1	10	6
France (470)	41	17	19	5	4	6	8
Canada (575)	37	9	13	3	7	9	10
Austria (747)	38	12	20	7	6	4	8
Switzerland (392)	36	17	24	1	1	8	7
Germany FDR (954)	37	22	11	1	2	7	12
<i>Mean</i>	41	14	17	3	3	10	9
D. Northern							
Norway** (696)	16	18	21	12	5	9	16
Sweden** (566)	8	27	32	12	5	4	19
<i>Mean</i>	12	23	27	12	5	7	12
E. Other							
Japan (census '90)	69	15	2	0	0	6	7

Source: FFS country reports, appendix tables 4; Japan: H. Kojima (communication)

Notes: *For those residing with parents we do not know whether they are single or not (i.e. couples with or without children or lone mothers coresiding in own parental household). As a result of this column the row totals are not equal to 100%. The exception is France for which we estimated the value as 100% minus the other percentages.

** at age 23 instead of the age group 20-24.

- (vi) *married without children* (Marr + 0), i.e. forming a separate household
- (vii) *married with children* (Marr + Chil.), also forming a separate household

In Table 5, averages are also calculated for each of the geo-political areas, and these are used to produce the results shown in Figure 24. These averages clearly reveal the differences between four "families" of countries. The southern European group is characterized by very high proportions of women 20-24 (around 80%) still coresident in the parental household, by a direct move into marriage, and by few women passing through the "intermediate stages". The Eastern European group also has a predominant pattern of home leaving via marriage, and given much earlier marriage, this eastern cluster has the highest proportion of young married mothers. However, the percentages in all the "intermediate positions", i.e. living alone, cohabiting or being a lone mother, are higher than in Southern Europe. It seems that these features of the second demographic transition may be spreading faster to the eastern than to the southern parts of Europe.

The Western European cluster has a pattern of home leaving that is in essence as early as in Eastern Europe, but the transition is not so much into marriage, but into alternative living arrangements. In these countries, the prevalence of cohabitation, with or without children, is often higher than that of marriage for women 20-24 (e.g. the Netherlands, France, Austria or Switzerland). To this, also sizeable proportions of home leavers currently living alone have to be added (e.g. in the Netherlands, Germany, France, Switzerland and Austria). In these countries the late ages at marriage and at parenthood are strongly related to the extra time spent in these intermediate household positions.

The Northern European populations are characterized by the earliest pattern of home leaving of all, and by transitions to either living alone or into cohabitation. In this cluster of populations, procreation has been detached from the precondition of marriage, and as a consequence, fertility postponement during the last two decades has not been as marked as in many Western European countries.

Japan, finally, bears the greatest resemblance to the Southern European pattern, mainly by virtue of its very low incidence of cohabitation or lone mothers. But, home leaving is earlier and there are more young women living alone than in the Mediterranean countries. In this respect, Japan more closely resembles the Western European pattern.

The data in Table 5 for 20 countries can also be summarized by using three dimensions only. These dimensions emerged from a multidimensional scaling (ALSCAL) based on proximities of country positions for the various variables.¹⁴ The correlates of the three dimensions are given below:

¹⁴ For each set of percentages of young women in a particular household position (see Table 5) a variable has been created and the country position on these variables has been expressed in z-scores. These are the basic input for the calculation of proximities, which are furthermore based on euclidean distances. A three-dimensional solution emerged after three iterations (Kruskal's stress = 0.17; R-squared = 0.85).

	dimension 1	dimension 2	dimension 3
Res Paren	.80	-.44	-.34
Alone	-.85	-.34	.11
Coh. +0	-.88	-.30	.19
Coh + child	-.83	.30	-.16
Lone Moth.	-.36	.78	-.32
Marr +0	.38	.19	.87
Marr + chil.	.31	.87	.02

The three dimensions can be interpreted as follows:


- (i) *dimension 1* catches the contrast between overall late home leaving (positive values) versus early home leaving via the stages of independent living and cohabitation with or without children (negative values). If signs are reversed, dimension 1 measures the typical progression of the "second demographic transition" as far as household formation is concerned.
- (ii) *dimension 2* brings out early motherhood, either in marriage or as a lone mother. The latter variable is correlated with this dimension mainly as a result of the relatively high levels of lone motherhood being associated with early marriage and earlier overall parenthood in the Eastern European cluster of populations.
- (iii) *dimension 3* reveals a pattern of earlier marriage, but prolonged postponement of parenthood for younger women with such an early marriage.

The position of the countries is presented in Figures 25 and 26. Figure 25 gives the plot using the first two dimensions. In the set of 20 countries, Swedish women 20-24 really stand out by virtue of their early home leaving and transitions to single living or cohabitation. The other Scandinavian FFS-country, Norway, follows but at quite some distance. The next three on this "second demographic transition"-axis are Austria, France and former East Germany. But from then onwards, an unfolding along dimension 2 occurs. The former Communist countries have high proportions of mothers below age 25 that live either in a marital union or as a single mother (positive values on dimension 2). The western countries and Japan, by contrast, have later parenthood and a low incidence of single mothers prior to age 25 (negative values on dimension 2). Furthermore, as one moves further to the right along dimension 1 and hence to populations that have not progressed as much toward the "intermediate phases", one increasingly encounters the populations with a Catholic tradition, but again with the maintenance of the East-West split according to dimension 2 (see Poland versus Italy or Spain for instance).

There are a number of other noteworthy features in Figure 25. Latvia and Slovenia, for instance, are almost at par with Canada, West Germany, Switzerland or the Netherlands in terms of earlier home leaving with transitions toward single living or cohabitation (cf. dimension 1), but they keep the eastern European feature of earlier parenthood in marriage as well. East and West Germany are quite distinct in Figure

FIGURE 24

HOUSEHOLD POSITIONS OF WOMEN 20-24 - GROUPED FFS COUNTRIES



25. East-Germany has not only a more advanced position on dimension 1, mainly by virtue of its higher proportion of young women cohabiting and especially cohabiting with children, but the East-West split brought out by dimension 2 still separates these two parts of Germany. A similar duality would also have been found in Belgium between Flanders (covered by the FFS) and Wallonia (not covered). In this country, the 1991 census showed that Wallonia had a much more French pattern with considerably more cohabitation with children for younger women, and also more single young mothers than Flanders. Incidentally, detailed geographic mapping of household positions (census of 1991) reveals that the Belgian duality is formed in exactly the same way by the language border as it was a century earlier with respect to the initial fertility decline.¹⁵ The Belgian and also the German example again illustrate the relevance of cultural, linguistic or political borders for the differential diffusion of the features of the second demographic transition.


Figure 26 contains the plot of dimension 3 against dimension 2. From the origin outward, we have added the four diagonals that help to describe the different clusters of countries. Along diagonal I countries are located that have a relatively high proportion of women 20-24 that are married, but among these a sizeable proportion have not yet started procreation (positive values for dimension 3). Along diagonal II, this feature is absent: early marriage is quickly followed by motherhood. When moving away from the origin, i.e. when the patterns become more pronounced, we typically encounter Eastern European and former Communist countries, but a subset has more postponed parenthood within marriage (Poland, Hungary, Lithuania) than the other (Bulgaria, Latvia, former East Germany or Slovenia). On the other side (negative values on dimension 2), mostly western countries are found. Along diagonal III, we move toward the Mediterranean pattern of late home leaving, late marriage and, even for women who marry young, a fast transition to motherhood. Along diagonal IV parenthood is more postponed among married women. In this respect, Flanders is distinct from the Netherlands, West Germany or Switzerland by its higher proportion of young women who opt directly for a transition into marriage, but do not follow this with parenthood.

Finally, it should be noted that information on current household positions of individuals by age and sex remains elusive for a number of countries, mostly because of a lack of a focussed comparative publication.¹⁶

¹⁵ For the detailed maps by municipality of the household positions, based on the LIPRO-typology of Keilman and van Imhoff (1991), see Deboosere et al. (1997) or Mérenne et al. (1997).

¹⁶ Most of the countries not participating in the FFS do have these data from other surveys, but they could not be readily retrieved by our contacts. This applies in particular to the US, the UK, Australia, New Zealand and the Russian Federation where appropriate data sets are known to exist (household surveys or micro-census). Among the FFS-countries, Finland and Estonia could not be included in the analysis: the Finnish country report lacks the tables on household position and the Estonian report mixes both sexes. Hence, an international effort of harmonizing, retrieving and publishing current *household positions for individuals* would be most welcome, not only because such data are good indicators of the patterns of household formation but are equally of relevance for social policy.

FIGURE 25



Dimension 1

HOUSEHOLD POSITIONS OF WOMEN 20-24,
ALSICAL-DIMENSIONS 1 AND 2.

4. Conclusions

In the countries studied in this paper, the second demographic transition is characterized by no less diversity than the historical first transition. The Princeton Project and subsequent studies of the historical first transition all pointed to the marked heterogeneity with respect to *timing*, *process* and *explanation*. Metaphorically, the heap of jig-saw pieces on 18th, 19th and early 20th Century demography apparently did not come from the same box. As evolution is per definition path dependent, there is a similar unfolding of the pace and patterning of the second demographic transition. This patterning exhibits the highest degree of diversity with respect to the unfolding of the intermediate stages of household formation between home leaving and parenthood, but the picture is more cohesive with respect to the postponement of childbearing.

For a long time now the Scandinavian countries have taken the lead in the "destandardization" of the sequence of transitions, and so far no other country has joined their cluster. The Scandinavian countries definitely belong to the most prosperous countries, but their high GNP per capita is not a distinguishing trait. Rather, a long Protestant tradition leading to advanced welfare systems and to respect for individual choices, in tandem with a strong national consensus around these issues, have fostered this development. Scandinavians themselves are quick - and rightly so - to point out the importance of the last two factors, but fewer are aware of the fact that the pattern of early home leaving and independence is equally state supported via the minimum income guarantees offered by their generous welfare systems.


A number of Western European countries have moved quite clearly toward the Scandinavian pattern, but in very diverse ways. For instance, France, Austria, the Netherlands and Switzerland all have had a rapid rise of premarital cohabitation, but procreation within this type of living arrangement has risen much faster in the first two countries than in the other two. A greater reticence toward teenage pregnancy, early motherhood and procreation prior to marriage has so far prevailed in the Netherlands and Switzerland. Within countries too diversity has developed along older cultural and/or socio-economic lines, with Belgium and unified Germany providing striking examples of clearly demarcated regional patterns.

Several Eastern European nations are also moving along trends typical of the second demographic transition. Premarital cohabitation, for instance, is clearly on the rise in Slovenia and Latvia. Younger married women in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Lithuania are postponing parenthood. In virtually all Eastern European countries ages at first marriage have started to climb since the early 1990s as well. The latter phenomenon may be a response to the increased deregulation of their economies and to the new labor market conditions, but since these are likely to stay, further demographic pattern developments are likely to occur.¹⁷ The other salient trait of

¹⁷ Compared to Mediterranean countries, for instance, Eastern European populations have much longer histories of high female labour force participation, very liberal divorce legislation and particularly earlier home leaving. Such factors may be correlates of a faster adoption of more independent living and of cohabitation in Eastern compared to Southern European populations.

FIGURE 26

HOUSEHOLD POSITIONS OF WOMEN 20-24 : ALSICAL DIMENSIONS 2 AND 3.



many Eastern European countries, i.e. the rise of the share of non-marital fertility, is not connected to the events of 1989: this share has risen uninterruptedly since the mid-1970s in Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary and Bulgaria, and since the early 1980s in the Czech and Slovak Republics, the Russian Federation and in Moldova.¹⁸ In most of these cases, however, this relative rise of extra-marital fertility is not so much associated with procreation among somewhat older cohabiting couples, but with increased teenage pregnancies. Four western countries have a similar pattern of high out of wedlock teenage fertility: the US, the UK, New Zealand and Australia. In all these instances this pattern hampers the educational careers of young women, but in Eastern Europe, teenage fertility has had even more dramatic consequences in terms of the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and child desertion.

On the whole, the Mediterranean populations have been remarkably reluctant to adopt the "intermediate phases" of household formation: home leaving has become very late and the subsequent life course transition is overwhelmingly into marriage. This has been explained from a variety of angles: high youth unemployment, high costs of housing, prolonged education and prolonged financial dependence on the parental household, a distinctive Mediterranean cultural pattern stressing matrimony, high consumption aspirations and high material standards required for the establishment of a new household, and the safeguarding of a period of freedom from obligations and from traditional gender roles that are associated with marriage and parenthood.

Many of these reasons would probably sound familiar in Japanese ears as well. However, Japan deviates from the Mediterranean pattern because of its higher proportion of young women leaving home to live by themselves. Also the feature of increased individual partner choice replacing arranged marriage and the concomitant rise in "shotgun" marriages are distinctive for Japan (cf. Atoh, 1994; Dalla Zuanna et al., 1998). Nevertheless, these three phenomena all point in the direction of increased individual freedom of choice and tolerance for greater diversity in patterns of household formation. It still remains to be seen to what extent and how fast this Asian variant of the "second demographic transition" will spread to other Far Eastern populations such as those of Taiwan, South Korea or urban China.

The evolution of fertility in industrialized countries is essentially characterized by postponement. The date of onset of this feature varies greatly, but at present there is hardly any population left in the industrialized world that has not started this process. Nevertheless, in several Eastern European countries, such a tempo shift is of a recent date and it does not fully account for the rapid fall in fertility during the 1990s. In western countries, though, further postponement has had a major fertility depressing effect. However, fertility levels vary greatly, with several countries keeping PTFR values above 1.70 or close to replacement level and others maintaining values well below 1.50. *The main cause of this differentiation is the degree of fertility recuperation at older ages and especially above age 30 among the cohorts that initiated or continued the tempo drift.* The literature abundantly covers the reasons for

¹⁸ The rise of the non-marital fertility share also started before 1980 in Armenia and especially in Georgia (Council of Europe, 1999: table T3.2).

the postponement aspect, but it is still silent on the underlying causes for such large national differences with respect to fertility recuperation in the age group 30-39. We shall try to explore this feature in a later paper.

Finally, the traces of policy interventions with respect to fertility are clearly visible in a number of countries (e.g. Russia, the former GDR, Sweden). In every single instance such policies proved to have only a temporary effect and they show up as distinct period distortions in the cohort fertility profiles. Hence, policy interventions of the types that have been tried since the 1970s have not been a match for the much stronger economic, social and ideational forces that have driven the second demographic transition.

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