

monthly earnings meet the test of Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) in nine months of a 60 month period, then disability benefits can continue for an additional three-month grace period before benefits are terminated. (The worker would no longer meet the requirements for being considered disabled.) In 1999 the SGA amount was \$700 a month for disabled persons and \$1,100 for blind persons. Any work-related expenses stemming from disability are subtracted from the worker's gross earnings before determining the worker's earnings. During the first 36 months after the worker loses SSDI benefits because of work, benefits can be reinstated for any month the worker's monthly earnings fall below the SGA amount. Medicare coverage continues for 39 months following the trial work period and then disabled persons have the option to buy Medicare coverage at a monthly premium.

- Prior work incentives under SSI disability program: If the only income an individual receives is from work, after the first \$85 earned, half of the remaining earnings are deducted from the monthly SSI check. In 1999, SSI disability payments ceased for individuals with earnings above the \$700 SGA limit (or \$1,100 for the blind). However, work-related expenses due to disability are subtracted from gross earnings before applying this test. After the termination of benefits, if monthly earnings fall below the SSI limit in the following 12 months, the benefits are reinstated without re-application. In general, Medicaid coverage continues for persons who no longer receive SSI, but whose income is still below a state-set limit, cannot afford private insurance, and continue to have a disabling condition.
- Other recent legislation: The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 created new opportunities for disabled persons by addressing discrimination against the disabled in housing and employment. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 enabled states to offer Medicaid buy-ins to disabled workers, whose income does not exceed 250 percent of the federal poverty level and meet the definition of disabled under SSI program. In 1998, President Clinton formed a National Task Force on Employment of Adults with Disabilities. Effective July 1, 1999 the SGA amount for SSDI and SSI disability benefits was raised from \$500 to \$700. The SGA is not indexed for inflation and this was the first increase since 1990.

6. Background of and problems driving the reform

- Although unemployment has reached a 29-year low of 4.1% in the United States, people who begin to collect either SSDI or SSI disability benefits only rarely return to work.
- Disabled persons or those with diagnosed degenerative diseases are often unable to receive or afford necessary medical coverage from private insurance providers. The ability to live independently and enter the work force for disabled often depends on personal assistance services. Under the previous system, disabled persons who returned to work risked losing their medical coverage. The value of the lost medical care and cash benefits often exceeds the earning potential of these persons, thus creating strong disincentives to work.

7. Basic approach and objectives of the reform

- This initiative is aimed at eliminating the choice between employment and health care, a painful choice facing many workers who are disabled or who suffer from degenerative diseases.
- Under the Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency Program, the Social Security Administration will provide SSDI and SSI disability beneficiaries with a ticket for vocational rehabilitation services, employment services, and other support services from an employment network of their choice.
- The legislation also expands the options created in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 for states to offer Medicaid "buy-ins" for workers with disabilities. This means that, at state discretion, a Medicaid insurance policy can be purchased for people who leave the SSI disability program for work, even though their earnings would disqualify the workers for SSI (and Medicaid) benefits under the old law.

8. Target groups and target regions

- Disabled workers, whose medical conditions would allow them to work, but who require continued health insurance coverage.
- Persons who have been diagnosed with degenerative medical condition, including Parkinson's disease, multiple sclerosis, and HIV, but who are still able to work

9. Concrete changes vis-à-vis the status quo

- Relaxes the income, asset, and resource limitations for workers with disabilities buying into Medicaid which were established in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. States can also require disabled persons to pay premiums for Medicaid coverage on a sliding income scale. Furthermore, individuals who are no longer considered disabled due to improvement in their medical conditions can buy into Medicaid, as long

as they still have a severe medically determinable impairment.

- Provides \$150 million in state grants over five years to implement the expanded Medicaid buy-in for the disabled.
- Extends the period in which SSDI beneficiaries, who re-enter the work force, are eligible for premium-free Medicare Part A (for in-patient hospital services and related acute area needs) from 4 years to 8 ½ years.
- Enables states to provide Medicaid for individuals who are not disabled, but have mental and physical impairments which are "reasonably expected" to become severe disabilities in the absence of treatment.
- Provides \$250 million in state demonstration grants over five years to implement Medicaid coverage for individuals with degenerative diseases.
- The resumption of work activity can no longer be used as definitive evidence that an individual is no longer disabled.
- The process of reinstating disability benefits entitlements has been expedited when the disabled person's entitlement was terminated after returning to work. If within 60 months of this termination, the person's medical condition worsens, their disability benefits can be reinstated without filing a new application.

10. Major conditions for success

- Efficient mechanisms are needed for the delivery these new benefits. President Clinton has suggested models of one-stop service centers for the disabled where they can obtain advice on all the options available to them.
- For the work patterns of disabled persons to change, the implementers of this policy must successfully disseminate information of the changes. Prior policy directly linked work activity with a loss of disability benefits, and most disabled persons are much more familiar with the old policy than they are with the new law.
- A continuation of the favorable job market would help disabled workers find employment, which adequately compensates them for their loss in disability cash benefits.

11. Expected results

- An increased number of disabled persons will enter the work force.
- The early medical treatment of persons with degenerative diseases will improve their health status.
- This legislation could result in significant government savings. If only one-half percent of current SSDI and SSI beneficiaries returned to work and no longer received cash assistance, the Social Security Trust Fund and the Treasury could save an estimated \$3.5 billion over the work life of such individuals.

12. First results

- At this point there are no results to report. The law was signed by the President in November 1999.

13. Effects on other policy fields

- None yet known.

14. Arguments raised by opponents of the reform

- Opponents were initially concerned about the cost and administrative burden of this initiative. It is estimated the new policy will cost about \$800 million over five years.
- Need to prevent misuse of the expanded medical coverage. Call for caps on benefits to ensure that upper-income people would not receive excessive benefits.

15. Personal judgement

-

16. General available references

- ➔ Legislative summary of the bill, H.R. 1180 <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c106:h.r.1180.enr>:
- ➔ Social Security Disability Publications: [http://www.ssa.gov/odhome/odhome.htm#disability publications](http://www.ssa.gov/odhome/odhome.htm#disability%20publications)
- ➔ Health Care Financing Administration: <http://www.hcfa.gov/>

1.1 Health Care -2-

1. Title (please insert a header)

➤ Health Care Reform Act of 2000 (New York State)

2. Initiators

➤ New York State Governor George Pataki
➤ Leaders of the New York State Legislature

3. Funding

➤ The HCRA 2000 is estimated to require \$626 million in state funds over 3 ½ year period. This funds will be raised through a surcharge on outpatient and inpatient hospital services, the reduced covered lives assessment to fund Graduate Medical Education, the 1 percent cash assessment on hospitals charged to third-party health care providers. A 55 cent increase in the cigarette tax to \$1.11 per pack, as well as the allocation of state tobacco settlements to health care will provide further funding. Finally the degree of required funding from New York County governments will be increased.

4. Beginning, expected end and duration

➤ Unanimously passed New York Senate on Dec. 29, 1999.
➤ HCRA 2000 replaces the current hospital financing system (HCRA 1996) which expired Dec. 31, 1999. The new 3-year act will be valid through June 30, 2003.

5. Country-specific institutional setting

➤ Since 1965 the Medicaid program, a Federal-State matching entitlement program, has provided medical assistance for individual and families with low income and resources. The Federal government establishes broad guideline within which the individual states can then specify their eligibility requirements, the scope of the services, payment rates, and the program administration. As a result, the Medicaid program varies among states and over time.

6. Background of and problems driving the reform

➤ Balancing cost containment of and improved accessibility to health care is a pressing issue at both the state and federal level. The current Medicaid program finances health care for 1 in 4 children, as well as 60 percent of the poor. The costs of Medicaid grown substantially in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Managed care and the introduction of market incentives has been the centrepiece of most cost containment measures.

➤ In response to changes in health care delivery, above all the growth of managed care organisations, the New York Legislature passed the Health Care Reform Act in 1996. The HCRA 1996 replaced the previous rate-regulated reimbursement system for hospitals. The goal of this initiative was to increase competition among health service providers, while maintaining the government's commitment to charity care and graduate medical education.

➤ The expansion of health coverage to uninsured individuals has also been widely debated. The Balanced Budget Amendment (BBA) of 1997 introduced the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) or Title XXI of the Social Security Act. CHIP gives States greater flexibility to expand Medicaid eligibility to uninsured children and increases the Federal funds available for such programs

7. Basic approach and objectives of the reform

➤ The HCRA 2000 utilizes a competitive hospital financing framework as in the HCRA 1996 while expanding health care to individuals not previously covered by insurance. The overarching goal is the provision of affordable, accessible and high-quality health care to the residents of New York state.

➤ The funding structure also necessitates further cost containment savings and discourages the use of tobacco products.

8. Target groups and target regions

- ➔ Residents of New York currently without health insurance.
- ➔ Current users of tobacco products, in particular adolescents.

9. Concrete changes vis-à-vis the status quo

- ➔ The Healthy New York package to provide affordable health care to one million uninsured New York state residents through the following programs:
- ➔ State Subsidized Health Benefits for Small Businesses. The cost of benefit packages offered by HMOs is often prohibitively high for small business owners, so the State will now subsidise the insurance premiums for a new, stream-lined benefit package for business with 50 or fewer employees. Under the arrangement the State will reimburse HMOs on individual claims between \$30,000 and \$100,000, while the HMO is responsible for claims above or below these amounts. All HMOs in New York are required to offer these benefit packages to small business and the working uninsured.
- ➔ State Subsidies for Uninsured Individuals and Families. The benefit package mentioned above will also be available to uninsured individuals and their families. To be eligible, residents must work for businesses, which do not offer health insurance.
- ➔ Subsidies for Direct Pay Individuals. To stabilise the insurance premiums of individuals in the direct pay market, the State will provide "stop loss" coverage by subsidising HMO claims between \$20,000 and \$100,000.
- ➔ Family Health Plus. The act expands the Child Health Plus initiative so those parents of children who are eligible for this subsidised health care can receive the same benefits. This expands Medicaid for families below 150 percent of the federal poverty level (\$25,000 for a family of four) and individuals with up to 100 percent of the poverty level (8,200).
- ➔ Child Health Plus. The current HCRA increases the funding for the Child Health plus plan to \$1.1 billion. Since its enactment in the HCRA 1996 this health insurance plan for children has grown from an enrolment of 125,000 to more than 415,000.
- ➔ Care for the Indigent. Hospitals will receive \$765 million more annually to defray the cost of treating uninsured, indigent patients. This measure is targeted at rural and high-need hospitals which provide substantial charity care. An additional \$48 million will fund charity care provided in clinics.
- ➔ Rural Health Care. To improve the efficiencies of rural hospital, the HCRA 2000 devotes \$17 million to the implementation of rural health care networks.
- ➔ Tobacco Prevention. Increased \$13 million in funding for Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation products, to help New Yorkers reduce their use of tobacco products. In addition, the New York tax on tobacco products will be raised 55 cents to a total of \$1.11 per pack. It is believed that the price increase will be a particular deterrent to adolescent smokers. These efforts will be supported by a wide-scale anti-smoking advertising campaign and community support.
- ➔ Medical Health Initiative. The act appropriates an additional \$80 million annually to improve New York's mental health system, in particular the monies will be used to implement Kendra's law, which requires mental patients to take their medication, and expand child and adult mental health services.

10. Major conditions for success

- ➔ Concerns have been raised that the measure, in particular the expansion of Medicaid eligibility, could strain municipal resources and lead to higher property taxes. Cost containment measures were included in the legislation with the hopes that the additional costs can be offset without additional tax burden. The popularity of this measure could be greatly reduced if it lead to tax increases in the counties.

11. Expected results

- ➔ The HCRA 2000 is expected to build on the successes of the HCRA 1996 by further improving the efficiency and coverage of the health care system.

12. First results

- ➔ No results yet to report.

13. Effects on other policy fields

14. Arguments raised by opponents of the reform

- ➔ The main opposition to the reform stems from its funding structure. New York County executives have contested the earmarking of tobacco settlement for the expansion of Medicaid. Some believe that this funding will prove insufficient, while other municipal governments believe they should decide how the tobacco settlements are spent.

15. Personal judgement

➔

16. General available references

- ➔ State of New York homepage: <http://www.state.ny.us/>
- ➔ State of New York Legislature: <http://unix2.nysed.gov/ils/legislature/legis.html>

1.5 Family Issues

1. Title (please insert a header)

➤ Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation (BAA-UC) Experiment

2. Initiators

➤ Clinton administration with a Presidential Executive Memorandum issued on May 24, 1999

3. Funding

➤ The parental leave benefits will be funded from surpluses in the States' Unemployment Compensation (UC) funds, although States may designate funding from other sources.

4. Beginning, expected end and duration

➤ The rule will take effect in early 2000 and does not require Congressional action for passage.

5. Country-specific institutional setting

- The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) which took effect in August of 1993 requires businesses with 50 or more employees to grant workers up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave to attend to their own serious health conditions, the illness of a family member, or the birth or adoption of a child. The act provides job protection and the continuation of health insurance for workers during their leave. Nearly 24 million workers have since taken part or all of their entitled leave, however this represents a relatively small portion of eligible employees. Lost income is the most frequently cited deterrent to taking a family leave.
- The unemployment insurance system was created in the 1930s. The joint Federal-State program allows states to collect State UC taxes which are used to pay benefits claims. The UC taxes collected by the Federal government provide State grants. The Department of Labour has the authority to interpret the Federal UC statutes. In the past their interpretations have expanded UC benefit requirements to include job training, illness, injury, jury duty, and temporary layoffs.
- Maryland, Vermont, Massachusetts, and Washington have already considered the use of unemployment benefits to provide paid family leave for new parents. However the prior interpretation of "able and available" for work has stymied State's efforts to extend the benefits to new parents who would not meet this test. A few states, including New Jersey and California instead provide partially paid parental leave through the state disability insurance. For most workers, paid family leave depends solely on their employer.

6. Background of and problems driving the reform

- The entitlement to family leave has A 1996 federal study of the program cited concerns of lost income as a main deterrent to taking the unpaid family.
- This rule also recognises the impact of women in the workforce and the changing dynamics of American families in which increasingly both parents work.

7. Basic approach and objectives of the reform

- This initiative provides States with a voluntary option to use their unemployment-compensation system to cover part of the income lost during parental leave.
- The rule will enable more parents to spend time at home with their new-born or newly adopted child during an important formative period, as well as afford the parents sufficient time to arrange permanent child care. The paid leave should help working parents maintain their connection to the workforce while serving the needs of their families.
- The BAA-UC enacts an experimental program. States are given considerable flexibility in designing their pilot programs. The Department of Labour will monitor these experiments to determine if the partially paid leave does increase the chances that a parent returns to employment. The effects on employers and States' unemployment funds will also be studied. This finding will be used to determine if expansion

of the interpretation or a permanent program is warranted.

8. Target groups and target regions

- ➔ Working parents of new-born or newly adopted children, particularly those who otherwise would be unable to take an unpaid leave of absence.

9. Concrete changes vis-à-vis the status quo

- ➔ The U.S. Department of Labour (DOL) has interpreted of the Federal UC statutes, in particular the statutes' longstanding "able and available" requirements, so that States may use their UC funds to provide partially paid parental leave. The State pilot projects must receive DOL approval and be accompanied by State legislative action.
- ➔ The specific implementation of this rule will be left to the discretion of State authorities.

10. Major conditions for success

- ➔ The success of this experimental program depends on the experiences of the States which establish pilot projects. Continued low unemployment and UC fund surpluses will also aid implementation.

11. Expected results

- ➔ The experimental program has been created so that the effects of partially paid parental leave using UC benefits can be better understood. Until concrete pilot programs have been approved it is difficult to predict the outcomes.

12. First results

- ➔ No results to report at this time.

13. Effects on other policy fields

- ➔ None to mention.

14. Arguments raised by opponents of the reform

- ➔ If the economy entered a recession and the unemployment increased, the additional use of unemployment insurance to pay for parental leave may place undue financial strain on the system. States would have an option of borrowing to shore-up their unemployment-insurance system, but financial standing will likely criteria in determining which states decide to participate.

15. Personal judgement

- ➔

16. General available references

- ➔ The BAA-UC proposed rule: <http://www.dol.gov/dol/eta/public/regs/fedreg/proposed/99030445.htm>
- ➔ U.S. Department of Labour: <http://www.dol.gov>

資料 B

共同研究 3

「所得分配に関する国際比較研究」

付表

表1-1 社会保険料負担率、所得階級別、世帯種別(1990)

INCCLASS	全世帯	国保世帯	被用者世帯
1	0.114824003	0.154254832	0.013178468
2	0.128046545	0.151232589	0.064838397
3	0.110237243	0.118981918	0.090547114
4	0.114935562	0.124813313	0.094300848
5	0.095603284	0.106430894	0.086069486
6	0.102900573	0.114408517	0.08876838
7	0.088794847	0.101616804	0.080198879
8	0.088770643	0.091924323	0.082684439
9	0.078553928	0.083504255	0.076580597
10	0.078407727	0.085827683	0.07548686
11	0.076975444	0.07871161	0.075153674
12	0.070543132	0.081120505	0.067055677
13	0.071996479	0.070642066	0.070836064
14	0.069752952	0.064839556	0.067858204
15	0.069583246	0.05966344	0.068859268
16	0.069773646	0.062812065	0.069008631
17	0.065374673	0.055878933	0.066093086
18	0.065237486	0.052056452	0.066750692
19	0.068315702	0.058635193	0.06676725
20	0.065408564	0.055190836	0.064329692
21	0.062505325	0.046202266	0.064457145
22	0.060769239	0.045909257	0.063364932
23	0.056145835	0.039148182	0.056112609
24	0.055035428	0.043492355	0.054362077
25	0.053998607	0.041002526	0.056709442
26	0.039132678	0.023800036	0.044461991

図1 社会保険負担率、所得階級別、世帯種別(1990)




表1-2 社会保険料負担率、所得階級別、世帯種別(1993)

INCCLASS	全世帯	国保世帯	被用者世帯
1	0.179210095	0.259978832	0.021957672
2	0.108893625	0.119309565	0.064004495
3	0.083581244	0.108596283	0.057400267
4	0.092896589	0.108217062	0.073966195
5	0.094419409	0.089232538	0.094687536
6	0.100062028	0.099681992	0.091323631
7	0.091146934	0.095051446	0.089301348
8	0.092983308	0.096025414	0.090136479
9	0.087320275	0.081904688	0.088269192
10	0.08802375	0.08648505	0.086798551
11	0.085965199	0.077912308	0.085306247
12	0.086712507	0.075666082	0.085893666
13	0.083802253	0.075144752	0.084850376
14	0.080812137	0.066725819	0.082216476
15	0.081669022	0.071517799	0.081049915
16	0.080117604	0.05409255	0.080866943
17	0.075882545	0.073702796	0.075248096
18	0.078205858	0.07010831	0.077506785
19	0.07579589	0.054065999	0.076465436
20	0.073436729	0.056563161	0.075456892
21	0.073274826	0.053701255	0.073667288
22	0.075464952	0.059794093	0.075489894
23	0.069210838	0.045836914	0.072392799
24	0.073441165	0.058300666	0.074510039
25	0.066671429	0.045208155	0.07000408
26	0.055313342	0.028737566	0.05889702

図2 社会保険負担率、所得階級別、世帯種別(1993)




表1-3 社会保険料負担率、所得階級別、世帯種別(1996)

INCCLASS	全世帯	国保世帯	被用者世帯	国保・被用者
1	0.28139	0.316278887	0.15	0.020833333
2	0.140795	0.166814663	0.107322891	0.146240011
3	0.117563	0.128847862	0.073262542	0.203602421
4	0.117299	0.131357965	0.100928706	0.102794122
5	0.110014	0.104117183	0.106458788	0.146530098
6	0.100697	0.102045389	0.099736359	0.097586207
7	0.095255	0.107879991	0.087083136	0.101010067
8	0.093856	0.104309439	0.087520906	0.10149974
9	0.093969	0.099658374	0.090537333	0.104172587
10	0.088939	0.091395061	0.085604287	0.103429566
11	0.079068	0.080919129	0.078533135	0.077755421
12	0.082873	0.082453555	0.080786336	0.096564784
13	0.077543	0.073169538	0.078681492	0.080117418
14	0.078979	0.079158442	0.079952681	0.075971995
15	0.075789	0.069181044	0.076353545	0.078643479
16	0.07816	0.07381825	0.077156678	0.085302215
17	0.074432	0.078080325	0.073420854	0.077996719
18	0.075105	0.060115476	0.076235365	0.0793462
19	0.068891	0.058098888	0.071442668	0.066242187
20	0.077037	0.075755789	0.076742585	0.078761022
21	0.072191	0.062377522	0.073043635	0.07489875
22	0.071777	0.058718081	0.07349671	0.07079458
23	0.067383	0.051121036	0.069873616	0.065896247
24	0.070859	0.044764056	0.072431126	0.075111916
25	0.064422	0.040184962	0.06429332	0.070223253
26	0.058668	0.031646887	0.062714097	0.058963487

図3 社会保険負担率、所得階級別、世帯種別(1996)




表2-1

年階層内 社会保険と税による再分配効果 (平成2年) (e=0)

年齢階層	n	当初ジニ係数	社会保険と税による再分配効果									
			再分配後ジニ	税による再分配後ジニ	社会保険料による再分配後ジニ	short-term 再分配後ジニ	long-term 再分配後ジニ	社会保険料による再分配後ジニ	short-term 再分配後ジニ	long-term 再分配後ジニ	社会保険料による再分配後ジニ	short-term 再分配後ジニ
10代	33	0.51324	0.51360	0.51180	0.51372	0.513071	0.513809	0.51452	0.51307	0.51381	0.51307	0.51381
20-24歳	190	0.40841	0.40444	0.40131	0.405688	0.407096	0.406813	0.41131	0.41072	0.40902	0.41072	0.40902
25-29歳	323	0.24778	0.26812	0.24332	0.251895	0.249602	0.24976	0.26935	0.25985	0.25513	0.25985	0.25513
30-34歳	498	0.23626	0.24065	0.22720	0.24258	0.23833	0.239942	0.24747	0.23944	0.24304	0.23944	0.24304
35-39歳	658	0.25793	0.30296	0.29144	0.267489	0.26244	0.262493	0.26733	0.26108	0.26230	0.26108	0.26230
40-44歳	962	0.29335	0.29382	0.28265	0.30243	0.297762	0.297522	0.30120	0.29691	0.29608	0.29691	0.29608
45-49歳	920	0.31220	0.31426	0.30428	0.321905	0.316942	0.316625	0.31915	0.31590	0.31426	0.31590	0.31426
50-54歳	944	0.32094	0.31237	0.30764	0.329154	0.324856	0.324785	0.32310	0.32187	0.32149	0.32187	0.32149
55-59歳	849	0.37135	0.36685	0.35835	0.383663	0.376983	0.377416	0.37552	0.37211	0.37417	0.37211	0.37417
60-64歳	223	0.50037	0.45855	0.47379	0.511789	0.505953	0.505734	0.48595	0.48978	0.49658	0.48978	0.49658
65歳以上	30	0.58176	0.51957	0.54550	0.587291	0.586654	0.582325	0.55697	0.57865	0.55937	0.57865	0.55937

当初所得と再分配所得は、厚生省「再分配調査」の定義によるもの

表2-2

年階層内 社会保険と税による再分配効果 (平成5年)

年齢階層	n	当初ジニ係数	社会保険と税による再分配効果									
			再分配後ジニ	税による再分配後ジニ	社会保険料による再分配後ジニ	short-term 再分配後ジニ	long-term 再分配後ジニ	社会保険料による再分配後ジニ	short-term 再分配後ジニ	long-term 再分配後ジニ	社会保険料による再分配後ジニ	short-term 再分配後ジニ
10代	58	0.3948682	0.3788631	0.3854709	0.388803	0.392123	0.391231	0.387691	0.391376	0.391231	0.391376	0.391231
20-24	272	0.309323	0.3061923	0.2962427	0.302089	0.307089	0.30431	0.317742	0.319223	0.306638	0.319223	0.306638
25-29	349	0.2430534	0.2512844	0.2373841	0.246433	0.244705	0.244439	0.254275	0.249512	0.246368	0.249512	0.246368
30-34	455	0.2587645	0.2528978	0.2461655	0.263869	0.260794	0.261524	0.263714	0.261365	0.260543	0.261365	0.260543
35-39	573	0.2755328	0.2723376	0.261832	0.282873	0.279195	0.27881	0.283803	0.28568	0.272047	0.28568	0.272047
40-44	904	0.2829631	0.2729402	0.2658554	0.290441	0.286663	0.286375	0.28697	0.28817	0.280036	0.28817	0.280036
45-49	987	0.31527	0.2996621	0.294724	0.324382	0.319425	0.319819	0.317865	0.314286	0.317591	0.314286	0.317591
50-54	904	0.3504998	0.3291774	0.3290643	0.359986	0.355126	0.354924	0.349712	0.34842	0.350809	0.34842	0.350809
55-59	349	0.4476927	0.3411139	0.3448254	0.369102	0.364652	0.364436	0.355105	0.356175	0.357573	0.356175	0.357573
60-64	349	0.4476927	0.3888674	0.4002117	0.457766	0.452596	0.452415	0.433621	0.443429	0.435941	0.443429	0.435941
65<	40	0.5308132	0.4594409	0.5097733	0.537738	0.535977	0.53244	0.472624	0.509026	0.488098	0.509026	0.488098

表2-3

年齢階層内 社会保障と税による再分配効果

(E=0)

年齢階層	n	inc2	当初ジニ係数	case13		case14		case23		Case21		case202		case18		Case19		case20	
				再分配後ジニ	税による再分配後ジニ	社会保険料による再分配後ジニ	短期保険料による再分配後ジニ	社会保険料による再分配後ジニ	短期保険料による再分配後ジニ	長期保険料による再分配後ジニ	社会保険料による再分配後ジニ	短期社会保険料による再分配後ジニ	長期社会保険料による再分配後ジニ	短期社会保険料による再分配後ジニ	長期社会保険料による再分配後ジニ	短期社会保険料による再分配後ジニ	長期社会保険料による再分配後ジニ		
10代	17	0.286027092	0.251756536	0.270686438	0.268027	0.274382	0.279436	0.26741119	0.27433726	0.2794359	0.26741119	0.27433726	0.2794359	0.26741119	0.27433726	0.2794359	0.26741119	0.27433726	0.2794359
20-24歳	160	0.324428028	0.354383027	0.318083614	0.327923	0.324992	0.326914	0.35690966	0.35438636	0.3268221	0.35690966	0.35438636	0.3268221	0.35690966	0.35438636	0.3268221	0.35690966	0.35438636	0.3268221
25-29歳	341	0.249183742	0.253546179	0.247181645	0.255107	0.250934	0.252748	0.25524726	0.25175565	0.2517307	0.25524726	0.25175565	0.2517307	0.25524726	0.25175565	0.2517307	0.25524726	0.25175565	0.2517307
30-34歳	463	0.21341415	0.220374947	0.212039568	0.218237	0.215855	0.215123	0.22062752	0.21669329	0.2167986	0.22062752	0.21669329	0.2167986	0.22062752	0.21669329	0.2167986	0.22062752	0.21669329	0.2167986
35-39歳	518	0.270081019	0.260583267	0.253694609	0.260678	0.274486	0.27562	0.27509267	0.26911663	0.2753336	0.27509267	0.26911663	0.2753336	0.27509267	0.26911663	0.2753336	0.27509267	0.26911663	0.2753336
40-44歳	684	0.287575772	0.273130409	0.275877185	0.294606	0.291081	0.290535	0.28297473	0.28460953	0.2824298	0.28297473	0.28460953	0.2824298	0.28297473	0.28460953	0.2824298	0.28297473	0.28460953	0.2824298
45-49歳	1034	0.303409045	0.303108966	0.291205216	0.312681	0.307819	0.307664	0.31122044	0.30828102	0.3030958	0.31122044	0.30828102	0.3030958	0.31122044	0.30828102	0.3030958	0.31122044	0.30828102	0.3030958
50-54歳	839	0.327025067	0.324940715	0.316012752	0.335858	0.330581	0.331776	0.33326104	0.32965454	0.3290459	0.33326104	0.32965454	0.3290459	0.33326104	0.32965454	0.3290459	0.33326104	0.32965454	0.3290459
55-59歳	826	0.360529217	0.352633564	0.351097285	0.370786	0.364906	0.365808	0.35968106	0.35878328	0.3587467	0.35968106	0.35878328	0.3587467	0.35968106	0.35878328	0.3587467	0.35968106	0.35878328	0.3587467
60-64歳	319	0.445862047	0.420232039	0.42917802	0.454929	0.450652	0.449715	0.43517402	0.43985516	0.4392845	0.43517402	0.43985516	0.4392845	0.43517402	0.43985516	0.4392845	0.43517402	0.43985516	0.4392845
65歳以上	41	0.504034303	0.433865568	0.481733663	0.509999	0.508419	0.505065	0.46184161	0.4805034	0.4844315	0.46184161	0.4805034	0.4844315	0.46184161	0.4805034	0.4844315	0.46184161	0.4805034	0.4844315

表3-1 年齢階層内 社会保障と税による再分配効果 (平成2年) (e=0.5)

年齢階層	n	当初ジニ係数	再分配後ジニ係数	税による再分配後ジニ	社会保障による再分配後ジニ	短期社会保障による再分配後ジニ	長期社会保障による再分配後ジニ
10代	33	0.513237	0.513599	0.511795	0.514519	0.513071	0.513809
20-24	190	0.395359	0.386496	0.387387	0.394344	0.39547	0.394214
25-29	323	0.236709	0.246685	0.231117	0.249896	0.241196	0.242813
30-34	498	0.250199	0.245522	0.239518	0.254834	0.248453	0.255011
35-39	658	0.262012	0.291301	0.288249	0.26371	0.262699	0.260992
40-44	962	0.292201	0.284259	0.281201	0.292934	0.293141	0.290341
45-49	920	0.307124	0.305328	0.298347	0.311381	0.309969	0.307044
50-54	944	0.313344	0.298815	0.297986	0.312103	0.312557	0.312174
55-59	849	0.353036	0.342904	0.338513	0.353821	0.352115	0.354206
60-64	223	0.467364	0.423395	0.438041	0.453236	0.456992	0.463616
65<	30	0.531769	0.46007	0.490434	0.499818	0.525476	0.506988

表3-2 年齢階層内 社会保障と税による再分配効果 (平成5年) (e=0.5)

年齢階層	n	当初ジニ係数	再分配後ジニ係数	税による再分配後ジニ	社会保障による再分配後ジニ	短期社会保障による再分配後ジニ	長期社会保障による再分配後ジニ
10代	58	0.394851	0.378172	0.385199	0.387307	0.39121	0.391014
20-24	272	0.28497	0.2739	0.27048	0.287273	0.288291	0.282925
25-29	349	0.239652	0.236585	0.23079	0.243451	0.241849	0.239205
30-34	455	0.270222	0.25386	0.256407	0.267208	0.267081	0.269895
35-39	573	0.299434	0.281718	0.284147	0.296299	0.301448	0.292983
40-44	904	0.286925	0.267163	0.268358	0.283887	0.288717	0.28032
45-49	987	0.303866	0.283165	0.28327	0.302215	0.30119	0.303658
50-54	904	0.331529	0.306035	0.309089	0.327991	0.328664	0.329915
55-59	349	0.349609	0.322296	0.329449	0.34123	0.343371	0.345593
60-64	349	0.430268	0.364092	0.375989	0.414754	0.426617	0.415789
65<	40	0.513732	0.447856	0.497143	0.456811	0.492067	0.472534

表3-3 年齢階層内 社会保障と税による再分配効果 (平成8年) (e=0.5)

年齢階層	n	当初ジニ係数	再分配後ジニ係数	税による再分配後ジニ	社会保障による再分配後ジニ	短期社会保障による再分配後ジニ	長期社会保障による再分配後ジニ
10代	17	0.23882	0.202196	0.223924	0.217126	0.224658	0.231807
20-24歳	160	0.294338	0.316789	0.28681	0.320911	0.317751	0.297795
25-29歳	341	0.244705	0.241372	0.240603	0.245911	0.242879	0.246944
30-34歳	463	0.232947	0.228823	0.23046	0.231016	0.231137	0.232554
35-39歳	518	0.27345	0.254929	0.25677	0.271395	0.269479	0.274771
40-44歳	684	0.290596	0.265028	0.277158	0.278292	0.284753	0.280891
45-49歳	1034	0.298948	0.286347	0.286313	0.29629	0.297241	0.294603
50-54歳	839	0.302679	0.299218	0.290461	0.308643	0.306151	0.303321
55-59歳	826	0.342383	0.327234	0.330377	0.337207	0.337294	0.339924
60-64歳	319	0.428872	0.400662	0.411819	0.416328	0.421335	0.421617
65歳以上	41	0.475011	0.406537	0.453301	0.432659	0.451302	0.454765

表4-1 年齢階層内 社会保障と税による再分配効果

年齢階層	n	当初シニ係数	再分配後シニ		税による再分配後シニ		社会保障による再分配後シニ		case21 短期保険料による再分配後シニ		case22 長期保険料による再分配後シニ		社会保障による再分配後シニ		短期社会保険による再分配後シニ		長期社会保険による再分配後シニ	
			再分配後シニ	税による再分配後シニ	社会保障による再分配後シニ	税による再分配後シニ	社会保障による再分配後シニ	短期保険料による再分配後シニ	長期保険料による再分配後シニ	社会保障による再分配後シニ	短期社会保険による再分配後シニ	長期社会保険による再分配後シニ						
10代	33	0.513237	0.513599	0.511795	0.51372	0.513071	0.513809	0.514519	0.513071	0.513809	0.513071	0.513071	0.513071	0.513071	0.513071	0.513071	0.513071	0.513071
20-24歳	190	0.393338	0.384477	0.385352	0.391605	0.392434	0.392243	0.392384	0.393541	0.393541	0.393541	0.393541	0.393541	0.393541	0.393541	0.393541	0.393541	0.393541
25-29歳	323	0.223023	0.23403	0.217157	0.226777	0.224331	0.225125	0.237309	0.227915	0.227915	0.227915	0.227915	0.227915	0.227915	0.227915	0.227915	0.227915	0.227915
30-34歳	498	0.234431	0.232545	0.224246	0.240601	0.236534	0.237892	0.241026	0.234013	0.234013	0.234013	0.234013	0.234013	0.234013	0.234013	0.234013	0.234013	0.234013
35-39歳	658	0.255546	0.287202	0.283995	0.26544	0.260376	0.260154	0.257433	0.256936	0.256936	0.256936	0.256936	0.256936	0.256936	0.256936	0.256936	0.256936	0.256936
40-44歳	962	0.290312	0.281951	0.279078	0.299009	0.29479	0.294047	0.290774	0.291267	0.291267	0.291267	0.291267	0.291267	0.291267	0.291267	0.291267	0.291267	0.291267
45-49歳	920	0.306917	0.303924	0.298233	0.316918	0.311827	0.311445	0.310135	0.30949	0.30949	0.30949	0.30949	0.30949	0.30949	0.30949	0.30949	0.30949	0.30949
50-54歳	944	0.314567	0.30135	0.299842	0.323285	0.318855	0.318521	0.313968	0.313995	0.313995	0.313995	0.313995	0.313995	0.313995	0.313995	0.313995	0.313995	0.313995
55-59歳	849	0.359566	0.349652	0.345261	0.372233	0.365438	0.365724	0.360399	0.358525	0.358525	0.358525	0.358525	0.358525	0.358525	0.358525	0.358525	0.358525	0.358525
60-64歳	223	0.475357	0.432045	0.447276	0.487471	0.481528	0.480815	0.460734	0.464636	0.464636	0.464636	0.464636	0.464636	0.464636	0.464636	0.464636	0.464636	0.464636
65歳以上	30	0.544518	0.475295	0.504037	0.55105	0.550404	0.545021	0.514958	0.539925	0.539925	0.539925	0.539925	0.539925	0.539925	0.539925	0.539925	0.539925	0.539925

(平成2年)

(e=八木・橋本)

表4-2 年齢階層内 社会保障と税による再分配効果

年齢階層	n	当初シニ係数	再分配後シニ		税による再分配後シニ		社会保障による再分配後シニ		case21 短期保険料による再分配後シニ		case22 長期保険料による再分配後シニ		社会保障による再分配後シニ		短期社会保険による再分配後シニ		長期社会保険による再分配後シニ	
			再分配後シニ	税による再分配後シニ	社会保障による再分配後シニ	税による再分配後シニ	社会保障による再分配後シニ	短期保険料による再分配後シニ	長期保険料による再分配後シニ	社会保障による再分配後シニ	短期社会保険による再分配後シニ	長期社会保険による再分配後シニ						
10代	58	0.395366	0.378577	0.385657	0.388849	0.392447	0.391462	0.387755	0.39173	0.391462	0.391462	0.391462	0.391462	0.391462	0.391462	0.391462	0.391462	0.391462
20-24歳	272	0.282735	0.272062	0.268128	0.275189	0.280345	0.27752	0.285511	0.286476	0.286476	0.286476	0.286476	0.286476	0.286476	0.286476	0.286476	0.286476	0.286476
25-29歳	349	0.228958	0.226661	0.219729	0.231323	0.230241	0.229659	0.233717	0.231328	0.231328	0.231328	0.231328	0.231328	0.231328	0.231328	0.231328	0.231328	0.231328
30-34歳	455	0.257699	0.242613	0.243178	0.262306	0.25965	0.260065	0.256342	0.255621	0.255621	0.255621	0.255621	0.255621	0.255621	0.255621	0.255621	0.255621	0.255621
35-39歳	573	0.288426	0.27113	0.273028	0.295332	0.292032	0.291349	0.285745	0.290873	0.290873	0.290873	0.290873	0.290873	0.290873	0.290873	0.290873	0.290873	0.290873
40-44歳	904	0.284946	0.264282	0.266306	0.29232	0.288666	0.288232	0.28129	0.286684	0.286684	0.286684	0.286684	0.286684	0.286684	0.286684	0.286684	0.286684	0.286684
45-49歳	987	0.305917	0.283425	0.285043	0.315224	0.310237	0.310479	0.303059	0.302374	0.302374	0.302374	0.302374	0.302374	0.302374	0.302374	0.302374	0.302374	0.302374
50-54歳	904	0.335063	0.309988	0.312514	0.344846	0.339917	0.339542	0.332015	0.332387	0.332387	0.332387	0.332387	0.332387	0.332387	0.332387	0.332387	0.332387	0.332387
55-59歳	349	0.352655	0.327474	0.333624	0.362234	0.35735	0.357095	0.345219	0.347057	0.347057	0.347057	0.347057	0.347057	0.347057	0.347057	0.347057	0.347057	0.347057
60-64歳	349	0.435223	0.371421	0.382646	0.446179	0.440558	0.440379	0.420421	0.431898	0.431898	0.431898	0.431898	0.431898	0.431898	0.431898	0.431898	0.431898	0.431898
65歳以上	40	0.52099	0.453786	0.503204	0.528836	0.526824	0.522837	0.463906	0.498712	0.498712	0.498712	0.498712	0.498712	0.498712	0.498712	0.498712	0.498712	0.498712

(平成5年)

(e=八木・橋本)

表4-3 年齢階層内 社会保障と税による再分配効果

年齢階層	n	(平成8年)										(e=八木・橋本)	
		inc2	case13	case14	case23	case21	case22	case18	Case19	case20	長期社会保 障による再 分配後ジニ	短期社会保 障による再 分配後ジニ	長期社会保 障による再 分配後ジニ
10代	17	0.240468	0.204217	0.225827	0.223281	0.229927	0.23344	0.219181	0.226688	0.23344	0.23344	0.23344	0.23344
20-24歳	160	0.292243	0.312585	0.284607	0.296664	0.293075	0.2953	0.316977	0.313911	0.295579	0.295579	0.295579	0.295579
25-29歳	341	0.236891	0.233649	0.23269	0.243127	0.238777	0.240627	0.238197	0.235114	0.239113	0.239113	0.239113	0.239113
30-34歳	463	0.215359	0.212672	0.212693	0.220436	0.217988	0.217162	0.214937	0.214891	0.215054	0.215054	0.215054	0.215054
35-39歳	518	0.266236	0.248423	0.249273	0.277114	0.270828	0.271824	0.26497	0.263146	0.267468	0.267468	0.267468	0.267468
40-44歳	684	0.289663	0.261985	0.27605	0.296878	0.293489	0.292487	0.27574	0.283744	0.278771	0.278771	0.278771	0.278771
45-49歳	1034	0.298467	0.28574	0.285981	0.308296	0.303223	0.302897	0.295607	0.296558	0.294236	0.294236	0.294236	0.294236
50-54歳	839	0.307742	0.304192	0.29592	0.317395	0.311796	0.312772	0.313343	0.310649	0.308674	0.308674	0.308674	0.308674
55-59歳	826	0.348977	0.336573	0.337894	0.360122	0.353369	0.35476	0.345486	0.345057	0.347038	0.347038	0.347038	0.347038
60-64歳	319	0.431162	0.403127	0.414288	0.441199	0.436188	0.435695	0.418662	0.423229	0.424457	0.424457	0.424457	0.424457
65歳以上	41	0.473665	0.402562	0.451159	0.481809	0.478843	0.475921	0.43043	0.449184	0.453718	0.453718	0.453718	0.453718

表5-1 年齢階層内 社会保障の累進性係数 (平成2年)

年齢階層 n	当初ジニ係数	社会保障全体			短期社会保障のみ			長期社会保障のみ		
		(G)at e=0	(R)at e=0	(C) (P)	(R)at e=0	(C) (P)	(R)at e=0	(C) (P)		
<20 33	0.51324	-0.2%	0.497704	-0.01554	0.0%	0.527273	0.01403	-0.1%	0.473064	-0.04018
20-24 190	0.40841	-0.7%	0.459943	0.05153	-0.6%	0.462625	0.05421	-0.1%	0.457974	0.04956
25-29 323	0.24778	-8.7%	0.201972	-0.04581	-4.9%	0.191547	-0.05623	-3.0%	0.208945	-0.03884
30-34 498	0.23626	-4.7%	0.17069	-0.06557	-1.3%	0.182484	-0.05378	-2.9%	0.16197	-0.07429
35-9 658	0.25793	-3.6%	0.138511	-0.11942	-1.2%	0.120845	-0.13709	-1.7%	0.152138	-0.10579
40-4 962	0.29335	-2.7%	0.181822	-0.11153	-1.2%	0.160094	-0.13326	-0.9%	0.198731	-0.09462
45-9 920	0.31220	-2.2%	0.18305	-0.12915	-1.2%	0.154975	-0.15723	-0.7%	0.20435	-0.10785
50-4 944	0.32094	-0.7%	0.216802	-0.10414	-0.3%	0.197954	-0.12299	-0.2%	0.23124	-0.08970
55-9 849	0.37135	-1.1%	0.21375	-0.15760	-0.2%	0.197976	-0.17337	-0.8%	0.226158	-0.14519
60-4 223	0.50037	2.9%	0.322685	-0.17768	2.1%	0.309531	-0.19084	0.8%	0.334602	-0.16577
>65 30	0.58176	4.3%	0.444576	-0.13718	0.5%	0.407136	-0.17462	3.8%	0.532972	-0.04879

表5-2 年齢階層内 社会保障の累進性係数 (平成5年)

年齢階層 n	当初ジニ係数	社会保障全体			短期社会保障のみ			長期社会保障のみ		
		(G)at e=0	(R)at e=0	(C) (P)	(R)at e=0	(C) (P)	(R)at e=0	(C) (P)		
10代 58	0.3948682	1.8%	0.629737	0.234869	0.9%	0.643534	0.248666	0.9%	0.62069	0.225821
20-24 272	0.3093230	-2.7%	0.429809	0.120486	-3.2%	0.406279	0.096956	0.9%	0.444685	0.135362
25-29 349	0.2430534	-4.6%	0.210378	-0.03268	-2.7%	0.193079	-0.04997	-1.4%	0.221159	-0.02189
30-34 455	0.2587645	-1.9%	0.20345	-0.05531	-1.0%	0.19535	-0.06341	-0.7%	0.208415	-0.05035
35-39 573	0.2755328	-3.0%	0.194662	-0.08087	-3.7%	0.166292	-0.10924	1.3%	0.21342	-0.06211
40-44 904	0.2829631	-1.4%	0.196491	-0.08647	-1.8%	0.170284	-0.11268	1.0%	0.214336	-0.06863
45-49 987	0.3152700	-0.8%	0.203069	-0.1122	0.3%	0.185008	-0.13026	-0.7%	0.21594	-0.09933
50-54 904	0.3504998	0.2%	0.2361	-0.1144	0.6%	0.20715	-0.14335	-0.1%	0.256494	-0.09401
55-59 349	0.4476927	20.7%	0.259636	-0.18806	20.4%	0.232297	-0.2154	20.1%	0.278512	-0.16918
60-64 349	0.4476927	3.1%	0.309572	-0.13812	1.0%	0.28841	-0.15928	2.6%	0.326732	-0.12096
65< 40	0.5308132	11.0%	0.395163	-0.13565	4.1%	0.384223	-0.14659	8.0%	0.423333	-0.10748

表5-3 年齢階層内 社会保障の累進性係数 (平成8年)

年齢階層 n	当初ジニ係数	社会保障全体			短期社会保障のみ			長期社会保障のみ		
		(G)at e=0	(R)at e=0	(C) (P)	(R)at e=0	(C) (P)	(R)at e=0	(C) (P)		
10代 17	0.2860271	6.5%	0.557159	0.271132	4.1%	0.680026	0.393999	2.3%	0.464754	0.178727
20-24j 160	0.3244280	-10.0%	0.299716	-0.02471	-9.2%	0.322131	-0.0023	-0.7%	0.285607	-0.03882
25-29j 341	0.2491837	-2.4%	0.191121	-0.05806	-1.0%	0.193326	-0.05586	-1.0%	0.189905	-0.05928
30-34j 463	0.2134141	-3.4%	0.170097	-0.04332	-1.5%	0.132882	-0.08053	-1.6%	0.190439	-0.02298
35-39j 518	0.2700810	-1.9%	0.150483	-0.1196	0.4%	0.123571	-0.14651	-1.9%	0.166267	-0.10381
40-44j 684	0.2875758	1.6%	0.215572	-0.072	1.0%	0.179022	-0.10855	1.8%	0.23757	-0.05001
45-49j 1034	0.3034090	-2.6%	0.199926	-0.10348	-1.6%	0.164508	-0.1389	0.1%	0.222442	-0.08097
50-54j 839	0.3270251	-1.9%	0.225307	-0.10172	-0.8%	0.21026	-0.11677	-0.6%	0.234598	-0.09243
55-59j 826	0.3605292	0.2%	0.244361	-0.11617	0.5%	0.220543	-0.13999	0.5%	0.259249	-0.10128
60-64j 319	0.4458620	2.4%	0.331231	-0.11463	1.3%	0.297455	-0.14841	1.5%	0.357358	-0.0885
65歳以上 41	0.5040343	8.4%	0.439791	-0.06424	4.7%	0.389382	-0.11465	3.9%	0.486635	-0.0174

表6 全世帯、現役世帯、および世帯類型別、社会保険料前後のジニ係数と再分配係数 (e=0)

平成2年予一々	当初ジニ係数		税による再分配		社会保険料		短期社会保険		長期社会保険			
	n	再分配係数	再分配係数	配後ジニ	再分配係数	後ジニ	再分配係数	後ジニ	再分配係数	後ジニ		
全世帯	8856	0.44316	0.38060	14.1%	0.43883	1.0%	0.453629	-2.4%	0.4493071	-1.4%	0.4469774	-0.9%
現役世帯	5630	0.35001	0.34878	0.4%	0.34087	2.6%	0.358981	-2.6%	0.3541059	-1.2%	0.3544064	-1.3%
国保世帯	1292	0.42930	0.45276	-5.5%	0.44181	-2.9%	0.44579	-3.8%	0.4369763	-1.8%	0.4372555	-1.9%
被用者世帯	3455	0.31781	0.30971	2.5%	0.30200	5.0%	0.32411	-2.0%	0.3200783	-0.7%	0.3214685	-1.2%
国保・被用者世帯	811	0.31152	0.31668	-1.7%	0.30880	0.9%	0.322562	-3.5%	0.3167916	-1.7%	0.3166665	-1.7%

平成5年予一々	当初ジニ係数		税による再分配		社会保険料		短期社会保険		長期社会保険			
	n	再分配係数	再分配係数	配後ジニ	再分配係数	後ジニ	再分配係数	後ジニ	再分配係数	後ジニ		
全世帯	8814	0.4489266	0.37208222	17.1%	0.43130206	3.9%	0.457734	-2.0%	0.4543397	-1.2%	0.4519031	-0.7%
現役世帯	5793	0.3586426	0.3408028	5.0%	0.33786439	5.8%	0.365855	-2.0%	0.3620235	-0.9%	0.362112	-1.0%
国保世帯	1208	0.4443353	0.42833604	3.6%	0.42615711	4.1%	0.457686	-3.0%	0.4515697	-1.6%	0.4497804	-1.2%
被用者世帯	3668	0.3242416	0.30757891	5.1%	0.30314476	6.5%	0.33013	-1.8%	0.3259636	-0.5%	0.3281015	-1.2%
国保・被用者世帯	874	0.324856	0.30369777	6.5%	0.29906202	7.9%	0.333811	-2.8%	0.3290494	-1.3%	0.3291221	-1.3%

平成8年予一々	当初ジニ係数		税による再分配		社会保険料		短期社会保険		長期社会保険			
	n	再分配係数	再分配係数	配後ジニ	再分配係数	後ジニ	再分配係数	後ジニ	再分配係数	後ジニ		
全世帯	8152	0.4502335	0.3708396	17.6%	0.44602358	0.9%	0.461459	-2.5%	0.4569753	-1.5%	0.4540982	-0.9%
現役世帯	5242	0.3428806	0.3375311	1.6%	0.33009608	3.7%	0.351081	-2.4%	0.3463835	-1.0%	0.3470493	-1.2%
国保世帯	1125	0.4289717	0.41914868	2.3%	0.41572604	3.1%	0.446002	-4.0%	0.436417	-1.7%	0.4376615	-2.0%
被用者世帯	3334	0.3069485	0.30240736	1.5%	0.29311579	4.5%	0.31273	-1.9%	0.3086919	-0.6%	0.3105405	-1.2%
国保・被用者世帯	737	0.3085051	0.30832204	0.1%	0.29897295	3.1%	0.31805	-3.1%	0.3130617	-1.5%	0.3128237	-1.4%

表7 現役世帯、および世帯類型別、社会保険料前後のジニ係数と再分配係数
(e=八木・橋本による等価所得比率)

1990年予一々	n	当初ジニ係数		税による再分配		社会保険料		短期社会保険		長期社会保険	
		再分配後ジニ	再分配係数	配後ジニ	再分配係数	後ジニ	再分配係数	後ジニ	再分配係数	後ジニ	再分配係数
全世帯	8856	0.4294302	0.35084351	18.3%	0.42394827	1.3%	0.4406542	-2.6%	0.43624877	-1.6%	0.4333023
現役世帯	5630	0.3325197	0.32551515	2.1%	0.32171791	3.2%	0.3416902	-2.8%	0.33683703	-1.3%	0.3368738
国保世帯	1292	0.4051665	0.42142781	-4.0%	0.41185457	-1.7%	0.4229325	-4.4%	0.41351714	-2.1%	0.4137015
被用者世帯	3455	0.2986183	0.28630813	4.1%	0.28200991	5.6%	0.3048109	-2.1%	0.30087658	-0.8%	0.302154
国保・被用者世帯	811	0.3133087	0.30999733	1.1%	0.30987004	1.1%	0.3246404	-3.6%	0.31886924	-1.8%	0.3184309
1993年予一々	n	当初ジニ係数		税による再分配		社会保険料		短期社会保険		長期社会保険	
		再分配後ジニ	再分配係数	配後ジニ	再分配係数	後ジニ	再分配係数	後ジニ	再分配係数	後ジニ	再分配係数
全世帯	8814	0.4318844	0.33858046	21.6%	0.41183161	4.6%	0.4412956	-2.2%	0.4378702	-1.4%	0.4348657
現役世帯	5793	0.3371591	0.31285891	7.2%	0.31431301	6.8%	0.3445498	-2.2%	0.34072823	-1.1%	0.3406016
国保世帯	1208	0.4157735	0.39484965	5.0%	0.39593357	4.8%	0.4297543	-3.4%	0.42347511	-1.9%	0.4213516
被用者世帯	3668	0.3016879	0.2791824	7.5%	0.27834879	7.7%	0.30755	-1.9%	0.30342741	-0.6%	0.3054906
国保・被用者世帯	874	0.3239439	0.2946684	9.0%	0.29611803	8.6%	0.3333141	-2.9%	0.3282767	-1.3%	0.3284772
1996年予一々	n	当初ジニ係数		税による再分配		社会保険料		短期社会保険		長期社会保険	
		再分配後ジニ	再分配係数	配後ジニ	再分配係数	後ジニ	再分配係数	後ジニ	再分配係数	後ジニ	再分配係数
全世帯	8152	0.4354314	0.33898266	22.2%	0.43140522	0.9%	0.447952	-2.9%	0.44311534	-1.8%	0.439588
現役世帯	5242	0.3236725	0.3118066	3.7%	0.3100898	4.2%	0.3325086	-2.7%	0.32752941	-1.2%	0.3280775
国保世帯	1125	0.4089305	0.39385594	3.7%	0.39590555	3.2%	0.4274969	-4.5%	0.41718236	-2.0%	0.4182957
被用者世帯	3334	0.2849495	0.27520092	3.4%	0.27003361	5.2%	0.2911242	-2.2%	0.28688706	-0.7%	0.2886931
国保・被用者世帯	737	0.3082424	0.29808543	3.3%	0.29855746	3.1%	0.3182072	-3.2%	0.3130454	-1.6%	0.3127299